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FOREWORD
The Dutch government has a duty to report to Parliament every four years on the progress
that it has made with regard to the implementation of the United Nations Convention on
the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW or the Women’s
Convention).1 Within this framework in recent years the Department for the Co-ordination
of Emancipation Policy (DCE) of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment has
commissioned a number of in-depth studies on the content and scope of this Convention.2
These studies are part of the government’s ‘National Report about the Implementation
of the CEDAW-Convention to Parliament’ (further on: National Reports).3 They also play
a role in the Country Reports that the Dutch government is required to submit to the CEDAW
Committee based on Article 18 of the Convention.4 The present study was commissioned
as part of this series of studies.
The present study contains an analysis of the meaning and scope of Article 5a CEDAW
together with a method that can be used to implement its provision. The study was written
by Dr. Rikki Holtmaat based on research conducted for the fifth in-depth study into the
scope and meaning of the CEDAW-Convention in the Netherlands.5
1 This obligation is based on Article 3 of the Kingdom Act of 3 July 1991 for the Ratification of the CEDAW-
Convention (New York, 18 December 1979), Official Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 1991, 355.
2 The first four studies were: Hes & Van Vleuten 1996, Holtrust et al. 1996, Monster et al. 1998 and Boerefijn
et al. 2000.
3 So far there have been two National Reports: Groenman Committee 1997 and Marchand 2003 together
with ACVZ 2002. (The Groenman Committee was named after its chairperson, Louise Groenman, a former
Member of Parliament.)
4 The Netherlands have so far issued three Country Reports; The initial report of 1992 and a second and third
report in 1999 and 2000. The fourth report will be send to New York in 2004.
5 This research, commissioned by the DCE, was presided by Professor Dr. Janneke Plantenga of Utrecht
School of Economics. Its central subject was the meaning of article 5a CEDAW for policy-making in the
field of paid labour, care and income. The results of this research will be published by the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment. See Plantenga, Holtmaat & Koopmans 2004.
iv Foreword
The overall aim of the Dutch government in publishing this report is to contribute to the
correct implementation of CEDAW in the 176 States that have ratified this Convention as
of May 2004. The report sets out to contribute to disseminating awareness about CEDAW.
Within this context, the publication also has some more specific objectives.
The Convention contains the general obligation on States to eliminate discrimination against
women. It also makes a specific stipulation that State parties should combat all negative
or damaging stereotypes of women and men. In the Netherlands there is general acceptance
of the view that Article 5a of CEDAW offers an additional legal tool to combat discrimination
against women, when compared with national Dutch and European Community law that
prohibits discrimination on the ground of sex. This study (which will also be published
in the Dutch language) aims to stimulate international legal discussion about this important
issue.6 To what extent can the impact of Dutch and European law in the field of equal
treatment be made more effective by taking into account this provision of CEDAW?
The second aim of the report is to provide academic researchers working in the field of
gender stereotypes in law and in public policy with a research method that can be used
to reveal instances of structural gender discrimination. Such a method can also serve as
one of the tools for achieving the general objective of public policy – that of mainstreaming
gender across the policy process.
Because the Netherlands has invested a good deal of research into the meaning and scope
of this important Human Rights Convention, the government has decided to publish the
study in both Dutch and English. The English edition also contains a translation of some
parts of the first National Report. The Appendix provides a general introduction to the
aims, scope and significance of the Women’s Convention.
The study was initially completed in March 2002, and updated to April 2004 prior to
publication.
6 The Dutch edition will be presented to Parliament as part of the National Reporting Procedure.
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SUMMARY
Towards different law and public policy: The significance of Article 5a
CEDAW for the elimination of structural gender discrimination
Under Article 3 of the Act of 3 July 1991, which ratified the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, also referred to as the Women’s
Convention) in the Netherlands, the Dutch government is obliged to conduct regular studies
on the progress of implementation. Several such reports and studies have been published
in recent years on the significance of the Convention for the Dutch legal order, and the
current study is part of this series. It contains an in-depth study of the content and meaning
of Article 5a CEDAW together with a method that can be used when implementing this
provision.
Article 5a of CEDAW provides that States that are party to this Convention, “shall take
all appropriate measures” to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men
and women, with a view to achieving “the elimination of prejudices and customary
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority
of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women”.
In the Netherlands there is a widely-accepted view that the fact that the Women’s Conven-
tion contains such a provision endows it with an additional significance and value over
and above existing Dutch and European Community sex discrimination law. What is the
basis for this assumption? And in what way does the Convention add something to these
other legal instruments? What must States that are party to this Convention do to in order
to implement this provision dutifully and in good faith?
According to the Committee that submitted the first National Report on the implementation
of the Convention in the Netherlands, within the overarching objective of eliminating all
forms of discrimination against women, the Women’s Convention has three sub-aims: the
achievement of full equality before the law and in public administration; improvement
of the position of women; and combating the dominant gender ideology.
The Committee assumed that Article 5a CEDAW provides a foundation for this third
objective. This assumption has also formed the starting point for the research that cul-
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minated in the present study. Does this interpretation of the provision indeed have a firm
basis in official legal documents and in academic literature about the Women’s Convention?
The conclusion of this research is that Article 5a CEDAW has a twofold meaning: it
not only obliges State parties to conduct an active policy to ban stereotyped images of
men and women, for instance in the media and in education, but also to scrutinise law
and policy for the presence of hidden gender stereotypes. The latter obligation is
summarised in the phrase that the provision contains the obligation to effectively eliminate
structural gender discrimination.
Article 5a CEDAW, and the implications that flow from it, does indeed entail a norm that
goes further than most existing legislation in the field of equal treatment between men
and women. Existing law sets out to protect individuals from discrimination; it does little
to offer any form of remedy against the structural causes of the persistent exclusion or
disadvantaging of women. Equal treatment legislation looks backward at instances of
discrimination that already have occurred. In contrast, the Convention expressly aims to
bring about structural change, and thereby prevent future discrimination. In Article 5a
CEDAW not only expresses the principle of equality, but also the principle of diversity or
freedom. That is: scope for individuals to make their own choices about what it means
to be a man or a woman without being confined to a particular traditional understanding
of masculinity or femininity by societal institutions or organisation. The significance of
Article 5a CEDAW can be summarised very briefly in the statement that it is an expression
of equality as transformation: it demands that different law and public policy be developed.
In this book gender is understood as the social, cultural and institutional construction of
what it means to be a man or a women, i.e. of masculinity and femininity. The concept
of structural gender discrimination refers to those forms of discrimination that are a
consequence of the fact that the structure or organisation of society is built on gender
stereotypes, hence ensuring that existing unequal power relations between the sexes are
sustained. It embraces the idea that through the use of stereotyped (often traditional and
implicit) ideas, symbols and structures a certain subordination and exclusion of women
and of femininity takes place. This approach exists alongside the legal concept of sex
discrimination that directly refers to a difference in treatment on the basis of biological
male and female sex.
The key prerequisite for combating structural gender discrimination is identifying and
revealing its existence. This is not an easy task, precisely because it involves challenging
self-evident ‘truths’ about the biological sex of males and females and about the relation-
ships between the sexes that are constitutive of prevailing social, cultural and institutional
arrangements.
This study sets out to develop a method for revealing structural gender discrimination based
on the literature on the construction of gender and the role gender plays in designing law
and public policy. For this purpose a number of methodological directions and starting
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points are described. Following this, the method is applied to the Wet Inburgering Nieuw-
komers (Law on the Integration of Newcomers) – a recent Act that requires immigrants
and asylum seekers who want to live in the Netherlands to follow training courses in order
to become acquainted with the norms and values of Dutch society. I consider the documents
that need to be studied and which questions need to be asked in order to reveal the possible
structural gender discrimination in this part of the law. What conclusions need to be drawn
from the outcome from such a study to inform the construction of different policy or law
is subsequently a matter for public officials and the legislature.
The method proposed here to reveal structural gender discrimination in law and public
policy forms an addition to the existing instrument of Gender Impact Assessments (GIA).
This instrument is mainly directed at estimating the impact of planned legislation and policy
on the social and economic position of women. The method elaborated here, combined
with GIA, can play an important role in the mainstreaming of gender issues across the policy
process.

PART I
STRUCTURE AND BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH

1INTRODUCTION TO PART I
1.1 The key issues for research
Article 5a of CEDAW provides that States that are party to this Convention, “shall take
all appropriate measures” to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men
and women, with a view to achieving “the elimination of prejudices and customary and
all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women”.
How should this provision be interpreted? For example, would compliance require govern-
ments to prohibit sexist commercials on TV? Should pornography be banned? Or should
all provisions in the social security system based on the notion of a ‘breadwinner’ (always
assumed to be male) be abolished? What are the ‘appropriate measures’ which would meet
the conditions set by the Convention?
The aim of this study is to clarify this provision, and in doing so hopefully contribute to
meeting the central aim of the Convention – the elimination of all forms of discrimination
against women.
1.2 The content and structure of this book
Part II of this study ‘Content and scope of Article 5a CEDAW’ tackles the issue of the
obligations on State parties arising from this provision, based on an analysis of authoritative
texts and the legal literature. This also embraces a discussion of the history of the drafting
of this Article, the interpretation of it by the CEDAW Committee, the opinion of the Dutch
government and the comments of legal experts. This part concludes with a proposition
about the twofold meaning of Article 5a CEDAW: that is, that this Article not only obliges
State parties to conduct an active policy to ban stereotyped images of men and women,
for instance in the media and in education, but also to critically scrutinise law and policy
with a view to uncovering the existence of hidden gender stereotypes. I term this latter
obligation, the obligation to eliminate structural gender discrimination.
4 Chapter 1 – Introduction to part I
The second central question to be dealt with in the study concerns the nature of the
measures that are necessary to eliminate structural gender discrimination. Part III ‘Towards
a method to reveal structural gender discrimination in legislation and public policy’ provides
an overview of a number of studies in which methods have been developed for ‘gender
sensitive’ approaches in law and public policy. Part III begins with an discussion of the
concepts of ‘gender’ and ‘structural gender discrimination’. This is followed by an overview
of studies undertaken in the Netherlands about the issue of gender stereotyped images of
men and women – that is, the construction of masculinity and femininity – and the role
that such images play in law and public policy.One of the instruments that have been
developed to track down stereotyped laws and policy measures is the Gender Impact
Assessment (GIA).
Based on this, the study presents a research model that can serve to reveal the gender
stereotyped images that lie at the basis of legislation or public policy. Used in addition
to GIA, this research model could serve as an instrument to improve the position of women
by mainstreaming gender equality in all aspects of the official policy process.1
The responsibility for incorporating the outcomes of the approach developed here into
the formation of new policy or law will therefore ultimately pass to public officials and
the legislature.
The significance of Article 5a CEDAW can be summarised in the statement that it is an
expression of equality as transformation.2 It requires the development of different law
and public policy that is free from gender stereotypes. That is, Article 5a not only expresses
the principle of equality, but also that of diversity or freedom. At its heart this means
enabling individuals to make a choice about what it means to be a man or a woman without
being confined to a pre-given or traditional understanding of masculinity or femininity
as embodied in culture and in social institutions or organisations.
1.3 The content of part I
The remainder of this introductory section deals with the legal and theoretical background
to the meaning and scope of Article 5a CEDAW.
In Chapter 2, Article 5a will be placed in the wider framework of the Convention.
According to the Dutch government and the CEDAW Committee it forms part of a series
1 Gender mainstreaming is official Dutch policy. See Min. SZW 2001 (letter of the DCE about Gender
mainstreaming.) Mainstreaming has become a central tool in both the UN and the EU context. On the UN,
see Jahan 1995; on the EU see, Beveridge & Nott 1996, Shaw 2001 and Pollack & Haffner Burton 2000.
In Chapter 15 of this book I will discuss how the method that is presented in this book relates to the
instrument of gender mainstreaming.
2 This term has been derived from the work of Sandra Fredman. See Fredman 2003, p. 115.
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of general provisions that underpin the threefold aim of the Convention. Article 5a CEDAW
supposedly underlies the third of these aims: combating the dominant gender ideology.
Chapter 3 discusses the most important assumption of the Groenman Committee and
the research team of the fifth in-depth study into the scope and meaning of the Conven-
tion.3 The Groenman Committee held that Article 5a CEDAW has a special meaning in
the sense that it (also) obliges State parties to eliminate so-called structural gender dis-
crimination. In that respect CEDAW offers an ‘added value’ compared to existing Dutch
and European Community legislation that prohibits sex discrimination.
Finally, in Chapter 4 I present a short introduction into the background of this assump-
tion: discontent about the assimilation to male norms and the stereotyping of women as
a consequence of existing equal treatment legislation in the Netherlands and in the European
Union. This research stems from a deeply-felt necessity to find a legal foundation for an
alternative approach to combat the discrimination of women – and specifically one which
enables the structural causes of this discrimination to be both revealed and eradicated.
3 Groenman Committee 1997 and Plantenga, Holtmaat & Koopmans 2004.

2THE PLACE OF ARTICLE 5A IN THE CEDAW CONVENTION
2.1 The nature of the Women’s Convention
The Women’s Convention is an international Human Rights document that – as of May
2004 – had been acceded to by 176 States. Compared with other international documents
that guarantee the fundamental principle of equality of (or between) men and women the
Women’s Convention stands out in a number of respects.1
Firstly, the Convention explicitly recognises the fact that it is women that are discriminated
against in today’s human society, not men. 2 This means that it is asymmetrical in its object
and purpose: it is directed at the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women
and not, as is standard in other texts, the elimination of discrimination on ground of sex.
The latter provisions all guarantee the right not to be discriminated on the basis of the
mere fact that one is a man or a woman. This means that these norms are symmetrical
and formal by nature.
In the second place the Women’s Convention entails the norm that all forms of dis-
crimination should be combated. This means that not only overtly visible or open forms
of sexism or direct discrimination are prohibited, but also forms of hidden or covert
‘indirect’ discrimination of individual women. The expression ‘all forms’ also covers, as
is demonstrated in the present study, forms of systemic or structural gender discrimination.
That is, the Convention not only forms a basis for individual litigation in the event of
discrimination (especially following the adoption of the Optional Protocol), but also offers
a solid legal ground for action aimed at combating structural forms of discrimination.
In the third place the Convention stands out compared with other legal documents in the
field of non-discrimination by the fact that it clearly is not (only) about granting formal
equal rights to women, but also aims to achieve substantive equality for women. This latter
1 I can not deal with this issue in any detail here. I recommend readers consult Chapter 2 of the Report of
the Groenman Committee (included as an Appendix to this book) and Holtmaat 2003 (a).
2 See General Recommendation 25, para 5.
8 Chapter 2 – The place of Article 5a in the CEDAW Convention
quality is clearly revealed in the CEDAW Committee’s latest General Recommendation on
the necessity for designing and implementing positive action measures, where it states that:
“In the Committee’s view, a purely formal legal or programmatic approach is not sufficient to
achieve women’s de facto equality with men, which the Committee interprets as substantive equality.
In addition, the Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered
by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women
treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally
constructed differences between women and men must be taken into account. Under certain
circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in order to address such
differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality also calls for an effective strategy aimed
at overcoming underrepresentation of women and a redistribution of resources and power between
men and women.”3
2.2 The place of Article 5a in the structure of the Convention
Article 5a CEDAW is connected to consideration 14 of the Preamble, in which the drafters
of the Convention state that they are aware that
“a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family
is needed to achieve full equality between men and women”.
The Article forms part of a group of general provisions in the Convention (Articles 1-5
and 24). This is followed by a group of provisions (Articles 6-16) in which the specific
areas in which the Convention is applicable are described (such as trafficking in women,
political and public life, nationality rights, education, paid labour and social security and
health). In these Articles State parties are provided with detailed instructions about what
to do to put an end to discrimination of women.4 Finally there are a number of provisions
on the implementation of the Convention’s norms and supervision by the Committee
(Articles 17-30).
Article 5b deals with the patterns of expectations with respect to the roles of men and
women in the context of parenthood.5 Monster, Cremers and Willems characterise the
difference between the Articles 5a and 5b as follows:
3 General Recommendation 25, para 8.
4 These obligations are phrased as: “shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination in the
field of …” In this study we will not deal with the question what kind of obligations this puts on State
parties. See Groenman Committee, Chapter 2, par. 2.2. (included in this Volume) for a detailed discussion
of this question.
5 State parties should take all appropriate measures (b): “To ensure that family education includes a proper
understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men
and women in the upbringing and development of their children, it being understood that the interest of
the children is the primordial consideration in all cases.”
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“The drafters of the Convention on the one hand wanted to recognise the important role of women
in the reproduction of mankind, but on the other hand wanted to prevent that women are solely
being seen as mothers. Parenthood involves responsibilities that rest both on men and women and
creates obligations for the society as a whole. (…) Article 5 CEDAW aims at disentangling the
conceptual fusion of woman and motherhood by clearly separating between ‘culture’ (the social
and cultural roles on ground of sex in part a) and ‘nature’ (the reproductive function of women
in part b).”6
On the ground of this difference in meaning between the two parts of Article 5 I have
chosen to concentrate solely on Article 5a CEDAW. This study also does not consider Article
10c of the Convention which deals with the elimination of stereotypes in the context of
education and educational materials. The latter provision solely concentrates on education
and information campaigns and can be seen as a lex specialis of the principle enshrined
in Article 5a CEDAW.
2.3 The threefold aim of the Women’s Convention
In order to answer the question as to scope and meaning of Article 5a CEDAW, it is im-
portant to place this provision in the context of the overall object and purpose of the
Women’s Convention. The first National Report (here referred to as the Groenman Commit-
tee) elaborated an analysis of the Convention’s sub-aims.7 According to the Committee
the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (the general aim, expressed
in the Convention’s title) entails that State parties must aim to:
1. achieve full equality before the law and in public administration.
2. improving the position of women.
3. combating the dominant gender ideology.
The Dutch government endorsed this analysis of the sub-aims of the Convention and stated
that there is a close connection between these three objectives and the three central aims
of Dutch emancipation policy that were laid down in the Emancipation Policy Plan of
1985.8 The CEDAW Committee, in its Concluding Comments on the second and third
Country Report of the Netherlands, indicated that it appreciates and subscribes to this
analysis of the Convention’s aims.9 In General Recommendation number 25 on temporary
special measures on the ground of Article 4(1), adopted in January 2004, the CEDAW
6 Monster et al. 1998, p. 50.
7 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 21. (We here refer to the numbers of pages in the Dutch report; a translation
of the first two Chapters of this report is included as an appendix to this book.)
8 TK 1997-1998, 25 893, nr 2, p. 8
9 25th Session of CEDAW, July 2001, A/56/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 512 and 513, para 196.
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Committee uses this threefold aim as a basis for a description of the object and purpose
of the Convention.10
The Women’s Convention details all the fields in which governments should strive to meet
these aims. In fact, the Convention embraces all aspects of political, social, cultural and
economic life. Relationships in private life can also be brought under the scope of
CEDAW.11 This means that, as far as the elimination of sex stereotypes is concerned, the
intervention of government could – in principle – also extend to private life. Whether,
and to what extend, Article 5a CEDAW requires measures to be taken in this sphere is one
of the questions to be tackled in the present study.
10 CEDAW, General Recommendation nr. 25, par. 6 en 7. In this light it may be expected that the Committee
in the future will revise the text that it has placed on its web site under the title “Reservations” about the
central principles of the Convention. At that place only the Articles 2 and 16 are being mentioned as the
‘core provisions’ that are essential for the object and purpose of the Convention. No reservations to these
provisions are allowed, according to the Committee. See: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
reservations.htm
11 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 28-29.
3THE ASSUMED SPECIAL MEANING OF ARTICLE 5A CEDAW
3.1 Article 5a CEDAW as a principle for cultural change
The view that Article 5a CEDAW has a particular and unique importance has been elaborated
in the Dutch legal literature from the outset of the Convention’s existence.1 For example,
in 1987 Henc van Maarseveen, Professor in Constitutional Law in Rotterdam, noted that
Article 5 is one of the pillars supporting the radicalising principle of cultural change that
underlies the entire Convention. That is, the Convention is not directed solely at providing
women with equal rights (compared with the rights already possessed by men) but also
aims at “(…) a possible feminisation of the culture, at least of the culture that is represented
in the legal order.”2 However, Van Maarseveen does not develop the argument as to what
type of obligations this provision might entail. Other authors interpret the Article in a less
radical way, but nevertheless still deem it to be of special importance, as with Liesbeth
Lijnzaad, who argues that this provision is important because it expresses the value of
diversity.3 She calls Article 5a CEDAW a ‘hat-peg’ provision, which is of great importance
for the interpretation of object and purpose of the Convention. She illustrates her point
with the example of the issue of violence against women: although not expressly regulated
in the Convention, it has been brought under its scope by reference to Article 5a.4
3.2 Article 5a CEDAW as a legal basis for combating structural gender discrimina-
tion
The elimination of the structural causes of sex discrimination
The Committee that produced the first National Report (Groenman Committee) declared
that Article 5a CEDAW is the pillar for the third objective of the Convention. According
1 This literature will be discussed in detail in Chapter 10 of this book.
2 Van Maarseveen 1987 (a), p. 75.
3 Lijnzaad 1994, p. 47.
4 See CEDAW General Recommendations numbers 12 and 19 about violence against women.
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to the Groenman Committee the obligation to combat the dominant gender ideology
represents a legal novelty in the sense that it is not the same as prohibiting (direct or
indirect) sex discrimination on the ground that – with some exceptions – men and women
should have strictly equal rights. As a consequence, this Article constitutes an indispensable
completion of existing national and international non-discrimination norms.
“Never before in a legal document that focuses on combating discrimination against women has
there been so much emphasis on the need to change existing ideas and ideologies, where women
are assigned an unequal, subordinate or ‘other’ role in human life in all its facets (in both the public
and private sphere). In this way, the Convention recognises that the unequal position of women
is a stubborn phenomenon and that this can only be improved if essential changes take place at
the level of gender ideology.”5
The importance of the third objective of the Convention is described by the Committee
as follows:
“The current gender ideology distinguishes between men and women by attributing different values
and qualities to their behaviour, ideas, feelings, value judgements and expectations. This ideology
must be exposed, and the exclusion mechanisms to which it gives rise must be combated effective-
ly.”6
In this context the Committee points to the double function of gender ideologies: they not
only play a role in constituting peoples’ ‘identity’, but are also constitutive for almost all
societal structures and institutions. “The gender-based structuring of human life is sometimes
described with the terms structural discrimination, institutional discrimination or systematic
discrimination”7 The Article is also presumably directed at eliminating or eradicating gender
differences that become ‘wired into’ in societies structures and systems. At this point, the
Groenman Committee cites the example of the construction of paid labour, which is said
to have a gender-specific content. The full-time working male employee (the ‘breadwinner’)
still constitutes the starting-point of policy and law in this field.
Towards fundamental change
Like Van Maarseveen, the Groenman Committee also considers that Article 5a CEDAW
can have a radicalising effect: “According to Article 5, the government cannot stop after
completing the first two sub-aims. A fundamental change of society is essential, i.e. a
change in ideas, values and structures based on the female perspective.”8 The Article can
5 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 25.
6 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 24. The Committee at this point refers to the report Projectgroep Beeld-
vorming, that will be discussed in Chapter 14 of this book.
7 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 25. These concepts will be defined in the next Chapter and in Chapter 13.
8 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 27.
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be read as an encouragement to analyse the precise content of the concepts and assumptions
that underlie law and public policy. The Committee warns:
“If this does not happen, the implementation of full equality before the law and a policy to improve
the position of women could sometimes have contrary effects. The concepts and assumptions that
are currently being used are often coloured by gender stereotypical relationships and expectations.
If these concepts and assumptions are included unchanged in new legislation or new policy, this
will lead to unwitting and unintentional reproduction of gender differences.”9
Implementing this Article of the Convention could help prevent (biological) differences
between men and women not being sufficiently taken into account or a policy under which
women are simply granted the same formal rights as men on the basis of an existing and
static range of conditions. The Committee (implicitly) rejects such a policy of assimilation.
Instead it observes that Article 5a CEDAW requires a policy that is directed towards diversity:
“The Article does not provide standards which men and women must satisfy – with the exception
of breaking through the traditional role division. As a result, it creates the possibility that dominant
(male) norms are not assumed to be self-evident. In a number of areas, this can mean that it is
not equal rights or equal opportunities that must have priority, but that other rights must be
developed or other opportunities must be offered.”10 (Italics in original.)
3.3 Article 5a CEDAW in relation to combating direct and indirect sex discrimina-
tion
The Groenman Committee has stressed that, in its view, the three objectives of the Conven-
tion are interlinked. Each objective singly cannot be attained without at the same time
working to fulfil the other two. In particular, there is a direct link between the obligation
to combat discrimination of women in law and public administration (first objective) and
the obligation to eliminate gender stereotypes.11
As regards the question as to how the third objective should be implemented, the Committee
states that Article 5a CEDAW necessitates the ‘screening’ of all laws for their possible
indirect discriminatory effect. The Committee further declares that a method should be
developed to test whether laws or regulations might have such an impact for women.12
One of the recommendations of the Committee, therefore, is to conduct research into the
9 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 27.
10 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 27.
11 The CEDAW Committee states in General Recommendation number 25, para 6, that the obligations that
follow from the Convention “(…) should be implemented in an integrated fashion and should move beyond
a purely formal legal obligation of equal treatment of women with men.”
12 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 59.
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indirect discriminatory effects of legislation and the existence of those gender stereotyped
assumptions that underlie legislation.13
3.4 An assumption in need of proof
The Groenman Committee did not provide a good deal of proof for its far-reaching state-
ments on the content and scope of Article 5a CEDAW. The present study aims to remedy
this and achieve some further clarification of the issue. That is why at the start of this
research project, the Committee’s thesis was presented as an assumption, the validity of
which still needed to be established.14 Part II below presents the materials from which
this specific meaning of Article 5a can be derived. Before this, however, I propose to
consider some further arguments that help illuminate the background to the present research:
the nature of the existing system of equal treatment legislation in the Netherlands and in
the European Union, and the observed shortcomings that this system has in tackling
systemic or structural gender discrimination.
13 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 140, recommendation number 4.
14 Planenga, Holtmaat & Koopmans 2004.
4DISCONTENT WITH EXISTING EQUAL TREATMENT
LEGISLATION
4.1 Introduction
Despite the fact that the right to equal treatment for men and women has been firmly
established in most western countries for a number of years, opinions about the effects
of this right are not very positive. In a report, published in 1991, The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) notes that:
“Although a necessary condition for achieving gender equality, the limited impact of anti-discrimina-
tion and equal opportunity measures points to the systemic nature of gender-based inequalities,
and the need for a systemic solution.”
Equal treatment, in the sense of a prohibition of direct or indirect discrimination on the
ground of sex, is, according to the OECD, not sufficient to eliminate this type of systemic
discrimination. In order to make real progress in the field of equality between men and
women, the OECD calls for ‘institutional change’:
“That solution lies in applying an integrated approach to institutional change aimed at addressing
the contradictions and tensions generated at the interface between the household, the community
and employment structures.”1
Instead of existing approaches to sex equality law, a different type of law would have to
be developed that targets the structural dimension of the unequal power relations between
men and women. For readers who are not familiar with the feminist legal debate about
the effects of this legislation, this Chapter provides a short introduction to the growing
body of critical academic writing on this issue.2
1 OECD 1991, p. 8.
2 This is only a very brief introduction. The literature on this topic is abundant. We will discuss only a few
representatives of the feminist jurisprudence. See for a Volume of critical comments on European Union
Sex Equality Law Hervey & O’Keeffe. See also Fredman 2002.
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4.2 The shortcomings of the existing equal treatment legislation
The limitations of formal equal treatment on ground of sex
Most laws that prohibit discrimination of women do this in the form of a prohibition of
unequal treatment on grounds of sex. This means that, when attributing rights and duties
to people, there shall be no distinction on the basis that somebody is of the male or female
sex. The scope and meaning of this type of legislation differs from country to country.
Sometimes the equal treatment norm is only directed at the government, sometimes it is
also applicable in certain fields of private (corporate) life, like the field of paid labor,
education or healthcare. Sometimes it is part of criminal law, sometimes the equal treatment
norms can be found in labor law, civil law or administrative law. Some countries have
a specific Equal Treatment Act.
There is an important similarity between all these norms: central in the concept of equal
treatment of men and women is that both sexes should have identical rights, apart from
a limited number of exceptions – mostly with regard to the protection of motherhood. This
type of equal treatment norm only prohibits unequal treatment on the ground of sex. It
does not impose a positive duty (on the State or private parties) to effectively put an end
to the de facto unequal situation of women. By prohibiting discrimination of men as well
as discrimination of women this legislation misses the point that in fact in today’s societies
women are the victims of discrimination. When a governments takes positive action to
do something about this factual unequal position of women by (temporarily) giving some
additional rights to women compared to men, this breach of the formal principle of equality
needs a very weighty justification.3 The CEDAW Convention is an exception to this
dominant legal construction of the non-discrimination norm, in that it explicitly recognizes
the fact that women are the victims of discrimination and that one of its aims is to improve
the position of women.4
Discrimination as an individual problem
Although very important, a strategy that aims at providing the right to non-discrimination
and (formal) equal treatment is not in itself sufficient to bring about equality between men
and women in reality. One of the main criticisms of existing EC equal rights laws is that
these laws define discrimination as an individualised concept.5
“The right not to be discriminated against on the ground of sex means the right of an individual
not be subjected to specific treatment which is less favourable than that which is or would be
3 In European Law this is very problematic. See Tobler 2003 and Holtmaat 2003 (a).
4 See CEDAW General Recommendation number 25 and Holtmaat 2003 (b).
5 The same criticism applies to most Anglo-American anti-discrimination laws. See for a discussion of EC
law Fredman 2002, p. 162.
Part I 17
received by a similarly placed member of the opposite sex, where the ground or reason for the
less favorable treatment is sex.”6
It is up to the individual woman to claim that her right to equal treatment has been
breached. That is why this strategy is called the individual rights strategy.
Although such equality legislation may be able to open some doors to women it can never
guarantee that women will be able to participate fully behind these doors. Moreover, it
is a backward-looking strategy: it only addresses harm already done! In equality law more
emphasis should be placed on the position of women (or groups of women) as the sub-
ordinated or excluded sex, and more attention should be placed on the systemic or structural
causes of discrimination in order to prevent discrimination in the future. That is why some
critics argue for a ‘move beyond equality’ or for ‘equality as transformation’.7 Others,
including the present author, consider that a multi-layered approach is needed within non-
discrimination law, in which the existing individual rights approach is combined with a
strategy for social support (through positive action) for women who are discriminated
against together with a strategy for social and cultural change.8
The tendency towards assimilation
A major problem in relation to the formal legal right to equal treatment of men and women
is that this norm always demands a comparison. The equal treatment norm generally has
been formulated in such a way that it is prohibited to disadvantage women as compared
to men (and vice versa). For example, this can be read in the definition of sex discrimination
in European Community law. “Direct discrimination: where one person is treated less
favourably on grounds of sex than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable
situation.”9
The comparison (of the situation of the disadvantaged sex) is customarily made with
reference to the dominant norm. This raises the danger of assimilation to this norm. When
women demand equal access to paid labour this demand will mean: equal to conditions
under which men in the past gained access to paid labour. The dominant (male) norm will
not be contested in such procedures. This means that, based on equal treatment legislation,
no remedies are available for the fact that paid labour is organised in such a way that
combining paid labour and unpaid care activities is very difficult. Granting some ‘special
rights’ to women (e.g. with respect to pregnancy and maternity10) can simply reinforce
6 See Ellis1998, p. 321. See further Sandra Fredman 2002., Chapter 4, where the author discusses the problems
that arise in this approach to legal equality.
7 Fredman 2002 and 2003.
8 Holtmaat 2003 (a).
9 Article 2 (2) of Directive 2002/73/EC.
10 See for example Article 2 (7) of Directive 2002/73/EC.
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gender stereotypes about the roles of women in the family, confirming views about the
role of the mother in the home, the incompatibility of paid labour and caring, and essential
differences in male and female roles in bringing up and caring for children.
A description of these effects of equal treatment legislation can be found in the work of
Clare McGlynn, who analysed a great number of judgements of the European Court of
Justice.11 Her conclusion is that this case law consolidates and reinforces traditional views
that maintain the subordinate position of women. At the basis of a number of these judge-
ments of the Court lies a dominant ideology of motherhood, that stems from psychological
theories about mother-child bonding developed after World War Two.12
Other authors, such as the Dutch lawyer Susanne Burri, have pointed to the fact that the
European Court of Justice at some points does acknowledge that women are sometimes
in a disadvantageous position because of certain regulations or systems. Burri discusses
case law in the field of positive action, and concludes that the Court at this point under-
stands that
“(…) as a consequence of certain prejudices and stereotypes about the roles and the capacities of
women and expectations about career interruptions or desired working times in regard to their duties
at home and in the family, women who have the same qualifications as men do not have the same
opportunities.”13
On this ground the Court deems it possible that certain measures to facilitate part-time
work can be justified under the provisions (in EC law) that allow positive action measures.
In another case the European Court of Justice expressly rejected the argument that the
legislature’s social welfare policy cannot be made responsible for general societal develop-
ments, including typical discrimination against women.14 This means that the situation
might be somewhat less negative than some commentators presume.
The invisibility of unequal power relations in equal treatment legislation
The assimilation to the dominant norm that follows from the application of the formal
equality principle is widely held to be one of the central problems of equal treatment
legislation and case law.15 Almost all legal scholars who study this law from a feminist
perspective acknowledge that as a consequence, systemic or structural discrimination cannot
be eliminated.
11 McGlynn 2000.
12 In the Netherlands this analysis of McGlynn caused some debate. See Monster 2001.
13 Burri 2000, p. 389. At this place she discusses the cases of Marschall and Badeck, resp. C-409/95 and C-158/
97.
14 Rust 1996, p. 445, who discusses the case of the Commissie vs Belgium, C-229-89.
15 See for example Fredman 2001, 2002 and 2003 and the literature that she discusses.
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One example of this critical approach can be found in an article by the Canadian professor
of law, Rebecca Cook. According to Cook, the ‘similarity and difference’ model
“(…) does not allow for any questioning about the ways in which laws, cultures or religious
traditions have constructed and maintained the disadvantage of women, or the extent to which the
institutions are male-defined and based on male conceptions of challenges and harms.”16
Paying attention to systemic discrimination would mean researching the ways in which
legal, social and religious traditions disadvantage women:
“Systemic discrimination or inequality of conditions, the most damaging form of discrimination,
cannot be addressed via the rule-based sameness of treatment approach. Indeed, the use of this
model virtually makes systemic disadvantage invisible.”17
The solution that Cook proposes is an asymmetric and substantive approach to equality
and equal rights.18 The test should not be whether men and women are treated equally
but whether a rule or practice is based on the powerlessness and exclusion of women, and
operates systematically to their disadvantage.19 The American feminist law professor,
Catherine MacKinnon, has advocated this approach, sometimes being called the dominance
approach. She states that in tackling discrimination against women, the test should not
be whether there is a situation of sameness or difference compared to men, but that every
policy or law should be tested against whether unequal power relationships between men
and women are at stake.
“In this approach, an equality question is a question of the distribution of power. Gender is also
a question of power, specifically of male supremacy and female subordination. The question of
equality (…) is at root a question of hierarchy, which – as power succeeds in constructing social
perception and social reality – derivatively becomes a categorical distinction, a difference.”20
The Dutch political scientist Selma Sevenhuijsen notes in addition:
“An analysis in terms of power, discourse and gender makes it possible to assess political and legal
texts for their inclusionary and exclusionary effect, analysing which and whose perspective can
be expressed and with which normative message.”21
16 Cook 1994 (a), p. 11.
17 Cook 1994 (a), p. 11, where she discusses Kathleen Mahoney’s contribution to this Volume.
18 See also Loenen 1992 en 1994.
19 Cook 1994 (a), p. 12. Such an approach still requires a comparison (disadvantaged compared to whom?)
See Holtmaat 1996.
20 MacKinnon 1991, p. 87
21 Sevenhuijsen 1998, p. 30
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4.3 From the prohibition of sex discrimination to the elimination of sex as a
legally relevant category
In most of today’s equal treatment legislation the problem of inequality between men and
women does not appear as a matter of unequal power relationships between the sexes,
a fact commented on in the early days of equal treatment legislation by Professor Van
Maarseveen. In his view the unequal ‘power of definition’ also played a role in the very
construction of this legislation.
“The person who has the power of definition, who succeeds at defining discrimination against
women as sex discrimination, takes the sting out of the matter and at the same time does not have
to fear much from it anymore.”22
The symmetric prohibition of sex discrimination protects men as well as women against
unequal treatment. Very often men bring equality cases on the basis of this legislation and
win them.23 This means that the factual inequality between men and women is being
denied.
The Dutch lawyer Marjolein van den Brink even takes it a step further than that:
“As long as sex difference is deemed to be essential for the human existence and human identity,
it will (partly) determine the structure of society and thereby it will consolidate, reproduce and
strengthen this difference.”24
It is the view of Van den Brink that it is necessary to eliminate the categories male and
female from the law altogether. Otherwise it is impossible to put an end to all three forms
of discrimination that she distinguishes: direct, indirect and systemic discrimination.
4.4 Final remark
According to the feminist critics of equal treatment law this law is not suitable when it
comes down to putting an end to structural gender discrimination. Article 5a CEDAW that
obligates State parties to eliminate “prejudices and customary and all other practices which
are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women” presumably will offer an appropriate legal tool
to reach this goal. This brings me back to the subject of this book: what exactly is the
content and scope of this provision in the Women’s Convention? In the next part of this
22 Van Maarseveen 1987, p. 21. See also Pessers 1991, p. 1003 and Smart 1989, p. 2.
23 In Europe we have the famous pension and positive action cases. See e.g. Barber, Kalanka and Marschall
described in Whiteford 1996 and Tobler 2003.
24 Van den Brink 2000, p. 30.
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book I will discuss how, according to official documents and the legal literature this
provision can or should be interpreted.

PART II
CONTENT AND SCOPE OF ARTICLE 5a CEDAW

5INTRODUCTION TO PART II
Chapter 3 discussed the assumption that Article 5a CEDAW has a special significance. This
part of the study considers what official documents and the legal literature have had to
say about the content and scope of this provision.
Initially, this will entail a discussion of what the drafters of the Women’s Convention meant
to express in Article 5a CEDAW and what the CEDAW Committee has subsequently said
about it in its Instructions, General Recommendations and the Concluding Comments to
their discussions of Country Reports. This is followed by a consideration of the opinions
that the Dutch government issued during the ratification procedure and in its Country
Reports to the CEDAW Committee. A good deal of material on the nature of Article 5a
CEDAW was found in the two National Reports and the studies undertaken in relation to
the national reporting procedure in the Netherlands. Finally, there is a review of the
academic legal literature on Article 5a CEDAW.1
The key questions here are as follows:
· Does this material taken together provide enough evidence to warrant the claim that
Article 5a CEDAW does indeed contain a special obligation that extends further than
existing prohibitions on sex discrimination in international human rights documents
and in European Community and Dutch equal treatment laws?
· If so, which specific duties can be derived from this provision?
Answers to these questions will be presented in Chapter 11.
1 For the search of Dutch literature, the bibliography on the CEDAW Convention from the Clara Wichmann
Institute (Kruizinga 2000) was used. The search of non-Dutch literature was confined to publications in
the English language, which were known to the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) and which
were available in the Netherlands at that time.

6ARTICLE 5a CEDAW ACCORDING TO THE DRAFTERS OF
THE CONVENTION
6.1 The source of the provision
Article 5a CEDAW stems from Article 3 of the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion against women. (DEDAW):1 “All appropriate measures shall be taken to educate public
opinion and to direct national aspirations towards the eradication of prejudice and the
abolition of customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of inferiority
of women”.
During the process of the drafting of the Women’s Convention the Philippines formulated
a text, the first paragraph of which closely corresponded with the final version of this
provision but with more specific provisions as to the activities that a State party would
have to undertake:
“State parties undertake to adopt immediate, effective and appropriate measures, particularly in
the field of teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to the eradication of … etc.
(identical to Article 3 DEDAW).”
A second paragraph was added: “Any advocacy of hatred for the feminine sex that con-
stitutes incitement to discrimination against women shall be prohibited by law.” The
representatives of the Soviet Union proposed a text in which the social function of mother-
hood was included as an important element. Together with the text that was proposed by
the Philippines this formed the first draft of Article 5 CEDAW:
“1. State parties shall adopt all necessary measures with a view to educating public opinion for
the complete eradication of prejudices, customs and all other practices based on the concept of
women and for the recognition that the protection of motherhood is a common interest of the entire
society which should bear responsibility for it.
1 Proclaimed by the UN General Assembly resolution 2263 (XXII) of 7 November 1967. See Lijnzaad 1994,
p. 44-45. The history of CEDAW is described in full extend in Rehof 1993, p. 77-88.
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2. Any advocacy of the superiority of one sex over the other and of discrimination on the basis
of sex shall be prohibited by law.”
6.2 The drafting of the text of Article 5a CEDAW
From the Traveaux Préparatoires of the Women’s Convention it can be derived that, on
the basis of the joint proposal made by the Philippines and the Soviet Union, three issues
played an important role in the drafting process of Article 5a CEDAW.2
1. Elimination of prejudices based on ideas of inferiority and superiority;
2. Education of the public; and
3. Maternity as a social function.
The second and third issue have resulted in part (b) of Article 5.
The attempt by Philippines to include an additional clause prohibiting incitement to
discrimination against women failed following opposition by Sweden which argued that
it was difficult to demarcate the punishable area from innocent acts. Sweden also stated
that such a provision might encroach upon freedom of speech and free debate. Columbia,
Finland and the United States were also concerned that the wording ‘advocacy of the
superiority of one sex over the other’ would result in a restriction of freedom of speech.
On this ground most countries rejected the second paragraph of the proposed article (see
above). Ethiopia protested that “fundamental freedoms are not generally granted to citizens
without exceptions or bounds”.
Sierra Leone stated that traditional practices should be studied carefully to see whether
they were indeed based on the idea of inferiority of women. Sweden preferred to mention
the “inferiority or superiority of either sex”. The United States of America also suggested
that this provision should be directed at stereotypes of men and women.
Together, all these interventions led to the following text of Article 5a CEDAW, as proposed
by Mexico:
“The State parties shall take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns
of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women”.
2 Rehof 1993, p. 80-81. Citations of opinions of countries and draft-text in this paragraph all stem from Rehof.
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6.3 Reservations about Article 5a CEDAW
The Women’s Convention leaves ample room for states to submit reservations.3 Although
Article 28, paragraph 2 states that reservations that are incompatible with the object and
purpose of the Convention shall not be permitted, some countries nevertheless have
registered reservations about Article 5a. New Zealand made a reservation to this Article,
in combination with Article 2f:
“The Government of the Cook Islands reserves the right not to apply article 2 (f) and article 5
(a) to the extent that the customs governing the inheritance of certain Cook Islands chief titles may
be inconsistent with those provisions.”
For the same reason, some countries with a monarchy based on exclusive male inheritance
have also made reservations to the Convention.
Niger, India and Malaysia have made a reservation to Article 5a in combination with
Articles 2 and 16, in as far as these provisions are not in accordance with customs and
practices. Niger phrases this as follows:
“The Government of the Republic of the Niger declares that the provisions of article 2, paragraphs
(d) and (f), article 5, paragraphs (a) and (b), article 15, paragraph 4, and article 16, paragraph 1
(c), (e) and (g), concerning family relations, cannot be applied immediately, as they are contrary
to existing customs and practices which, by their nature, can be modified only with the passage
of time and the evolution of society and cannot, therefore, be abolished by an act of authority.”
India says that it wants to respect the customs and practices of separate Communities:
“With regard to articles 5 (a) and 16 (1) (…), the Government of the Republic of India declares
that it shall abide by and ensure these provisions in conformity with its policy of non-interference
in the personal affairs of any Community without its initiative and consent.”
In addition, many Islamic countries have made reservations to Articles 2 (especially 2f)
and 16 – often without mentioning Article 5a – inasmuch as these provisions are deemed
contrary to the Islamic Shari’a.4
A number of countries, among them Mexico, Norway and the Netherlands, have expressed
strong objections to these reservations, arguing that such reservations undermine the object
and purpose of the Convention. The CEDAW Committee states in particular that reservations
3 The Reservations can be found at: http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/
treaty10.asp
4 Nyuma 2000, p. 391.
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to Articles 2 and 16 are in breach of Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Convention.5 The
Committee has often noted that reservations to the Convention cannot be justified with
reference to traditions and religion. This point of view has also been laid down in a general
statement:
“Neither traditional, religious or cultural practice nor incompatible domestic laws and policies can
justify violations of the Convention. The Committee also remains convinced that reservations to
Article 16, whether lodged for national, traditional, religious or cultural reasons, are incompatible
with the Convention and therefore impermissible and should be reviewed and modified or with-
drawn.”6
6.4 Conclusion
Compared to Article 3 DEDAW, in which the education of public opinion and eradication
of prejudice had a central place, Article 5a CEDAW is much broader. The history of the
drafting process indicates that the drafters were convinced of the damaging effects of
stereotyped roles of men and women and clearly wanted to instruct the State parties to
do ‘something’ about the continuing existence of such stereotypes. In the end, modifying
social and cultural patterns of conduct was formulated as one of the Convention’s explicit
obligations. What States should do to implement the provision was left undecided.
5 At it’s web site only the Articles 2 and 16 are being mentioned as the ‘core provisions’ that are essential
for the object and purpose of the Convention. No reservations to these provisions are allowed, according
to the Committee. See: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations.htm
6 General Statement on the Impact of Reservations, A/53/38, CEDAW on its 19th session, Chapter 1, para.
17.
7ARTICLE 5a CEDAW ACCORDING TO THE CEDAW COMMITTEE
7.1 Introduction
What precisely a State party must do to implement this provision cannot be read from
the text of Article 5a CEDAW itself. In 1987 the UN Committee that supervises the imple-
mentation of the Convention (below referred to as the Committee or the CEDAW Committee)
issued a very broad General Recommendation (number 3) on this Article. More clues about
the meaning of Article 5a CEDAW can also be found in some General Recommendations
on specific topics such as violence against women and family law. This chapter also reviews
the directions that the Committee has given to State parties on how to report on the
implementation of this provision of the Convention. The Concluding Comments of the
CEDAW Committee in particular contain an abundance of material on how the Committee
sees the problem of gender stereotyping and the measures it sees as necessary to eliminate
damaging and repressive gender stereotypes.1 I have chosen to let the Committee speak
for itself by citing extracts from these Concluding Comments.
7.2 The General Recommendation about Article 5 CEDAW
In its Fifth Session in 1986 the Committee appealed to the State parties to
“consider the introduction of appropriate measures to overcome obstacles to equality arising from
prejudices, customs or practices based upon stereotyped roles for men and women, aimed at
modifying the social and cultural pattern of conduct.”2
1 Concluding Comments or Concluding Observations are included in the official reports that the CEDAW
Committee delivers to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the basis of the Country Reports
that State parties deliver to the Committee (on the ground of Article 18 CEDAW) and the constructive
dialogue between the Committee and the governments of the State parties. I here refer to the official
publication of the Committees annual report to the General Assembly.
2 UN.doc.A/41/45, para. 365, as cited by Wadstein 1988, p. 13.
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In General Recommendation Number 3, adopted in1987, the Committee again stressed
the fact that Article 5 is an important provision and that State parties should give serious
attention to the problem of stereotypes based on sex in their Country Reports. This General
Recommendation is very short and reads as follows:
“The Committee,
considering that the CEDAW Committee has considered 34 reports from State parties since 1983,
further considering that, although the reports have come from States with different levels of
development, they present features, in varying degrees, showing the existence of stereotyped
conceptions of women, owing to socio-cultural factors, that perpetuate discrimination based on
sex and hinder the implementation of article 5 of the Convention,
urges all States parties effectively to adopt education and public information programmes, which
will help eliminate prejudices and current practices that hinder the full operation of the principle
of the social equality of women.”
However, as a close reading reveals, this General Recommendation does no more than
establish the fact that damaging sex stereotypes still exist and that the Committee urges
the adoption of educational and public information programmes.
7.3 Article 5a CEDAW in other General Recommendations
The fact that Article 5a CEDAW is not only a norm that stands on its own, but also serves
as a provision that helps to fill in the content of other Articles in the Convention, can be
inferred from the way in which the CEDAW Committee regularly refers to the obligation
to eliminate sex stereotypes in other General Recommendations.
Article 5a CEDAW and violence against women
This is very clear in the two General Recommendations (numbers 12 and 19) that the
Committee has issued about violence against women. This subject is not explicitly regulated
under the Convention. The Committee uses (among others) Article 5a as a peg on which
it can bring this subject under the overall scope of the Convention. This is done by making
a direct link between negative stereotyping of women and violence against women.3 This
takes place very explicitly in Article 24, paragraphs d to f of General Recommendation
number 19, in which the State parties are enjoined to take effective measures to ensure
“that media respect and promote respect for women”, that in their Country Reports they
should “identity the nature and extend of attitudes, customs and practices that perpetuate
3 The subject of violence against women was analysed in detail in Boerefijn et al. 2000. (Discussed in Chapter
9 of this book.) Also in other UN Documents, a direct link between violence and stereotyping is often
asserted. See e.g. Article 4 of the 1994 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women
(DEVAW).
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violence against women” and that they “should take effective measures to overcome these
attitudes and practices”.4
Article 5a CEDAW in relation to family law
Also in General Recommendation number 21, which deals with the rights of women in
family law, there are various places where the role of negative sex stereotypes are discussed
in relation to the unequal rights that women often have in this field of law. To begin with,
the Committee stresses the fact that the Convention goes further than simply acknowledging
the principle of the equal rights of women – as guaranteed in numerous International
Documents – by
“(…) recognizing the importance of culture and tradition in shaping the thinking and behavior of
men and women and the significant part they play in restricting the exercise of basic rights by
women.”5
Specifically in relation to Article 16 of the Convention the Committee notes that the
separation between public and private life in the legislation, that occurs as a consequence
of the inferior treatment of domestic duties of women, can no longer be justified.6 Attribu-
ting formal equal rights to women is not enough to eradicate the different roles of men
and women:
“Even where de jure equality exists, all societies assign different roles, which are regarded as
inferior, to women. In this way, principles of justice and equality contained in particular in Article
16 and also in Articles 2, 5 and 24 of the Convention are being violated.”7
On the ground of Article 5a in the same General Recommendation polygamy is declared
to be expressly prohibited under the Convention:
“( …) polygamous marriage contravenes a woman’s right to equality with men, and can have such
serious emotional and financial consequences for her and her dependants that such marriages ought
to be discouraged and prohibited. The Committee notes with concern that some State parties, whose
constitutions guarantee equal rights, permit polygamous marriage in accordance with personal or
customary law. This violates the constitutional rights of women, and breaches the provision of
article 5 (a) of the Convention.”8
4 In the latter consideration an explicit reference is made to General Recommendation number 3 about Article
5a CEDAW.
5 General Recommendation nr. 21, para 3.
6 General Recommendation nr. 21, para 11 and 12.
7 General Recommendation nr. 21, para 12.
8 General Recommendation nr. 21, para 14.
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The Committee also rejects traditional practices, common law systems and customary law
which breach such fundamental rights of women as the right to a free choice of spouse
and which assign different rights and duties to men and women. Often insufficient pro-
tection is offered to women who live in a de facto union with a man.9 Finally, the Commit-
tee points out that the fact that in many cases the contribution made to the household by
domestic labour is not valued in the same way as financial contributions. This can have
serious consequences for the attribution of ownership and control over family assets between
men and women. The Committee strongly disapproves of this kind of inequality.10 From
all this the Committee draws the conclusion that “State parties should resolutely discourage
any notion of inequality of women and men which are affirmed by laws, or by religious
or private law or by custom (…).”11
The place of Article 5a in the Convention
In January 2004 the CEDAW Committee adopted General Recommendation Number 25,
in which it explains that the Convention has a threefold objective, following the line of
argument made by the Dutch Groenman Committee.12 This General Recommendation
links Article 5a CEDAW to the third objective:
“Thirdly, State parties’ obligation is to address prevailing gender relations and the persistence of
gender-based stereotypes that affect women not only through individual acts by individuals but
also in law, and legal and societal structures and institutions.”13
In connection to the general obligation to eliminate all forms of discrimination against
women the CEDAW Committee remarks that it is not enough to guarantee formal legal
equality:
“As steps are being taken to eliminate discrimination against women, women’s needs may change
or disappear, or become the needs of both women and men. Thus, continuous monitoring of laws,
programmes and practices directed at the achievement of women’s de facto or substantive equality
is needed so as to avoid a perpetuation of non-identical treatment that may no longer be war-
ranted.”14
9 General Recommendation nr 21, para 16, 17 and 18.
10 General Recommendation nr 21, para 31 and 32.
11 General Recommendation nr. 21, para 44.
12 See Chapter 2.
13 General Recommendation nr. 25, para 7.
14 General Recommendation nr. 25, para 11.
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7.4 Article 5a CEDAW in the Instructions to the State parties
Article 5 of the Convention is discussed in detail in the Instructions that the CEDAW
Committee has made available to the State parties on how they should report on their
implementation of the Convention and progress in this respect.15 In this document the
Committee underlines the significance of this provision, shows that it is important for
various subjects that fall under the scope of the Convention, and presents a long list of
questions that need to be answered in relation to this Article. On the specific issue of
violence against women, and its relationship to Article 5a CEDAW, the Committee warns
that prejudices and traditional practices cannot serve as a justification for gender-based
violence. The list of questions proposed by the Committee clearly indicates that it is not
only interested in how traditional customs and practices determine religious and cultural
life, but how these are reflected in law and public policy. For example, the Committee
wants to know who is considered to be the ‘head of the household’, according to national
law, and whether women are banned from practising certain occupations.16
7.5 Article 5a CEDAW in the Concluding Comments of the CEDAW Committee
Introduction
The clearest indications of how Article 5a CEDAW should be interpreted and the obligations
that follow from it can be found in the Concluding Comments drawn up by the CEDAW
Committee after having reviewed and discussed the Country Reports submitted by State
parties under their obligations in accordance with Article 18 of the Convention.
Reasons of time and limited availability of the sources meant that the present study
was only able to consider the Concluding Comments and not the Country Reports that
formed the basis for these discussions, nor the Shadow Reports submitted to the Committee
by non-governmental organisations. For the first period (sessions 1-9) the Secretariat of
the Committee compiled a report summarising the Country Reports.17 Lijnzaad concludes
from this summary that “ (…) State parties report an amazing range of activities. (…) This
list shows what other [than the Dutch; RH] State parties have done to implement Article 5
and indicates that this provision has a broad scope.”18
The following presents an overview of the relevant statements about the content and scope
of Article 5a CEDAW in the Concluding Comments made between the 13th session in 1994
and the 30th session in January 2004. Material on the first 12 sessions of the CEDAW
15 DAW 2002.
16 See also UN 1997, p. 322-324
17 DAW 1990.
18 Lijnzaad 1994, p. 5. Because this involves very outdated and incomplete materials (until 1990) these have
not been included in the analysis.
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Committee is not available on the Internet; moreover, it is now so old that it is less relevant
for current interpretations of this provision.
The overview begins with a consideration of a number of general aspects, including
the continuing existence of cultural and religious traditions and practices. This is followed
by more specific comments that relate to subjects covered by the Convention.19 While
this research was conducted in the wider framework of a study into the meaning of Article
5a CEDAW for the fields of paid work, care and income, particular attention is devoted
to the question of what the Committee said about the meaning of this provision in this
specific area. Finally, there is a discussion about the measures that should be taken to
implement the provision.
General remarks
The Committee frequently notes in quite general terms that it is concerned about the
persistence of traditional sex stereotyped ideas and conceptions. For example, in its Con-
cluding Comment about Zambia: “The Committee was very concerned about the persistence
of traditional sex roles, which were deeply embedded in the cultural lives of the Zambians
and which generally seemed to impede equality.”20 This kind of commentary also can
be found on a regular basis in Concluding Comments about ‘developed’ Western countries.
For example, on Luxembourg:
“The Committee is concerned at the persistence of traditional and stereotypical attitudes about the
roles and responsibilities of women and men in public and in private life. These attitudes are
reflected in people’s behaviour and in legislation and policy, and limit women’s full enjoyment
of all their rights guaranteed under the Convention.”21
And on Germany:
“The Committee is concerned about the continuation of pervasive stereotypical and conservative
views of the role and responsibilities of women and men. It is also concerned that women are
sometimes depicted by the media and in advertising as sex objects and in traditional roles.”22
The existence of religious and cultural traditions
In the view of the CEDAW Committee, religious and cultural traditions do not excuse the
persistence of repressive stereotypes. In that context it regularly raises the issue of the
19 The topic of family law and health and healthcare (articles 16 and 12 of the Convention) will be discussed
in relation to the cultural and religious traditions. The field of education is not included in the survey because
the Committee deals with that under Article 10c.
20 Zambia (1994), A/49/38, CEDAW/C/SR.241 and 246, para. 361.
21 Luxembourg (1998), A/55/38/CEDAW/C/SR. 446 and 447, para. 404.
22 Germany (2004), A/59/38, CEDAW/C/SR, 640 and 641, para. 20.
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situation of women in rural areas whose economic development is hindered by traditional
practices and customs.23 In regard to the situation in Morocco the Committee emphasises:
“(…) that cultural characteristics could not be allowed to undermine the principle of the universality
of human rights, which remained inalienable and non-negotiable, nor to prevent the adoption of
appropriate measures in favour of women.”24
And in relation to Indonesia it remarks:
“The Committee is convinced that the existence of cultural attitudes that confine women to the
roles of mothers and housewives presents a great obstacle to the advancement of women. Policy
measures and programmes developed on the basis of those stereotypes limit women’s participation
and entitlements, thereby impeding implementation of the Convention. The Committee expresses
the view that cultural and religious values cannot be allowed to undermine the universality of
women’s rights. It also stated its belief that culture is not a static concept and that the core values
in Indonesian society are not inconsistent with the advancement of women.”25
The persistence of traditional ideas is of great concern to the Committee, especially in
relation to the growth of religious fundamentalism in a number of countries.26 In con-
nection to this phenomenon the Committee regularly points to the existence of traditional
religious beliefs that can endanger women’s health.27 The existence of customary law
alongside the official law of the State party cannot warrant acceptance of the continuation
of discriminatory practices based on sex stereotypes.
“The Committee notes with great concern that, although the national laws guaranteed the equal
status of women, the continued existence of and adherence to customary laws perpetuated discrimina-
tion against women, particularly in the context of the family. The Committee notes with dissatis-
faction that prevailing traditional and socio-cultural attitudes towards women contribute to the
perpetuation of negative images of women, which impedes their emancipation.”28
In a Concluding Comment on Congo the Committee expresses its special concern about
the continued existence of polygamy and of the unequal rights provided for in custom-based
family law:
“The Committee expresses concern about the continued existence of discriminatory family laws
and traditional practices, including those related to dowries and adultery. The Committee is par-
23 E.g. Paraguay (1996), A/51/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 289 and 297, para. 126.
24 M0rocco (1997), A/52/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 312, 313 and 320, para. 64.
25 Indonesia (1998), A/53/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 377, para. 282.
26 E.g. Turkey (1997, A/52/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 318 and 319, para. 164 and Azerbaijan (1998), A/53/38,
CEDAW/C/SR. 361, 362 and 367, para. 58.
27 Senegal (1994), A/49/38, CEDAW/C/SR.247, para. 725, Nigeria (1998), A/53/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 396 and
397, para. 153 and the Maldives (2001), A/56/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 498, 499 and 506, para. 142.
28 Zimbabwe (1998), A/53/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 366, 367 and 372, para. 139.
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ticularly concerned about the practice of pre-marriage in view of the fact that Congolese law, while
recognizing the practice, does not stipulate a minimum age for pre-marriage partners.”29
In a Concluding Comment about the situation in Ethiopia, the Committee expresses its
disapproval of the fact that 80 per cent of women in this country are victims of genital
mutilation and of the widespread use of “widow inheritance with all her property”.30
Sexual violence and pornography
The CEDAW Committee frequently makes a link between (sexual) violence against women,
trafficking and prostitution and the failure to implement Article 5a CEDAW.31 An example
of how the Committee sees the relationship between this issue and women’s economic
dependence can be read in a report of the constructive dialogue with Zambia, in which
the representative of the Zambian government summarise this problem in the following
way:
“Violence against women was widespread and even traditionally accepted as a way of disciplining
a wife. (…) Since most women were economically dependent on their husbands and afraid to lose
their matrimonial home, they were very reluctant to prosecute their aggressors. Some women did
not admit that they had been abused and considered battering as a sign of man’s affection.”32
The Committee also often links the existence of sex stereotypes with the problem of sexual
harassment in the workplace.33 The issue of pornography is raised only a few times in
the context of the discussion of Article 5a, at the same time acknowledging that legislation
had been enacted that limits this phenomenon.34
Political participation of women
In relation to the discussions about the implementation of Articles 7 and 8 of the Conven-
tion the Committee often highlights the relationship between the existence of gender
stereotypes and the under-representation of women in political and public life. For example,
in its Concluding Comment on Uruguay
29 Congo (2003), A/58/38, CEDAW/C/SR, 606 and 607, para. 180. See also Buthan (2004), A/59/38, CEDAW/
C/SR, 636 and 642, para 31 and 32.
30 Ethiopia (2004), A/59/38, CEDAW/C/SR, 646 and 647, para 26 and 27.
31 Prostitution and trafficking in women is prohibited in Article 6. Since there is no provision prohibiting
(sexual) violence against women in the Convention the reporting and discussing of the issue of violence
often takes place under the heading of Article 5. E.g. Uganda (1995) A/50/38, CEDAW/C/SR.270 and 273,
para. 332. See also above, where I discuss General Recommendation numbers 12 and 19.
32 Zambia (1994) A/49/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 241 and 246, para. 330.
33 E.g. Japan (1994), A/49/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 248 and 249, para. 570.
34 E.g. New Zealand (1994), A/49/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 243, para. 641.
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“The Committee (…) urges the State party to concentrate on increasing women’s participation in
all areas, particularly decision-making, and on prevailing on men to share family responsibilities.
It urges the Government to strengthen its awareness-raising programmes, and to take action to
change stereotyped attitudes and perceptions as to men’s and women’s roles and responsibilities.”35
Women’s participation in paid labour
The field of paid labour and income is regulated in Articles 11 and 13 of the Convention.
The Committee frequently links the fact that sex stereotypes exist with the existence of
a segregated labour market and low pay for women. The traditional division of labour
between men and women is one of the reasons why women cannot achieve economic
independence. Measures to facilitate the combination of paid work and care activities that
are directed solely at women are rejected by the Committee as being gender stereotypical
in themselves. An example of this can be found in a Concluding Comment on Egypt.
“The Committee notes with concern that the persistence of cultural stereotypes and patriarchal
attitudes impedes progress in the implementation of the Convention and the full enjoyment of their
human rights. In this regard, the Committee is concerned that article 11 of the Egyptian Constitution,
which states that the State shall enable a woman to reconcile her duties towards her family with
her work in society and guarantee her equality with men in the sphere of political, social, cultural
and economic life, appears to entrench the woman’s primary role as mother and homemaker.”36
For this reason the Committee, in the context of discussing Article 5, repeatedly insists
that concrete measures are needed to promote the role of men in unpaid care activities.37
The enactment of pregnancy leave and/or maternity leave is not deemed sufficient for that
purpose.38 The Norwegian government receives an elaborate compliment for its policy
in this field:
“The Committee applauded the Government of Norway for directing attention to the necessary
changes in men’s roles and tasks as an important element in achieving true gender equality, including
men’s encouragement to use their right to paternity leave and to increase their involvement as
caretakers in the labour market.”39
35 Uruguay (2002), A/57/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 539, 540 and 548, para. 27. See also Cuba (2002), A/55/38,
CEDAW/C/SR. 474 and 475, para. 262.
36 Egypt (2001), A/56/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 492 and 493, para. 332.
37 Ukraine (1996), A/51/38, CEDAW/C/SR.302, para. 300 and Iceland (2002), A/57/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 532
and 519, para. 28.
38 Iceland (1996), A/51/38, CEDAW/C/SR.290 and 291, para. 94, 95.
39 Norway (1995), A/50/38, CEDAW/C/SR.277, para. 486. See also Finland (1995), A/50/38, CEDAW/C/SR.
272, para. 388.
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However, in the same document the Committee warns against segregation in the labour
market and points to the large pay gap between men and women, as well as to the fact
that many women work part time.40
From a Concluding Comment about Finland it appears that the Committee deems it
necessary to pursue a combined approach:
“The Committee urges the Government to increase its efforts to eliminate stereotypes in women’s
education as well as biased perceptions in job evaluations and pay relating to traditional areas of
employment for women. In particular, it recommends efforts to encourage cross-vocational training
in typical female and male-dominated areas, and to address the issue of the negative impact on
women of policies of time-fixed contracts. The Committee also urges the Government to increase
incentives for men to use their rights to parental leave and to set up stronger monitoring mechanisms
for the plans under the Equality Act.”41 A Concluding Comment on Ireland contains the instruction
to ensure that “(…) legislation and policies create the structural and systemic framework that will
lead to women’s long-term participation in the labour force on a basis of equality with men.”42
Protective labour laws
In the view of the Committee protective labour legislation can be especially damaging
for women’s interests. “The Committee is very concerned about the relationship between
sexual stereotyping and overprotective labour legislation. It noted that protective labour
laws had the sole effect of restricting women’s economic opportunities, and were neither
legitimate nor effective as a measure for promoting women’s reproductive health. Women
should have a right to free choice as to their employment, and the high rates of infant
mortality and fetal abnormality resulting from the ecological disaster should be addressed
as a matter of public health.”43 In its commentary on the situation in the Slovakia this
relationship is described in the following manner:
“The Committee expresses its concern at the overemphasis on legislative protection of and cultural
promotion of motherhood and family roles for women, rather than on women as individuals in
their own right. The traditional, stereotyped view of women as mothers is thereby reinforced and
negates the participation of fathers in childcare. That perception reflects a misunderstanding of
such critical concepts as gender roles, indirect discrimination and de facto inequality.”44
40 Norway (1995), A/50/38, CEDAW/C/SR.277, para. 491.
41 Finland (2001), A/56/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 494 and 495, para. 298.
42 Ireland (1999), A/54/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 440 and 441, para. 182.
43 Ukraine (1996), A/51/38, CEDAW/C/SR.302, para. 286. This warning can often be read in Concluding
Comment s on the situation in (ex-)communist countries. See e.g. Armenia (1997), A/52/38, CEDAW/C/SR.
344 and 345, para. 58, The Czech Republic (1998), A/53/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 370, 371 and 373, para. 196,
China (1999), A/54/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 419-421, para. 280 and 296 and Kazakhstan (2001), A/56/38,
CEDAW/C/SR. 490, 491 and 497, para. 101 and 102.
44 Slovakia (1998), A/53/38, CEDAW/C/SR 385,386 and 389, para. 74.
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Part-time work and unequal pay for women
The Committee expressly rejects the encouragement of part-time work as a solution to
the problem of the combination of paid work and caring activities.45 According to the
Committee, the fact that many more women work part time as compared to men is an
indication of hidden discrimination against women.46 In the Concluding Comments about
the situation in the Netherlands this situation is also mentioned. The Dutch government
is urged to take measures to allow women to choose to work full time, instead of working
part time, as a great majority does.47 In its discussion of the situation in Germany the
Committee comments at great length on the relationship between gender stereotypical ideas
about the role of women as housewives and mothers and the fact that the majority of part-
time workers are women. In the same vein the Committee makes a connection between
this situation and the persistence of unequal pay for women – a subject raised in virtually
every Concluding Comment.
On the issue of part-time work and unequal pay in Germany, the Committee makes the
following comment:
“The Committee is concerned that those differences are indicative of the persistence of indirect
discrimination against women in the labour market. It is also concerned that part-time work tends
to be in low skilled employment, offering fewer opportunities for professional advancement.”
And:
“The Committee expresses its concern at the persistence of stereotypical and traditional attitudes
about the roles and responsibilities of women and men in private and in public life. The Committee
notes that that persistence is reflected in women’s predominance in part-time work, their main
responsibility for family and caring work, occupational segregation, men’s extremely low participa-
tion in parental leave, at 1.5 per cent of those taking parental leave in 1997, and the taxation of
married couples. The Committee is concerned that measures aimed at the reconciliation of family
and work entrench stereotypical expectations for women and men.”48
45 Australie (1995), A/50/38, CEDAW/C/SR.279, para. 600.
46 Belgium(1996), A/51/38, CEDAW/C/SR.300 and 301, para. 187 and Iceland (1996), A/51/38, CEDAW/C/
SR.290 and 291, para. 96.
47 The Netherlands (2001), A/56/38/CEDAW/C/SR. 512 and 513, para. 214.
48 Germany (2000), A/55/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 464 and 465, para. 313, 314. A sharp comment on unequal pay
of women can also be read in the Concluding Comment on the situation in the UK and Northern Ireland:
(1999), A/54/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 429 and 430, para. 308.
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Obligations on the basis of Article 5a CEDAW: general remarks
The Committee quite frequently provides general directions on the basis of Article 5a
CEDAW. One example of such a comment can be found in the Concluding Comment on
the situation in the Ukraine in 2002:
“The Committee urges the State party to design and implement comprehensive programmes in
the educational system and to encourage the mass media to promote cultural changes with regard
to the roles and tasks attributed to women and men, as required by article 5 of the Convention.
It recommends that policies be developed and programmes implemented to ensure the eradication
of traditional sex roles stereotypes in the family, in employment, in politics and in society.”49
A comparable general instruction can be read in a recent Concluding Comment about
Albania, where the Committee – after having stated that Article 5 implies an obligation
to put an end to gender stereotypes – discusses the need to eliminate practices based on
traditional or customary law which discriminate against women.50
Obligations on the basis of Article 5a CEDAW: information and education
In a Concluding Comment on Morocco the Committee offers guidelines as to how the
State party should contribute to the elimination of gender stereotypes in society:
“The Committee recommended the establishment of specific machinery located at the highest policy
level, with adequate financial and human resources, that would co-ordinate and guide action in
favour of women, would be able to prevent the persistence of attitudes, prejudices and stereotypes
that discriminate against women and would narrow the gap between de jure and de facto equal-
ity.”51
On a number of occasions the Committee expressed its approval about information cam-
paigns mounted by the State parties.52 The Committee also regularly urges State parties
to undertake more activities in this field, especially through the media and in schools. What
this could mean in practice can be found a Concluding Comment on the situation in
Lithuania:
“The Committee urges the Government to design and implement comprehensive programmes in
education and the mass media in order to promote roles and tasks of women and men in all sectors
of society. It also recommends that the draft Code of Advertising Ethics be amended in order to
cover not only the prohibition of the promotion of discrimination against women and men, or of
49 Ukraine (2002), A/57/38 (part II), CEDAW/C/SR, 555 and 556, para. 196.
50 Albania (2003), A/58/38, CEDAW/C/SR, 594, 595 and 605, para. 69.
51 Morocco (1997), A/52/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 312, 313 and 320, para. 72.
52 Cyprus (1996), A/51/38, CEDAW/C/SR.287, para. 51.
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the alleged superiority of one sex over the other, but also of the more subtle utilization of and
support for traditional role stereotypes in the family, in employment and in society.”53
Obligations on the basis of Article 5a CEDAW: the revision of legislation
In several Concluding Comments a connection is made between the obligation to eliminate
gender stereotypes and the need to undertake a profound revision of the legislation and
public policy that sustain these stereotypes. The Committee urges the State parties, in
unmistakeably clear language, to change such laws and public policy.
The most far-reaching remark in this respect can be found in a Concluding Comment on
Ireland, where the Committee is of the opinion that the Irish Constitution reflects a stereo-
typed image of the roles of women “in the home and as mothers” and urges the Parlia-
mentary Committee engaged on a revision of the Constitution to be “fully aware of Ireland’s
obligations under the Convention, including article 5.”54 In other words, the Committee
makes a direct link between the continued existence of sex stereotypes and the existence
of certain laws in which these stereotypes are reaffirmed.55 Sometimes the Committee
connects this problem with the obligation to (also) combat indirect discrimination in law
and to sensitise lawyers to this type of discrimination.
“The Committee recommended that Italy expand its existing legislation and/or enact new legislation,
where needed, in order to effectively deal with the phenomenon of indirect discrimination. To that
end it emphasized the importance of measures to sensitise judges, lawyers and law enforcement
personnel to indirect discrimination and to Italy’s international obligations, in particular those
outlined in the Convention.”56
In a Concluding Comment on the Fiji Islands the Committee recommends that work be
undertaken to effect
“(…) changes in laws and administrative regulations to recognise women as heads of households,
and the concept of shared economic contribution and household responsibilities.”57
Finally, in a report on Croatia a comment can be found as to how government should
eliminate sex stereotypes in law:
53 Lithuania (2000), A/55/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 472, 473 and 480, para. 139. See also e.g. Romania (2000),
A/55/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 481 and 482, para. 303, Egypt (2001), A/56/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 492 and 493para.
334, 335, Vietnam (2001), A/56/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 518 and 519, para. 251 and Estonia (2002), A/57/38,
CEDAW/C/SR. 539, 540 and 548, para. 25, 26.
54 Ireland (1999), A/54/38, CEDAW/C/S. 440 and 441, para 193, 194.
55 Venezuela (1997), A/52/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 323 and 324, para. 223, Mexico (1998), A/53/38, CEDAW/C/Sr.
376 and 377, para. 398 and Thailand (1999), A/54/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 417and 418, para. 244, 245.
56 Italy (1997), A/52/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 346 and 347, para. 357.
57 Fiji Islands (2002), A/57/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 530, 531 and 538, para. 32.
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“The Committee recommends that the Government take advantage of existing bodies of knowledge
relating to indirect and structural patterns of discrimination. It emphasises that the Government,
rather than women themselves, have primary responsibility for implementing strategies to eliminate
these forms of discrimination.”58
The importance of Article 5a CEDAW in relation to European Community sex equality law
In a Concluding Comment on Slovenia, dating from 2003, the Committee comments both
on the necessity to implement Article 5a CEDAW and the fact that Slovenia has mostly
oriented itself to European law in its fight against discrimination against women. It appears
as if the Committee is implying that European law is not sufficient for a correct imple-
mentation of the Convention:
“The Committee urges the State party to strengthen measures to eradicate traditional sex role
stereotypes in the family, in employment, in politics and in society. The Committee recommends
that the State party encourage the mass media to promote cultural changes with regard to the roles
and responsibilities attributed to women and men, as required by article 5 of the Convention. While
noting that the State party’s efforts to promote gender equality appear to be oriented primarily
towards the framework of European Union provisions, the Committee is concerned that the Conven-
tion has not been given central importance as a legally binding human rights instrument and basis
for the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and the advancement of women.
The Committee urges the State party to base its efforts to achieve gender equality on the wide
scope of the Convention, as a legally binding human rights instrument. It therefore urges the State
party to take proactive measures to raise awareness about the Convention, in particular among
parliamentarians, the judiciary and the legal profession.”59
A comparable remark can be read in the Concluding Comments on Germany, where the
Committee expresses its concern that the Convention is not taken seriously by lawyers
(this time in relationship with article 4(1) of the Convention):
“The Committee is concerned that the Convention has not received the same degree of visibility
and importance as regional legal instruments, particularly European Union directives, and is therefore
not cited regularly as the legal basis for measures, including legislation, for the elimination of
discrimination against women and the advancement of women in the State party. The Committee
urges the State party to place greater emphasis on the Convention as a legally binding human rights
instrument in its efforts to achieve the goal of gender equality.”60
58 Croatia (1998), A/53/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 363, 364 and 368, para. 113.
59 Slovenia (2003), A/58/38, CEDAW/C/SR, 620 and 621, para. 217, 218 and 219.
60 Germany (2004), A/59/38, CEDAW/C/SR, 640 and 641, para. 26 and 27.
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Conclusion
The Concluding Comments of the CEDAW Committee illustrate the rich variety of subject
matter that can be brought under the scope of Article 5a CEDAW. Because the Committee
is always re-active in these reports (that is, it responds to Country Reports and sometimes
to NGO Shadow Reports) it is difficult to say whether the developments revealed in these
documents can be attributed to a change in the opinions of the Committee, or whether
they were (also) inspired by what the State parties and Non-Governmental Organisations
brought to the Committee’s attention.61
What is evident is that the Committee not always discusses Article 5a CEDAW as a free-
standing obligation, but is increasingly making a connection between this provision and
specific obligations under the Convention in relation to labour, health, political participation,
and other relevant issues.
One further visible development is that over the years the Committee has placed less and
less emphasis on information campaigns and education, and instead increasingly argued
for concrete action to be taken (for example, with regards to violence against women based
on sex stereotypes or unequal pay and labour market segregation). Finally, it is noteworthy
that the Committee repeatedly stresses that formal equal treatment in law and public policy-
making is not sufficient, and that there should be a critical review as to whether law and
policy remains based on stereotyped role models and traditional ideas of masculinity and
femininity.
61 As said in the introduction to this Chapter, time constraints and limited facilities meant that the Country
Reports could not be studied.

8VIEWS OF THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT ON THE MEANING OF
ARTICLE 5a CEDAW
8.1 Introduction
The first section of this Chapter outlines the discussions between the Cabinet and Parliament
which took place about Article 5a CEDAW during the ratification procedure.1 Two themes
played a central role in these discussions: the relationship between the provision and
fundamental rights and freedoms; and what kind of measures are necessary as result of
adopting the provision. Following this, there is a review of the observations made by the
Dutch government about Article 5a CEDAW in its Country Reports to the CEDAW Commit-
tee.2 What can we learn from these documents about the content and scope of this pro-
vision?
8.2 The discussion of Article 5a CEDAW during the ratification procedure
Article 5a CEDAW and fundamental freedom rights
The history of the Ratification Act makes it clear that the main concern of Members of
the Dutch Parliament was the question as to whether Articles 5a and 10c CEDAW are
compatible with the principle of freedom of education and whether implementing these
Articles could lead to a form of ‘state indoctrination’.3 It was the view of some political
parties that government should avoid seeking to give direction about the allocation of roles
between men and women. For this reason the small (fundamentalist) Christian parties voted
against the Ratification Act.
The notion that Article 5a CEDAW would lead to indoctrination by the state was vehe-
mently opposed by the Cabinet.4 In this connection, there was a short – but not very
1 See also Lijnzaad 1994, p. 52-54, Lijnzaad 1991, p. 7 and Monster et al. 2001, p. 50 et.seq.
2 The next Chapter discusses the opinions that the Dutch government expressed in its response to the National
Reports and the first four in-depth studies.
3 TK 1984-1985, 18 950 (R 1281), VV, nr. 4, p. 14.
4 TK 1986-1987, 18 950 (R1281), MvA, nr. 6, p. 29.
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illuminating – discussion about the meaning of the word ‘stereotype’, in which the Cabinet
simply repeats the wording of this provision of the Convention.5 One Member of Par-
liament of a Christian party expressed concern about advertising commercials in which
traditional role models are swapped. In his view, this undermined the natural order of the
family and led to divorce.6 The fundamentalist Christian parties also asked which legal
principle in a democratic state based on the rule of law gave the government the right to
change men’s and women’s social and cultural patterns of behaviour.7 The response was
that the freedom of citizens to arrange their lives according to their own views about
humanity and society constitutes the primordial norm in such a state. However, this freedom
may be limited if this is necessary to guarantee an equal amount of freedom for every-
body.8
The opposite view was expressed by the Social Democrats who wanted the government
to play an active role in combating sex stereotypes in the media.9 The Cabinet acknow-
ledged that the media can indeed play an important role in changing social and cultural
patterns of behaviour and announced a series of measures and state-supported pro-
grammes.10
During the ratification procedure the Dutch government expressly conceded that there
is a connection between sex stereotypes and violence against women, and that the Conven-
tion entails an obligation to put an end to this violence.11
A change of behaviour or structural change
In first instance the Dutch government appears to interpret Article 5a CEDAW as an obliga-
tion to promote a change of attitudes and patterns of behaviour of men and women at an
individual, subjective level. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill of Ratification notes
that in its emancipation policy, the government acknowledges the fact that formal equal
rights are not enough, but that “(…) in essence, only a general re-evaluation of the roles
of women and men in society will lead to the emancipation of women.”12 According to
the government, emancipation policies aim to change the traditional attribution of roles
and to tackle the accumulated backlog of discrimination experienced by women.
5 TK 1984-1985, 18 950 (R 1281), VV, nr. 4, p. 14 and TK 1986-1987, 18 950 (R1281), MvA, nr. 6, p.
29.
6 Oral debate on the Ratification Bill, Handelingen TK 4 July 1990, p. 86-4867.
7 TK 1984-1985, 18 950 (R 1281), VV, nr. 4, p. 14.
8 TK 1986-1987, 18 950 (R1281), MvA, nr. 6, p. 29.
9 TK 1984-1985, 18 950 (R 1281), VV, nr. 4, p. 13.
10 TK 1986-1987, 18 950 (R1281), MvA, nr. 6, p. 26.
11 TK 1984-1985, 18 950 (R 1281), VV, nr. 4, p. 14 and TK 1986-1987, 18 950 (R1281), MvA, nr. 6, p.
28
12 TK 1984-1985, 18 950 (R 1281), MvT, nr. 3, p. 14.
Part II 49
This approach was criticised by Members of Parliament:
“If one wants to change social and cultural patterns of behaviour it is not enough to design a specific
emancipation policy; rather, this is one aspect which must be taken into account in all policy-making
and legislation. This is especially the case in the fields of healthcare and social services, but also
in social security and tax. As long as these (indirect) obstacles for women to change their patterns
of behaviour exist, traditional views will persist.”13
The government acknowledged that this was (also) the case and referred to the objectives
of the emancipation policy programme in force at that time, which were formulated in
terms of “the achievement of structural changes to ensure that difference between the sexes
is no longer one of the organising principles of society” and “to eradicate traditional images
of masculinity and femininity”.14
During the ratification procedure there was a good deal of discussion about the question
as to whether the Convention implied an obligation to prohibit indirect discrimination,
and hence whether it would require a corresponding adaptation of legislation. However,
this discussion was not linked to the discussion about Article 5a CEDAW.
8.3 The Dutch Country Reports to the CEDAW Committee
This section considers the views of the Dutch government on Article 5a CEDAW as
expressed in the Country Reports submitted to the CEDAW Committee. Article 18 of the
Convention requires State parties to submit such reports on a regular basis. In total the
Netherlands has reported three times between 1991 (year of ratification) and May 2004
(when this research was completed).
The Initial Country Report of the Netherlands
The initial Country Report of the Netherlands to the CEDAW Committee, written in 1992,
contains a long list of measures that the government had implemented in the light of Article
5a CEDAW.15 All these measures were aimed at raising awareness and changing attitudes
through information campaigns, research and state-supported programmes. One example
is the media campaign encouraging girls to choose a technical education. The Report
highlights the fact that such programmes can collide with freedom of expression. At the
13 TK 1984-1985, 18950 (R1281), VV, nr. 4, p. 14.
14 TK 1986-1987, 18 950 (R1281), MvA, nr. 6, p. 27. In Dutch this is formulated as: “Het doorbreken van
beeldvorming in termen van mannelijkheid of vrouwelijkheid.” It is particularly difficult to translate this
phrase. Beelvorming is something like ‘the social and cultural construction of images’. In this book I have
chosen to translate it as ‘to combat stereotyped images of masculinity and femininity’ or shorter: ‘to combat
(or eradicate) gender stereotyped images’.
15 Min. SZW 1992 (b): Initial report, p. 85-87.
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same time, it argues that, despite this constitutional right, it is legitimate to place limits
on the distribution of pornographic material. According to the government, it is not appro-
priate to draft new legislation to implement Article 5a CEDAW because such legislation
could infringe the autonomy of various social sectors. The Report concludes with the
observation that government policy in this field appears to be effective. However, im-
mediately after having said this, the government admits that its own policy had been less
systematic than would have been desirable.16
In its review of this Report the CEDAW Committee does not discuss the policy of the Dutch
government with respect to Article 5a CEDAW. It only requested clarification on the policy
of the government on guaranteeing the equal rights of lesbian women.17
The Second and Third Country Report of the Netherlands18
In the Second and Third Country Report of the Netherlands, Article 5a CEDAW is no longer
discussed as a separate issue. This is a consequence of the fact that the Dutch government
decided to structure its Reports to the CEDAW Committee on the basis of the threefold aims
of the Convention, a system developed by the Groenman Committee between the First
(Initial) and the Second Report. The Reports review progress in meeting these aims in
the Netherlands in relation to every policy field that falls under the scope of the Conven-
tion.19
Consideration of these two Country Reports suggests that Article 5a CEDAW is viewed
as an important interpretative framework for both the second sub-aim (improving the
position of women) and the third sub-aim (combating the dominant gender ideology) of
the Convention. In policy-making language, the second sub-aim has been translated into
the expression ‘towards diversity’. According to the Dutch government, diversity policy
is mainly directed at increasing the proportion of women in processes of social and political
decision-making, and in facilitating different roles for men and women with regard to paid
labour and care.20 The main instrument cited by the government for implementing this
policy is that of Gender Impact Assessment.
16 Initial report, p. 87.
17 The Netherlands (1994), A/49/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 234 and 239, para. 270. See Lijnzaad 1994, p. 56 and
Jacobs & Van den Brink 1994, p. 31.
18 See Min. SZW 1998 and 2000 (a), here referred to as ‘Second Report’ and ‘Third Report’. Both reports
have been discussed by the CEDAW Committee in July 2001. We here refer to the page numbers of the
Reports as they were published by the Min. SZW.
19 Second Report, p. 4-6.
20 Second Report, p. 12-13.
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The third sub-aim of the Convention has been translated into ‘promoting and supporting
social and cultural change’.21 According to the government, Article 5a CEDAW does
embody this sub-aim.
“Each subsequent level attempts to penetrate more deeply into the structures of society. And the
more deeply the issue of emancipation penetrates into this structure, the more difficult it is to
formulate policy to cover it. Traditional ideas and customs are by definition regarded as so self-
evident that they are never questioned.”22
It also notes that the Convention does not give a good deal of direction as to how these
changes should be brought about. Under the heading of ‘strategies for cultural change’
the government understands the following:
“(…) increasing attention has been focused in the Netherlands on this third level: that is, identifying
and eliminating hidden gender discrimination. The Netherlands has decided to tackle the problem
by formulating a strategy for cultural change. This is based on the recognition that policy has
hitherto been determined as a matter of course by reference to the criterion of the white middle-class
male. The implicit concomitant of this approach has been that women too have had to fulfil this
criterion. In recent years the authorities have conducted an in-depth analysis of the problem. This
has generated many new ideas. Translating these ideas into specific policy measures is not easy.
However, the report will show that it is not impossible.”23
The instruments mentioned in the context of this third sub-aim all lie (again) at the level
of campaigns for awareness raising and information. That this third sub-aim can also have
consequences for legislation and policy making becomes apparent when the reports are
discussed with the Committee. At that point the government states that this sub-aim “(…)
provides a framework for reviewing legislation, policy and the implementation of policy.”24
In its Concluding Comments the Committee expressed its appreciation for the presentation
of Dutch policies on the basis of the threefold aims of the Convention.25 During the
‘constructive dialogue’ between the Committee and the Dutch government in July 2001,
the third sub-aim was not a separate issue for debate. The CEDAW Committee also did not
discuss it in its Concluding Comments. Nevertheless, this document gave some considera-
tion to the issue of stereotypes in relation to paid labour and care.
21 The Dutch women’s NGOs have objected to this transformation in their Shadow Report. See E-Quality
2000, p. 12-13.
22 Second Report, p. 8
23 Second Report, p. 8-9.
24 Press Release on the 512th and 513th meeting of the CEDAW Committee (2001). WOM 1288.
25 The Netherlands, A/56/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 512 and 513, para 196.
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The division of paid labour and care in relation to Article 5a CEDAW
Both Country Reports lack an analysis of the obstacles and stereotypes that stand in the
way of (re)distributing paid labour and care. Nor is any attention given to the ways in which
legislation and public policy might serve to reflect and reinforce such stereotypes. The
Dutch government stresses the importance of the so-called combination-model, as the main
means of solving the problems of combining paid labour and care.26 Positive action policy
(part of the government’s emancipation policy in the early-1990s) has been replaced by
a policy that (once more) focuses on awareness raising.
The Shadow Report presented to the CEDAW Committee by 23 Dutch women’s NGOs notes
that the activities of the Dutch government have been very limited as far as efforts to
achieve the third sub-aim of the Convention are concerned. The emphasis has been placed
on achieving economic independence for women, and the (intrinsic) value of unpaid care
work seems to have disappeared from view.27
The CEDAW Committee is also critical about the one-sided emphasis on the economic
aspects of women’s emancipation, and the approach to facilitating part-time work.28 The
Committee stresses that the government should make greater efforts to eliminate gender
stereotypes in certain parts of the labour market. Finally, the CEDAW Committee states
that positive action measures are indispensable for real progress as far as an equal repres-
entation of women in all positions in professional and commercial life is concerned.29
26 Third Report, p. 113. “The basic idea of this model is that workers at a time of life when they have heavy
family responsibilities can work rather fewer hours and so provide part of the necessary care themselves
(helped by the special leave schemes) while contracting out the rest (to organised child care facilities and
home care services).” This involves an average working week of 30-32 hours for both parents.
27 E-Quality 2000, p. 16.
28 The Netherlands (2001) A/56/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 512 and 513, para. 213, 214.
29 The Netherlands (2001), A/56/38/CEDAW/C/SR 512 and 513, para. 213, 214.
9ARTICLE 5a CEDAW IN NATIONAL REPORTS AND IN-DEPTH
STUDIES
9.1 Introduction
Article 3 of the Ratification Act requires the Dutch Government to report on the state of
implementation of the Convention to the Dutch Parliament before it sends its Country
Report to the CEDAW Committee.1 In 1997 the first so-called National Report appeared.2
As noted in Chapter 3 of this book, the Committee that produced this Report attached
special importance to Article 5a CEDAW. This Chapter explores in more detail what obliga-
tions can be derived from this provision, according to this Committee. This is followed
by an analysis of the second National Report, issued in 2002-2003. In addition, four in-
depth studies were undertaken between 1996 and 2000: one was on the significance of
the Convention for the Dutch legal order and three about specific policy areas covered
by the Convention. What insights about the meaning of Article 5a CEDAW can be derived
from these materials?
9.2 The first National Report
The relationship between Article 5a CEDAW and diversity policies
In its Report the Groenman Committee paid a good deal of attention to Article 5a CEDAW.
As discussed before – see Chapter 3 – the Committee derived the third aim of the Conven-
tion from this provision: combating the dominant gender ideology. The Committee places
this sub-aim in the context of the promotion of diversity and a policy in which various
life styles are made possible.
1 Kingdom Act of 3 July 1991 for the Ratification of the CEDAW Convention (New York, 18 December
1979), Official Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 1991, 355.
2 Report of the Groenman Committee (named after its chairperson, Louise Groenman). Parts of this Report
are included as an Appendix to this book.
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In its response to this Report the Cabinet fully subscribes to this conclusion:
“In a social state based on the rule of law, the perspective of one group of citizens – be it the
majority or the minority of the population – should not be dominant. Granting equal rights to citizens
does not imply that the only work that needs to done is in the framework of equal rights or equal
opportunities.”3
This suggests that government has acknowledged that Article 5a CEDAW adds a different
value to the equal rights framework already in place.
The necessity to use concrete instruments
The Committee’s evaluation of the existing legislation and policy of the Dutch government,
viewed against the background of the Convention’s obligations, indicates that very few
actions have been taken towards meeting the third sub-aim of the Convention.4 The
Committee points out that gender ideology is active at different levels and that, for that
reason, it must be combated using a range of different instruments.5 Since gender stereo-
types are also active at the level of social structures, it is not enough to use only ‘soft’
measures.
“According to the Committee more ‘hard’ instruments, like legislation, directives and gender impact
assessments should be used, also when this third sub-aim is concerned. This means that not only
information campaigns should be held (…)”6
The Committee finds that there is no agreement about the role that the government can
play in this. Restraint, dictated by respect for constitutional rights such as freedom of
expression or freedom of religion, and by doubts about the government’s potential to
influence gender issues, is to be expected – but is not justified: “ (…) because the excluding
effect of gender stereotypes has sufficiently been studied and their existence is not subject
for debate.”7
3 TK 1997-1998, 25 893, nr, 2, p. 10.
4 The Committee discusses with approval the activities of the Projectgroep Beeldvorming (to be discussed
in Chapter 14 of this book), but is critical about the fact that the actions of the government have been very
one sided, i.e. only directed at education and information. Groenman Committee 1997, p. 59.
5 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 73. The Commission here refers to the ‘layered meaning’ of gender according
to women’s studies: it has power at the symbolic level, at the level of individual and collective identities
and at the level of social structures.
6 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 74.
7 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 74.
Part II 55
Combating gender stereotypes in law and public policy
Law and public policy are a component part of the structural level at which gender stereo-
types operate. “Administering the principle of equality before the law does not automatically
lead to the elimination of gender ideology that is active in law.” Therefore, it is of great
importance “(…) to critically analyse legal concepts and to continually call into question
the assumptions that underlie the interpretation of legal concepts.”8 This demands that
the legislator develop gender sensitivity and that some concepts and structures in law are
subject to a fundamental reconsideration. By way of example the Committee cites the
reconsideration of the division between the system of social insurance and that of welfare
benefits and to reconsider which income risks should be covered by means of social security
in a modern (emancipated) society . Within the latter system the risk of losing income
as a result of combining paid labour and care should also be taken into consideration.9
The Dutch government subscribed to the conclusion of the Groenman Committee that
it is necessary to develop a clear framework of reference within which legislation can be
tested for its indirect discriminatory effects on women. It also promised that the recom-
mendations that the Committee made at this point would be included in the design of further
explorative studies.10
9.3 The second National Report
Introduction
In 2002 and 2003 for the second time a National Report on the implementation of CEDAW
in the Netherlands was delivered to the Dutch Parliament. The Report consisted of two
separate parts: a Report by Professor Marianne Marchand, containing a general overview,
and a Report by the Advisory Commission for Alien Affairs, which contained a review
of the position of female foreign nationals in the Netherlands. This section reviews if and
how these Reports discussed the obligations arising under Article 5a CEDAW.
The Marchand Report
Professor Marchand, the second National Rapporteur, cites the threefold aims of the
Convention described by the Groenman Committee as the framework for her assessment
as to whether the Convention is being correctly implemented.11 When making an assess-
ment of the emancipation policy of the government she does not specify the requirements
8 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 75.
9 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 76.
10 Reaction of the Cabinet to the f irst National Report, TK 1997-1998, 25 893, nr 2, p. 20.
11 Rapport Marchand 2003, p. 3.
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set by the Convention’s provisions that underpin these three sub-aims, nor does she evaluate
whether these requirements are met.12 Only with regard to the gender mainstreaming policy
of the government does she conclude that the Ministries that are required to carry out this
policy had not tackled the third sub-aim of the Convention. She notes that:
“(…) in formulating the concrete tasks one often gets stuck at the level of aiming at formal and
substantive equality of men and women, but does not include in those objectives fundamental
changes of paradigms about gender stereotyping and traditional male-female relationships.”13
As far as the realisation of the third sub-aim is concerned, Professor Marchand reports
that little progress has been made.14 She cites a few activities, mostly in the field of
awareness raising and information campaigns, aimed at eliminating gender stereotyped
images. She is especially concerned by the fact that care work is still seen as a burden
or as a deviation from paid labour.
The advice of the Advisory Commission for Alien Affairs
The thematic study carried out in the context of the second National Report was dedicated
to the position of female foreign nationals in the Netherlands. The Advisory Commission
for Alien Affairs mentions the threefold aims of the Convention in a footnote,15 but then
summarises the impact of the Convention as follows, using its own words: “From the first
five Articles of the Convention it should be derived that the Women’s Convention not
only aims at formal legal equality but also at de facto equality between men and
women.”16 From this the Commission concludes that it should analyse whether Dutch
legislation on aliens contains direct or indirect discriminatory provisions. However, in doing
so the Commission overlooked the fact that combating direct and indirect discrimination
belongs to the first sub-aim of the Convention, according to the schema elaborated by the
Groenman Committee. In order to prevent indirect discrimination the Advisory Commission
at some points deems it necessary to assemble and analyse statistical data, and to conduct
a Gender Impact Assessment (GIA).17
12 One explanation for this omission is that Prof. Marchand had only a few months in which to do this research
and submit her Report. Moreover, she is not a lawyer.
13 Report Marchand 2003, p. 15.
14 Report Marchand 2003, p. 65.
15 ACVZ-advice 2002, p. 14, footnote 14 .
16 ACVZ-advice 2002, p. 14. The Commission thereby neglects the instructions laid down in the assignment
that it got from the government before doing this research. See appendix 2 to the ACVZ-Advice.
17 ACVZ-advice 2002, p. 19.
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The reaction of the government to the second National Report
The official response of the Cabinet to the two parts of the second National Report only
mentions the third sub-aim of the Convention in one specific paragraph where the subject
of the ‘security and rights’ of women is discussed.18 With regard to all the other issues
discussed in this response (gender mainstreaming, work, care, income, power and decision
making and the position of female foreign nationals) the multi-layered approach which
characterised the government’s emancipation policy (in terms of the threefold aims of the
Convention) is no longer visible.19 The comments made by the government on the scope
and meaning of the third sub-aim in the paragraph about security and rights do not seem
particularly hopeful. “Combating the dominant gender ideology” (as the Groenman Commit-
tee has formulated this sub-aim) has been ‘translated’ into “to eliminate a culture based
on traditional role patterns and prejudice”.20 The government does not indicate which
of the measures mentioned in this paragraph are targeted at this particular sub-aim.
9.4 In-depth studies into the meaning of the Women’s Convention
A radical interpretation of Article 5a CEDAW
The first in-depth study into the implications of CEDAW for the Dutch legal order, which
preceded the first National Report, mentions Article 5a CEDAW as the final goal of the
Convention, and as such of major importance for a dynamic interpretation of the Conven-
tion.21 The Report does not indicate which specific obligations this Article entails.
As part of the preliminary work for this Report Lammy Betten and Mies Westerveld
conducted a study into the field of social security.22 These researchers attached a far more
important role to Article 5a CEDAW. According to them, the essential difference between
the Women’s Convention and other international non-discrimination norms lies in this
provision in which “(…) a more far-reaching substance is given to the concept of dis-
crimination then in any other international Convention, a situation which can have radical
consequences for social security.” In their view, Article 5a CEDAW demands “(…) tout
court and without any qualification, a change of habits and customs based on traditional
role models (…). And not simply where possible or when deemed expedient.” They
conclude that Article 5a CEDAW necessitates the eradication of all gender stereotypes in
18 Min. SZW 2003, p. 30.
19 Only in the paragraph about mainstreaming it is noticed that in many policy areas ‘old role models’ are
still implicitly the norm, while these models can hinder the full participation of every citizen in society.
Min. SZW 2003, p. 13
20 Min. SZW 2003, p. 30.
21 Hes & Van Vleuten 1996.
22 Betten & Westerveld 1994.
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the social security system, including the elimination of all instances of ‘breadwinner-
thinking’, even if in practice this might worsen the position of women. They subsequently
qualify this stance by noting that abolishing pension rights for housewives might be
necessary under Article 5a CEDAW on a first consideration, but that this is not really what
this provision aims for. Such a measure would damage the interests of those whom the
Convention aims to protect.
The obligations of the government arising out of this Article go further than simply
abolishing rules and regulations that hamper women. It also requires positive action by
government, according to Betten and Westerveld. As an example they point to the Nor-
wegian law that obliges men to take parental leave.
The study into health and healthcare
The study into the meaning of Article 12 CEDAW for Dutch law and policy in the field
of health and healthcare does not contain a separate discussion of gender stereotypes.23
However, at several places in this Report it appears that male and female stereotypes (in
both the biological and the social sense) do in fact play a role in regard to access to
healthcare and difference in treatment between men and women.24 The researchers
emphasise that the Women’s Convention is not aimed at a male norm to which women
must adapt if they want to attain equality.25
Article 5a CEDAW as a basis for a different organisation of paid labour and care
The study into the meaning of the Women’s Convention for the fields of motherhood,
parenthood and paid labour devotes a good deal of attention to the implications of Article 5
CEDAW.26 As noted above in Chapter 2, the authors of this Report see a connection
between parts (a) and (b) of this provision. These parts – in their mutual connection – make
it clear that a distinction should be drawn between physical aspects of motherhood and
the (culturally determined) role of a mother. “Motherhood needs to be respected, but it
ought not to be idealised in such a way that women are forced into the role of mother and
are limited in their other faculties.”27 According to Monster, Cremers and Willems Article
5a CEDAW is of great importance for the organisation of the structure of paid labour.
“Article 5a CEDAW poses a requirement to take the care work of both parents into consideration,
to establish gender-neutral regulations for paid work and care, and hence create the preconditions
for a non-gender related division of labour in which men can also take on the work of caring.”28
23 Holtrust et al. 1996.
24 Holtrust et al. 1996, p. 217.
25 Holtrust et al. 1996, p. 32 and p. 218.
26 Monster et al. 1998, p. 50.
27 Monster et al. 1998, p. 53.
28 Monster et al. 1998, p. 53.
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From their conclusions, it would seem that these authors do not see Article 5a CEDAW
as a provision that stands on its own; rather, it has ‘supportive’ significance in the sense
that it serves as a provision that helps to fill in the content of Article 11 (about paid work
and income). It indicates that when implementing this (latter) provision, habits and customs
based on gender stereotypes should be eliminated.29
In this regard Monster et. al. indicate at several places in their report that in their view
the non-discrimination principle of the Women’s Convention has an additional value when
compared to existing (constitutional) norms for equal treatment. While the latter are mainly
directed at discrimination as a problem for individual women, the Women’s Convention
addresses the structural dimension of such discrimination. “A general, important aspect
is that structural discrimination is not effectively combated with the laws [i.e. equal
treatment laws; RH].”30
Discussion of this report between Cabinet and Parliament
The discussion about this Report – as far as the meaning and impact of Article 5a CEDAW
is concerned – concentrated on the content of the paragraph quoted immediately above.31
The view of the researchers led to a number of questions.32
“Does the government acknowledge that the definition [of discrimination; RH] in the Women’s
Convention is in fact more suitable for realising equal treatment between men and women (…)
and is it prepared to accept this definition as its own?”33
According to the government this difference does not exist.34 The ban on discrimination,
as formulated in the Women’s Convention, can also be found in other international Treaties,
such as the general Human Right Treaties of the United Nations and EC Directives in the
field of sex equality. According to the Dutch government, these instruments establish a
more concrete non-discrimination norm than the Women’s Convention.
The relationship between gender stereotypes and violence against women
On the issue of the (supposed) relationship between the existence of negative gender
stereotypes about women and violence against women, the Report on the impact of the
Women’s Convention on policy and legislation dealing with violence against women pays
29 Monster et al. 1998, p. 343.
30 Monster et al. 1998, p. 95
31 There was also some debate on policy to eliminate gender-stereotyped images and on the nature of the
concrete measures that the government should take. See TK 1998-1999, 25 893, nr. 6, p. 28.
32 TK 1998-1999, 25 893, nr. 6, questions A11 – A14, B4 and B7.
33 TK1998-1999, 25 893, nr. 6, question A11.
34 TK1998-1999, 25 893, nr. 6, p. 40.
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a great deal of attention to Article 5a CEDAW.35 For Boerefijn, Loenen and Van der Liet,
one key consideration is the extent to which the obligation under the Convention is weighed
against other constitutional rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom of religion.
If it could be established that there is a causal relationship between negative gender
stereotypes and sex-based violence, these latter rights should be afforded less protection
on the ground of the principle of proportionality.36 The authors conclude that the govern-
ment does not make sufficient efforts to combat negative gender stereotypes and that more
information campaigns are necessary.37 Nothing was said about the meaning of Article
5a CEDAW for this policy area in the subsequent discussion of this study between the
Cabinet and Parliament.38
35 Boerefijn et al. 2000, p. 39. The authors point at some reports of the Dutch Emancipation Council (Emanci-
patieraad) and to some UN-Documents, like the Beijing platform for action, in which this connection is
also made. See also General Recommendation 19 of the CEDAW Committe, discussed in Chapter 7 of
this book.
36 Boerefijn et al. 2000, p. 39.
37 Boerefijn et al. 2000, e.g. at p. 106, 209 and 266.
38 TK 2002-2003 28 600 XV, nr. 110 and Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2002-2003 nr. 58.
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LEGAL LITERATURE ABOUT ARTICLE 5a CEDAW
10.1 The meaning of Article 5a CEDAW according to Dutch legal literature
An instrument to bring about cultural change
In one of the first publications about the Women’s Convention in the Netherlands1 Pro-
fessor Henc van Maarseveen cites Article 5a CEDAW explicitly in the context of what he
considers to be the five principles that underlie the Convention.2 Besides protection, non-
discrimination, equal treatment and emancipation in his view the principle of cultural
change is of central importance in achieving real progress on (equal) rights for women.
In his view, this constitutes the most novel and radical principle in the Convention.
Van Maarseveen considers that there are several indications that the Convention contains
this principle.
“In the existing legal order women need to be protected, women may not be treated differently
on unjustified grounds, women need to have equal rights and possibilities as men, and special
measures need to be taken to put an end to the de facto unequal social position of women. However,
these instruments always begin from existing positions and relations. (…) The CEDAW Convention
has partly broken with this convention. In the first place, the male norm that in other instruments
is incorporated in the expression ‘on the basis of equality with men’ has been replaced by the
formula ‘on a basis of equality of men and women’. In the second place, the Preamble expresses
the conviction that a change of traditional roles of men and women is necessary, both in society
and in the family. And thirdly, there is Article 5a.”3
The renewing and radical potential of this provision lies in the fact that it has opened the
way to “(…) a possible feminisation of culture, at least of the culture that is represented
1 Earlier publications, e.g. by Goldschmidt and Brunott in Nemesis, the Dutch journal on Women and Law,
did not discuss this provision.
2 Van Maarseveen 1987.
3 Van Maarseveen 1987, p. 74-75.
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in the legal order.”4 How this can or should be achieved is left undetermined by the author.
Nevertheless, Van Maarseveen states that official policy can only have a limited impact
in this areas. Eradicating traditional roles requires men and women to strive for this outcome
in their personal lives.5
The under-determination of Article 5a CEDAW
Other authors have also had difficulty in ascertaining the precise meaning and scope of
this Article. Liesbeth Lijnzaad states that “Article 5a CEDAW is probably the most difficult
provision when it comes to implementation [of the Convention; RH].”6 In a later publication
she repeats this observation, but this time adds that “(…) in a given culture, stereotypes
work like carbon paper. It is against these stereotypes that Article 5a CEDAW is directed.”7
After having eliminated direct and indirect discrimination, the elimination of gender
stereotypes is the final step to an optimal realisation of women’s human rights as the
possibility for individuals to make their own choices in life, in a situation free of prejudice,
represents the final realisation of the objective of the Convention. Lijnzaad sees Article
5a as the “primal aim of the Convention, the intention behind the whole of the Conven-
tion.”8
Lijnzaad points out that this provision lacks determinacy as there is no definition of
‘stereotypes’ and of ‘the inferiority or superiority of either sex’.
“What should we make of a beauty contest, the election of Prince Carnival, or the chivalry of
keeping the door open for a woman? To me the right answer to this question seems to be a matter
of subjectivity – which inevitably detracts a good deal from the usefulness of Article 5a CEDAW
as a legal rule.”9
Lijnzaad thus questions the legal usefulness of the Article:
“It is not infeasible that the objective of eradicating role models, and thereby enlarging the freedom
of choice of women, is an extra-legal objective and that its realisation is outside the scope of the
law.”10
4 Van Maarseveen 1987, p. 75.
5 Van Maarseveen 1987 (b), p. 137
6 Lijnzaad 1991, p. 7.
7 Lijnzaad1994, p. 43.
8 Lijnzaad1994, p. 46.
9 Lijnzaad1994, p. 45 and p. 57.
10 Lijnzaad1994, p. 46.
Part II 63
In her view, the Article can certainly not have direct effect, and will – if it collides with
other constitutional rights – almost certainly lose against classical rights such as freedom
of religion or freedom of education.11
The importance of Article 5a CEDAW
Despite her warnings not to expect too much, Lijnzaad moves on to argue quite positively
about the potential effects of Article 5a CEDAW. Firstly, she identifies that the provision
aims to facilitate diversity.12 Secondly, she terms this Article a ‘hat peg provision’ that
is of great importance for a dynamic interpretation of the Convention. This is to say that
with the help of this provision new issues can be brought under the scope of the Conven-
tion. In order to illustrate this point she discusses General Recommendations number 12
and 19, in which, based on Article 5a CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee constructs a con-
demnation of violence against women, a subject not expressly covered by the Convention
itself. Although, from an international law perspective, this would not win a prize for the
most elegant solution “(…) it is a flexible method with which probably more can be
achieved than by negotiations over additional protocols to the Convention or a new text
of the Convention.”13 In her view, the practical importance of this Article for the Dutch
situation lies in the fact that it offers a legal basis for measures taken by government to
eliminate negative stereotypes, including TV commercials in which girls are summoned
up to choose physics and mathematics for their studies and men to iron their own shirts.14
Testing policies and legislation with the help of Article 5a CEDAW
In an article in which she discusses the payment of overtime rates to part-time workers,
Klaartje Wentholt demonstrates that Article 5a CEDAW can be used to test (proposed)
legislation.
“The recognition of the fact that part-time workers can also have caring obligations and that overtime
means an extra burden to them, breaks with the dominant norm of full-time working. This contests
the dominant gender ideology, in conformity with Article 5a CEDAW. It is up to the judge to read
this obligation to eliminate this dominant norm into the non-discrimination rule”.15
11 Lijnzaad 1994, p. 54.
12 Lijnzaad1994, p. 57.
13 Lijnzaad 1994, p. 47.
14 Lijnzaad1994, p. 55.
15 Wentholt 1997, p. 202. In the rest of her publication it appears that this can be done by interpreting existing
legal norms, such as the norm that one needs to be a ‘good employer’ or the norms of reasonableness and
equity in such a way that the norm of Article 5a CEDAW is included in them.
64 Chapter 10 – Legal literature about Article 5a CEDAW
In her view the provision calls for a ‘care friendly’ interpretation of social law. “Rigid
assumptions in law must be made visible in order to make room for really taking caring
activities into consideration.”16
In the view of the present author, Article 5a CEDAW is a legal norm with great importance
for combating so-called systemic or structural discrimination.17 On the basis of a close
reading of the provision itself and of the documents and literature discussed above I take
it that State parties to this Convention are obliged to strive to eliminate negative gender
stereotypes. This Article provides a sound legal basis for measures aimed at ending the
reproduction of the dominant gender ideology in law and public policies.18
10.2 Literature in the English language on Article 5a CEDAW
The limited instrumental value of Article 5a CEDAW
Even in feminist legal literature the Women’s Convention is regularly dismissed as a weak
and ineffective instrument for guaranteeing women’s human rights. The main reasons given
for this viewpoint are that the Convention lacks an adequate system of supervision and
that there are ample possibilities for State parties to make reservations.19 One further
argument is that the Convention only requires State parties to take ‘appropriate measures’,
and does not impose clearly-defined obligations backed up by effective deterrent sanc-
tions.20 Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright summarise this critique in the following terms:
“In sum, the Women’s Convention (…) is an ambiguous offer. It recognises discrimination against
women as a legal issue but is premised on the notion of progress through good will, education
and changing attitudes and does not promise any form of structural, social or economic change
for women.”21
Other authors recognise that the Convention covers a broad area and that it goes further
then the elimination of (formal) discrimination as it also requires the elimination of sex
16 Wentholt 1997, p. 203.
17 See Holtmaat 1997, Holtmaat 1998, Holtmaat 2001 and Holtmaat 2003 (a).
18 Holtmaat 1997, p. 77-78 and Holtmaat 2001, p. 178-179. This research, commissioned by the DCE, provided
me with the opportunity to find more substantive evidence for the validity of this interpretation.
19 See Charlesworth & Chinkin 2000, p. 221. See also ook Nyamu 2000, p. 391. The latter author discusses
the fact that attempts by human rights activists to find a legal basis for state responsibility for discrimination
against women often fail because many (mainly Islamic) states have made reservations to the Articles 2f
and 5a of the Convention.
20 See e.g.. Felmeth 2000, p. 710 en: Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright 1991, p. 634.
21 Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright 1991, p. 634
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stereotypes. However, they do not deal with Article 5a CEDAW in any detail.22 Where
attention is paid to this provision, is it only descriptive in manner.23
Noreen Burrows is one of the few authors who makes a substantive comment on this
provision.24 Her view is that a correct implementation of the Convention will automatically
put an end to stereotyping.
“If a woman, for example is given the right to earn a living, to own property, to chose the number
and spacing of her children then the role stereotyping of men and women must eventually be called
into question.”25
She is also of the opinion that State parties to the Convention ought to be expected to have
an active role in changing both patterns of behaviour as well as certain ideas about women.
However, she places a big question mark over this task. The provision is not very concrete
about how the State parties should do this and to precisely what actions or measures they
are obliged – in her view, the weakness of this Convention.
The concept of discrimination in the Women’s Convention
Apart from highlighting the limited instrumental value of the Convention, this literature
also raises a number of substantive issues. These concern the concept of discrimination
that characterises the Convention. It is remarkable that the analysis of the (supposedly)
different content of the concept of discrimination in the Women’s Convention in the (early)
Dutch literature is not reproduced in the English-language literature cited here. Authors
such as Charlesworth and Chinkin take it for granted that the Women’s Convention suffers
from the fault that it requires a comparison to be made with a male standard, which means
in order to get equal rights women must assimilate to the male norm.26
According to Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright, the Convention goes further than most
legal equal treatment instruments by demanding ‘equality of results’, which means that
positive action or affirmative action can be justified and that the Convention provides a
basis for prohibiting indirect discrimination. Nevertheless, the Convention is likely to have
a limited impact on the situation of women as, in the final analysis, it uses a definition
of equality in terms of ‘equal to men’:
22 E.g. Felmeth, 2000, p. 710.
23 E.g. Wadstein 1988, p. 13-14.
24 Burrows 1985, p. 428-429.
25 Burrows 1985, p. 248.
26 Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright 1991, p. 631.
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“Both the notions of equality of opportunity and equality of result accept the general applicability
of a male standard (except in special circumstances such as pregnancy) and promise a very limited
form of equality: equality is defined as being like a man.”27
The same standpoint can be found in Charlesworh and Chinkin:
“For these reasons, even the comparatively broad definition of discrimination contained in the
Women’s Convention may not have much cutting edge against the problems women face
worldwide.”28
These authors state that, with the exception of Article 6 about trafficking in women, the
prohibition on discrimination based on the Convention is
“(…) confined to accepted human rights and fundamental freedoms. If these rights are defined
in a gendered way, access to them will be unlikely to promote any real form of equality.”29
The positive appraisal of the opportunities that the Convention offers to justify positive
action programmes and the fact that it also prohibits indirect discrimination are simply
‘written off’.
“The Convention’s endorsement of affirmative action programmes in article 4 similarly assumes
that these measures will be temporary techniques to allow women eventually to perform like
men.”30
The absence of an analysis of the meaning of Article 5a CEDAW
Charlesworth and Chinkin recognise some other positive aspects of the Women’s Conven-
tion, such as the fact that it overcomes the demarcation between classic liberal rights and
social rights, and the fact that the dichotomous division between public and private life
is partly removed (especially in Article 16).31 It therefore seems odd that no attention
is paid to Article 5 in this context. This provision is only mentioned in a footnote, at the
point where the authors discuss the fact that the Convention covers the domination of
women in the private sphere in only a very limited way.
“The male centred view of equality offered in international law is tacitly reinforced by the focus
in the Women’s Convention on public life, the economy, the legal system and education, and its
only limited recognition that oppression within the private sphere, that of the domestic and family
worlds, contributes to women’s inequality (footnote: CEDAW, Preamble and Article 5). It does not,
27 Charlesworth, Chinkin & Wright 1991, p. 631.
28 Charlesworth & Chinkin 2000, p. 230.
29 Charlesworth & Chinkin 2000, p. 230.
30 Charlesworth & Chinkin 2000, p. 230.
31 Charlesworth & Chinkin 2000, p. 217-218.
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for example, explicitly prohibit violence against women perhaps because of the conceptual difficulty
of compressing a harm characterised as private into the public frame of the Convention, or perhaps
because this does not fit directly into the equality model.”32
Later in their book they admit that in General Recommendation number 19 the CEDAW
Committee (with the help of Article 5a CEDAW!) brought the issue of violence within the
scope of the Convention, but do not see this as a reason to revise their earlier conclusions.
According to Charlesworth and Chinkin the Convention does not tackle the structural causes
of the oppression of women:
“The fundamental problem for women is not simply discriminatory treatment compared with men,
although this is a manifestation of a larger problem. Women are in an inferior position because
they lack real economic, social or political power in both public and private worlds.”33
The Convention places too much emphasis on the equal participation of women, especially
at the level of decision-making and power. This misjudges the underlying structures and
power relations that contribute to the oppression of women:
“While increasing the presence of women is certainly important, it does not of itself transform
these structures. We also need to understand and address the gendered aspects of fundamental
concepts such as ‘the economy’ ‘work’, ‘democracy’, ‘politics’ and ‘sustainable development’.”34
The authors do not recognise or acknowledge the fact that a progressive interpretation of
Article 5a CEDAW would create pressure on State parties to eliminate the gender-stereotyped
contents of these concepts and structures.
The relationship between Articles 2f and 5a CEDAW
There are only two contributions in the English-language literature that seem to be on the
same line as the Dutch discussions on the meaning and scope of Article 5a CEDAW. The
first comes from the Canadian law professor Rebecca J. Cook.35 Under the heading
“Customs and Practices” Cook establishes an interesting connection between Articles 5a
and 2f of the Convention. Article 2f CEDAW requires that States “(…) take all appropriate
measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs
and practices which constitute discrimination against women.”
32 Charlesworth & Chinkin 2000, p. 321
33 Charlesworth & Chinkin 2000, p. 229.
34 Charlesworth & Chinkin 2000, p. 321.
35 Cook 1994 (b). In a recent publication Cook endorses the threefold description of the aims of the Convention
as developed by the Dutch Groenman Committee. See Cook 2003, p. 130.
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According to Cook, these Articles combined mean that State parties are obliged to
“(…) reform personal status laws and to confront practices, for instance of religious institutions,
that, while claiming to regard the sexes as different but equal, in effect preclude women from senior
levels of authority and influence. These articles strongly reinforce the commitment to eliminate
all forms of discrimination, since many pervasive forms of discrimination against women rest not
on law as such but on legally tolerated customs and practices of national institutions.”36
Cook mentions different examples of provisions in the Convention that should be interpreted
with the help of these two Articles. For example, Articles 13, 14 and 16 should be read
in such a way that they oblige State parties to put an end to traditional practices. In her
view, Articles 2f and 5a CEDAW also play an important role in preventing and combating
violence against women.
Finally, Cooks pays attention to the question of whether the implementation of these
Articles could collide with other constitutional rights, especially the right to freedom of
religion. At this point she arrives at the conclusion that State parties, for example, have
the freedom and duty to deny tax privileges to institutions that do not conform to the
Convention’s norms.37
“State parties’ duties of due diligence to take all appropriate measures to prohibit all forms of
discrimination against women, and state liability for omissions to enforce human rights nondis-
crimination provisions may require that they treat religious institutions whose practices do not
conform to international human rights standards as secular, non-charitable organisations.”38
Towards equality as transformation
A second contribution with interesting arguments on the significance of the Women’s
Convention is Sandra Fredman’s discussion of the Convention in relation to the problem
of how to legally justify positive action.39 Fredman mentions three possible ways to
overcome the (dominant) legal approach of formal legal equality in which equality is
defined as ‘treating likes alike’.
First, there is the concept of equality of opportunity, which recognises that identical
treatment can in practice reinforce inequality because of past or ongoing discrimination
and which allows a policy that aims for equal starting points. This approach seems to
overlook actual barriers to the achievement of such positions. Second, there is the approach
of equality of result, which aims at an equal representation of women in all spheres.
36 Cook 1994 (b), pp 239-240.
37 Cook 1994 (b), p. 241.
38 Cook 1994 (b), p. 241.
39 Fredman 2003.
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However, this approach also overlooks structural barriers to attaining this goal. Equality
of opportunity and equality of results are the two concepts that are predominantly used
in (feminist) legal theory to denominate a (more) substantive approach to equality, one
which aims not at a formal but at de facto equality for women.40 To this Fredman adds
a new concept. This third approach, termed ‘equality as transformation’, specifically aims
to transform society in such a way that the barriers within existing structures that prevent
factual equality are eradicated. In this connection, Fredman mentions Article 5 CEDAW
as a provision that “(…) requires a modification of social and cultural patterns of conduct.
Articles 2, 3 and 5 also make it mandatory for States to take positive steps to achieve the
desired goal.”41
40 See Loenen 1995.
41 Fredman 2003, p. 116.
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CONCLUSIONS OF PART II
11.1 The significance of Article 5a CEDAW
A dynamic interpretation of the Convention
This concluding Chapter first sets out to answer the question as to whether the assumption
of the Groenman Committee – that Article 5a CEDAW is of particular significance – is
sufficiently based on what official documents and the legal literature have to say about
this provision. It is apparent that the meaning of this Article is not fixed once and for all
but is changing quite markedly (as illustrated in the Traveaux Préparatoires of the Conven-
tion or the history of the Dutch Ratification Act). This observation accords with the general
idea that the Convention is a living instrument that requires a dynamic interpretation and
implementation.1
From awareness raising to structural change
The original meaning of Article 5a CEDAW mainly appears to aim at information campaigns
and education, and the influencing or correcting of the media and advertising. Over the
course of time the CEDAW Committee developed a sense for the structural effects of the
(continued) existence of negative and damaging images and ideas about women. The
Committee has connected this ‘evil’ to almost all forms of structural subordination of
women, especially in connection with paid labour, health and healthcare, family law and
violence against women. The Committee not only considers that education, information
and a change of mentality are important, but increasingly has moved to urge State parties
to do something about the structural unequal payment of women, segregation in the labour
market, the lack of scope for women to work full time and to be economically independent,
the disadvantaged position of women in family law, and so on.
1 Cook 1994 (b), p. 234, who states that the Committee can give autonomous interpretations of the meaning
of the Convention’s provisions. See also Groenman Committee 1997, p. 9 and 31.
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The position of the Dutch government has moved in a similar way. In the beginning,
emphasis was placed on changing culturally and religiously inspired ideas, opinions and
attitudes held by individual persons about women. As early as during the ratification
procedure, the government acknowledged that gender stereotypes can also be reflected
in social structures and institutions, including law, and that Article 5a CEDAW is (also)
directed at this phenomenon.
From equality as sameness to equality as transformation
The shift from stereotypes as a problem of mentality to stereotypes as a source of structural
discrimination is especially evident in the legal literature and in-depth studies carried out
in the Netherlands on the meaning and scope of the Women’s Convention.2 It seems that
from early on in the history of the Convention, this provision has been interpreted so to
imply a pressure for ‘cultural change’. In the Dutch legal literature the conclusion is that
Article 5a CEDAW adds something to the current interpretation of the non-discrimination
principle. Since this provision has such an important place in the Women’s Convention,
it is assumed that the prohibition of discrimination in this Convention not only seeks to
offer individual women legal protection against discrimination, but also demands that
attention be paid to the structural causes of this discrimination. The State parties are held
to be obliged to eradicate all instances of gender bias and gender presumptions in legislation
and public policy.
In the English-language legal literature this idea can be found in the work of Rebecca Cook,
who grounds this obligation on a combined reading of Articles 2f and 5a CEDAW. It can
also be found in the work of Sandra Fredman, who sees this Article as an expression of
the (acknowledged) need for a transformation of society so that that structural barriers which
stand in the way of ‘real’ equality are overcome.
With this the Women’s Convention indeed does contain a norm that goes further than most
existing legislation in the field of equal treatment of men and women.3 Such legislation
is directed at offering individuals protection against discrimination, and offers scarcely
any remedy against the structural causes of the persistent exclusion or disadvantaging of
women. Equal treatment legislation looks backward towards instances of discrimination
that already have occurred. In contrast, the Convention expressly is directed at bringing
2 It should be noted that in the same period there was a lot of attention for ‘beeldvorming’ (the construction
of gender stereotyped images) in the Dutch emancipation policy and in feminist studies, and that the
instrument of Gender Impact Assessment was developed. These texts undoubtedly have influenced the legal
discussions about the meaning of the Convention. See about this policy and these studies chapter 14 of
this book.
3 In the case law of the European Court of Justice there are some indications that the Court is developing
a better understanding of the systemic nature of discrimination against women. See the literature of Burri
and Rust, discussed in Chapter 4.
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about structural change, and hence at preventing future discrimination. In Article 5a the
Convention not only expresses the principle of equality, but also the principle of diversity
or freedom. That is, the possibility for individuals to make their own choices about what
it means to be a man or a woman without being confined by social institutions or
organisation to a traditional understanding of masculinity or femininity. The significance
of Article 5a CEDAW can be summarised very briefly in the proposition that it is an ex-
pression of equality as transformation. The Convention not only requires the same or
identical rights for women but also the development of different law and public policy.
Article 5a CEDAW as the pillar under the third sub-aim of the Convention
The far-reaching importance attached to Article 5a CEDAW (as the pillar of the third sub-aim
of the Convention) by the Groenman Committee is supported by the available documents
and studies, and as such allows the provision to be read in this way – as of the present.
This conclusion is supported by the statement of the CEDAW Committee that it appreciates
the way in which in the Netherlands the aims of the Convention are analysed and described
in three distinct sub-aims. One strong argument in favour of this conclusion can also be
derived from the importance that the Committee attached to the third objective in its recent
General Recommendation number 25.
The Dutch government is at least ambivalent in this regard. Despite the fact that it
recognises that Article 5a CEDAW is the pillar for the third objective of the Convention,
the discussions about the fourth in-depth study suggest that the government is unwilling
to recognise that the Convention therefore entails a non-discrimination norm that is different
to and more far-reaching than other existing norms in national and international law. The
recent Cabinet response to the second National Report on the Convention also allows the
conclusion that there has been a fading of interest in the Convention’s third objective.
That the CEDAW Committee perhaps holds the conviction that the Convention does add
something to existing equal treatment legislation can – with some with caution – be derived
from a number of recent Concluding Comments in which it states, with some emphasis,
that the State parties should not only look at European Community law in the field of equal
treatment of women, but should devote as much attention to the Women’s Convention
and that they should encourage wider knowledge of the Convention on the part of lawyers.4
4 Slovenia (2003), A/58/38, CEDAW/C/SR, 620 and 621, para. 217, 218 and 219 and Germany (2004), A/59/
38, CEDAW/C/SR, 640 and 641, para. 26 and 27.
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11.2 The nature and scope of obligations under Article 5a CEDAW
The instrumental value of Article 5a CEDAW
The legal literature contains a great deal of discussion about the nature of the obligations
arising under the Women’s Convention in general. It can often be read that the Convention
only contains so-called ‘instruction norms’ which cannot provide any enforceable legal
rights available to women in individual litigation. Although in general it is not the case
that this Convention does not entail any such rights,5 it seems to be true that this particular
provision is indeed phrased such that it is hard to assume that (at this point in history)
it could have direct effect, in the sense that an individual woman could rely on it in legal
proceedings. The wording of the Article is not sufficiently clear and precise to have this
direct effect. This means that the nature of this provision is indeed that it is primarily an
instruction norm, directed at the State parties. (What it instructs them to do is discussed
below.)
However, this should not be taken to mean that Article 5a CEDAW cannot play any role
at all in individual sex discrimination cases. The prohibition of gender stereotypes is an
important norm when assessing whether there is a case of ‘equal or comparable situations’
or whether there is ‘unequal treatment’.
It would have made a significant difference if the European Court of Justice, when
considering the question as to whether part-time workers (predominantly women) had the
right to overtime supplements, would have taken cognisance of the fact that existing
regulations assumed that only people with full-time jobs have a ‘full’ day – that is, their
time is more or less wholly accounted for – and therefore ‘deserve’ to be paid extra for
extra hours. Working extra hours in no less inconvenient for part-time workers as it is
for full-time employees, one reason being that part timers often need to make special
arrangements to accommodate caring or other activities.6
In other words, Article 5a CEDAW could play an important role as an interpretative
framework to be applied in all sex discrimination cases. The use of this norm could help
prevent the assimilating effect of equal treatment legislation as it exists now.
In the context of legislation and policy-making Article 5a CEDAW can be used as a yardstick
against which to gauge whether laws and policies are free of stereotyped views about gender
relations.7 I return to this particular role below.
In addition, Article 5a CEDAW can also be used as a ‘hat peg provision’: that is, an
interpretative framework on the basis of which the scope of the Convention might be
5 Heringa, Hes & Lijnzaad 1994.
6 A lot of them are students who need to work beside their insufficient grant. See the case of Angelika Helmig:
ECJ 15 dec. 1994, in joined cases C-399/92, C-409/92, C-425/92, C-34/93, C-50/93 and C-78/93, Angelika
Helmig and others vs Stadt Lengerig as discussed in Holtmaat 1995, 1996 and 1999.
7 Wentholt 1997.
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extended, as in the case of violence against women.8 In future other issues might be
considered as discrimination in the same manner, based on such a reading of the Women’s
Convention. Article 5a CEDAW therefore plays an important role in a dynamic interpretation
of the Convention and helps render it into a living instrument.
Finally, the instrumental value of this provision also lies in the fact that it can serve
as a legitimate ground for action by government to combat negative and damaging stereo-
types that are expressed in or distributed across society.9
The scope of the obligations under Article 5a CEDAW
On the basis of the legal literature and the General Recommendations made by the CEDAW
Committee, the Groenman Committee accepted the view that the Women’s Convention
can have an impact both on the relationships between government and citizens (vertical
relationships) as well as between citizens themselves (horizontal relationships).10 In the
latter case relationships between citizens in the public sphere (when engaging with others,
for example in paid labour, healthcare, education or banking) are distinguished from
relationships in the intimate, private sphere. Should the government – on the basis of the
CEDAW Convention – issue anti-discrimination legislation that effects this intimate or private
sphere it runs the risk of breaching the constitutionally-protected right of privacy of the
home or of family life. In general the Groenman Committee did not exclude the possibility
that a State party might take measures based on this Convention that would directly interfere
in the intimate, private sphere. Is this also the case with Article 5a CEDAW?
None of the documents and legal literature examined for this research contain such a
suggestion. In my view it is quite obvious from the wording of this provision that it is
directed in the first instance at the sphere of (open or covert) expressions of negative and
damaging stereotypes about the roles of men and women in public, both in vertical and
horizontal relationships. Indirectly, measures undertaken by government or employers,
healthcare institutions or schools11 to combat such expressions can (and hopefully will!)
have an impact on the private or intimate relationships between people.
Relationship to other constitutional or civil rights
Even if a State party, in taking all appropriate measures to eliminate gender stereotypes,
limits itself to the public sphere, the question may arise as to how far other constitutionally-
guaranteed human rights or civil rights (such as freedom of speech or freedom of religion)
may be curtailed. Although many commentators discuss this issue and urge caution, these
8 Lijnzaad 1994, discussed in Chapter 10 of this book.
9 Lijnzaad 1994.
10 Groenman Committee 1997, p. 28.
11 These organisations and institutions can take such measures on their own accord or instigated by the
government on the basis of the Convention.
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discussions would not warrant the proposition that such freedoms could prevent the
application or implementation of Article 5a CEDAW altogether. As the Ethiopian Member
of the Preparatory Committee stated: freedoms are not unlimited.12 In theory and practice
they can be limited by other rights, such as the not to be discriminated against on grounds
of sex.13
This means that a government that wants to put an end to this type of discrimination and
takes measures to that effect, can cite Article 5a CEDAW as a legal basis for such measures.
That is to say, if certain measures are contested as representing an encroachment on certain
civil rights, it could be argued that this is justifiable on the ground that Article 5a CEDAW
requires such measures to be taken.14 State parties are under all circumstances required
to implement the Convention’s obligations loyally, in due diligence, in a timely fashion
and in good faith.15 This is also the case with this provision. What they have to do in
order to meet this duty is discussed below.
11.3 The content of the obligations under Article 5a CEDAW
The final question for consideration here is what precisely the content of Article 5a CEDAW
is. In other words, what must a State that is party to the Women’s Convention do – in
the year 2004 – to implement this provision loyally, with due diligence, in a timely fashion
and in good faith? What are the ‘appropriate measures’ that State parties should take? Two
kinds of measures are suggested by the research undertaken for this study.
The duty to banish negative gender stereotypes from social and cultural life
Based on Article 5a CEDAW, State parties have a duty to intervene in those social relations
and institutions in which negative stereotyped images and views about women are expressed
and/or used. This would embrace (re)presentations (that is: the image and presence or non-
presence) of men and women in the media and in commercial advertising; and (re)presenta-
tions of female and male roles in pornography and negative images that inspire to violence
against women. The CEDAW Committee does not leave any room for discussion that State
parties are indeed obliged to develop and implement active policies in this field.
In the light of the many deliberations of the Committee on the obligation to undertake
information campaigns and limit the damaging impact of stereotypes in advertisements
or in teaching materials, Article 5a CEDAW does indeed set very concrete standards as to
12 Rehof, 1993, p. 80.
13 Cook 1994 (b), p. 241.
14 Provided that they are proportional to this aim and appropriate and necessary to reach that aim.
15 Cook 1994 (b)
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the kind of activities that a government should undertake. Various instruments are deemed
to be suitable, such as information campaigns, adjustment of schoolbooks, advertisements,
financial support for institutions that are engaged in this field, general regulations (for
example, a complaints procedure in the field of commercial advertising) or establishing
criteria for subsidising the media. Even making a criminal offence of certain kinds of
expressions that are particularly damaging for women (such as certain kinds of pornography)
can be an appropriate measure.
However, the scope for government to bring about real change at the level of individual
gender awareness or gender identity and on the symbolic level are limited.16 This is a
good enough reason to pay particular attention to the second level at which the construction
of gender stereotypes takes place: the level of social structures and institutions.
The duty to eliminate gender stereotypes in law and public policy
In the second place, Article 5a CEDAW (in combination with Article 2f CEDAW) implies
that State parties have the duty to take all appropriate measures to track down and eliminate
gender stereotypes that are at the basis of law and public policy. The government itself
is possibly culpable in terms of breaching the Convention’s norms, and it is government
itself that has the responsibility to put an end to this situation.
However, opinions differ widely about how far-reaching this duty is. At one side of the
spectrum there are authors who, at present, derive no concrete obligation from Article 5a
CEDAW. At the other, there is the view that this provision obliges State parties to take very
rigorous measures, such as abolishing all breadwinner provisions in the social security
system. These latter measures, however, should be taken with regard to the second objective
of the Convention: the improvement of the de facto position of women. That is to say that
any measure undertaken on the basis of Article 5a CEDAW should be tested against the
criterion of whether they have a genuinely positive effect on the conditions of life and
the human rights of women.
Moreover, there are arguments which contend that this provision of the Convention not
only contains a negative obligation to eliminate all instances of damaging sex stereotypes
in practice and in law, but also a positive obligation to take measures to enable men and
women to take on different (than traditional or stereotyped) roles. One example cited is
the design of a system of parental leave that encourages or even requires fathers to take
on caring activities.
16 Among others on the ground of civil liberties that are guaranteed by national constitutions and in International
Human Rights Conventions. See above.
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The duty to ban gender stereotypes from law and public policies can be rephrased as the
duty to ban systemic or structural gender discrimination.
From the analysis of the Concluding Comments of the CEDAW Committee it is apparent
that the Committee does not have a clear view of how far-reaching these obligations are
at this point. The statement that there is no such obligation is untenable in the view of
the many concrete directions issued by the Committee. For example, the Committee
frequently indicates that legislation should be cleared of gender bias and constructions,
be it in constitutional provisions, family law, tax law, social security or labour law.
11.4 The enforceability of cultural change
The obligations that are incumbent on State parties arising from Article 5a CEDAW are,
admittedly, not easily enforced. The CEDAW Committee’s remit is very limited, and in fact
it is only a supervisory body.17 It cannot impose any sanctions, even when there is an
outright breach of the Convention’s provisions. This means that only constant pressure
on the part of human rights organisations and the women’s movement might possibly have
some impact in the long run. In that respect the process of ‘naming’ and ‘shaming’ of State
parties is important: the continuous revealing of violations of the Convention’s norms in
the international arena. The effect of this process can be that State parties begin to change
their behaviour, in the sense that they make a start to the process of actively combating
the discrimination of women, including those forms of discrimination embedded in national
law and policy, and in culture and customs.18
11.5 The danger of cultural hegemony
The central aim of Article 5a CEDAW is to eliminate or abolish all traditional customs and
practices, including those laid down in law or religious injunctions that are damaging for
the fulfilment of all the human rights of women. This so-called ‘abolitionist’ method has
been severely criticised in the legal literature. The non-discrimination norms included in
international law are held to be too one-sided and unsuitable for the abolition of all forms
of discrimination against women. In addition, this approach is said to deny the fact that
women may have rights which are important for them as a result of some cultural and
customary practices.
17 Notwithstanding the fact that its powers have been extended on the ground of the Optional Protocol of
October 6, 1999, which makes individual complaints possible. See: A/RES/54/4, Optional Protocol on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women. The text of the Protocol is included in an Annex
to this Resolution.
18 See for a detailed discussion of the problem of State accountability under the Convention Cook 1994 (b).
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“Some critics have pointed out that these abolitionist responses create the impression that women’s
rights do not exist in custom or local practice, and that the solution therefore lies in substituting
custom and local practice with alternatives offered by national legislation or the international human
rights regime. Furthermore, the abolitionist approach does not encourage a holistic understanding
of the context in which these practices are embedded, and as a result, prevents comprehensive
solutions. The abolitionist approach has also suffered counter-accusations of cultural imperialism
from interested Third World states.”19
The present author fully acknowledges that this danger does indeed exist and therefore
subscribes to the importance of the alternative method of so-called cross-cultural
dialogue.20 This means that, for the purpose of guaranteeing all human rights of women,
it cannot be assumed that the non-discrimination (or equal treatment) standards enshrined
in national or international legal instruments are better or more suitable than norms that
can be found in a number of cultures and customs. In particular, if the right to equal
treatment of women is understood in a formal sense (of treating likes alike) there is certainly
no guarantee that this will have a positive effect on their actual situation. In Western
countries the application of such a formal right to equal treatment of men and women has
often led to a worsening of the position of women.21 It is important to remember that
the Women’s Convention also demands that the position of women is improved. This means
that instead of simply applying an abstract and general equal treatment norm and the radical
elimination of customs and traditions, much attention must be paid to the concrete daily
circumstances in which women need to realise their human rights. What is necessary in
that respect is expressed by Nyamu in the following passage of her important article.
“The non-abolitionist approach, therefore, calls for a non-hegemonic human rights practice that
incorporates the two simultaneous processes of internal discourse and cross-cultural dialogue, in
order to find legitimacy for human rights principles within all cultures.”22
11.6 Final remark
The assumption of the Groenman Committee that Article 5a CEDAW has a special and far-
reaching meaning appears to be confirmed by this research. Two concrete obligations can
be derived from this provision in the Convention: State parties are under a duty to actively
combat gender stereotypes (among others in education and in the media) and to ban
systemic or structural discrimination in law and public policy. As a consequence, the
Women’s Convention entails the concept of equality as transformation.
19 Nyamu 2000, p. 393. At this place she refers to works of Thandabantu Nhlapo, Daniel A. Bell and Katha
Pollit.
20 See Holtmaat 2002, p. 132.
21 In Chapter 15, I give the example of the treacherous effect of applying equality standards in family law.
22 Nyamu 2000, p. 393. At this point she refers to the work of Abdullahi An-Na’im.
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This research has established, with retroactive effect, a legitimate ground for Dutch eman-
cipation policy in the field of ‘erasing traditional role models’ and ‘combating stereotyped
images of masculinity and femininity’. According to many commentators, such a policy
should have two sides in order to be effective: an active role on the part of government
to change the role of gender in society; and scrutiny of the role that government itself plays
in maintaining and (re)producing the power of gender.23
How the State parties can implement the Women’s Convention with regard to this second
obligation – in other word, how they can carry out this specific instruction – is discussed
in the third part of this study.
23 Schaapman 1995, p. 61. See the policy and the studies that I discuss in Chapter 14.
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INTRODUCTION TO PART III
At the end of the previous Chapter, it was concluded that under Article 5a CEDAW State
parties are obliged, amongst other things, to eliminate gender stereotypes that underlie
law and public policy and maintain a situation of structural discrimination. Part III of the
study focuses solely on this duty.
Tracking down structural gender discrimination is not an easy task, precisely because it
concerns self-evident ‘truths’ about the biological sex of males and females, and about
the relationships between the sexes that are constitutive of prevailing social, cultural and
institutional arrangements. As a consequence, in the Dutch context, the Department for
the Co-ordination of Emancipation Policy at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
has commissioned the development of a method to undertake this task. This research method
will be described in Chapter 16.
Because the concepts of gender and gender discrimination have a central place in the
research method, Chapter 13 examines the content that these concepts have been given
in women’s studies and the analytical role they can play in screening law and public policy.
Chapter 14 discusses Dutch policy and studies undertaken in the field of gender stereotyping
and the design of the instrument for a Gender Impact Assessment (GIA). These studies
provide important indications about the way in which a method to reveal gender discrimina-
tion can be constructed. In Chapter 15 a number of methodological directions and starting-
points will be presented, which follow from the studies discussed in Chapter 13 and 14.
The method, presented in Chapter 16, is based on these materials. It can be used for
research into the nature and impact of structural gender discrimination in law and public
policy. Together with the instrument of the GIA, this method can serve as a tool in the
policy of mainstreaming gender issues.
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GENDER AND STRUCTURAL GENDER DISCRIMINATION
13.1 Gender
Gender: a construction of masculinity and femininity that differs in time and place
Contrary to the biological category of sex, gender is an indication of the social, cultural
and institutional construction of masculinity and femininity.
“The term ‘gender’ here refers to the social construction of differences between women and men
and ideas of ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ – the excess cultural baggage associated with biological
sex.”1
In a document published by the United Nations the concept of gender is described in the
following manner:
“Gender is defined as the social meanings given to biological sex differences. It is an ideological
and cultural construct, but is also reproduced within the realm of material practices; in turn it
influences the outcomes of such practices. It affects the distribution of resources, wealth, work,
decision- making and political power, and enjoyment of rights and entitlements within the family
as well as public life. Despite variations across cultures and over time, gender relations throughout
the world entail asymmetry of power between men and women as a pervasive trait. Thus, gender
is a social stratifier, and in this sense it is similar to other stratifiers such as race, class, ethnicity,
sexuality, and age. It helps us understand the social construction of gender identities and the unequal
structure of power that underlies the relationship between the sexes.”2
The dynamic character of gender
That the categories of ‘men’ and ‘women’ are not only defined by nature but are also
(perhaps mainly!) social and cultural constructions, means that these are not static categories
1 Charlesworth 1999, p. 379.
2 1999 World Survey on the Role of Women in Development, United Nations, New York, 1999, page ix, as
cited in footnote 2 in CEDAW General Recommendation nr 25.
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but are given substance depending on the time and place where and when they exist. As
a consequence, gender and gender relations are always in motion and can only be under-
stood against the background of the specific context in which they play a role at a given
time.
Men and women in the year 1954 were not the same as they are in 2004. What it means
to be a man in India differs widely from the situation of a Swedish man. An older, poorly-
educated childless housewife in the Netherlands, living in a closed Christian community
in the so-called bible belt, is confronted with different limitations as a result of gender
stereotypes than a 20 year old female student of art history who lives in Amsterdam and
has been raised in a secular environment. A medical doctor with young children who is
a refugee from Iran and who tries to find a place on the Dutch labour marked again
encounters other difficulties and limitations. Not only their own gender identity is of great
importance, but also how they are seen as a ‘woman’ within their social environment –
and again, how the legislator or a policy-maker defines their situation.
Gender as an analytical category
Within women’s studies gender often is seen as an analytical concept which can be used
to reveal how the social, cultural and institutional construction of masculinity and feminin-
ity, operates. Such studies have tended to delve deeper and deeper:
“In this sense, feminist explorations can be likened to an archaeological dig. There are various
layers of practices, procedures, symbols and assumptions to uncover and different tools and
techniques may be relevant at each level.”3
An elaborated definition of gender, which is suitable for an analytical usage in law, has
been provided by Joan Wallach Scott. The core of the definition rests on an integral
connection between two propositions:
“gender is (1) a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between
the sexes, and gender is (2) a primary way of signifying relationships of power.”4
I will now demonstrate what content has been given to these two elements of gender in
theories about the role of gender in law and policy.
3 Charlesworth 1999, p. 381.
4 Scott 1989, p. 94.
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The role of gender in the construction of social relations
According to Scott, four factors simultaneously play a role in the construction of social
relationships between the sexes. These also play a role in the construction and of law and
public policy.5
(1) culturally available symbols that evoke multiple (and often contradictory) representations
of the male and the female;
(2) normative concepts that set forth interpretations of the meanings of the symbols and
that attempt to limit and contain their metaphoric possibilities;
(3) the notion of politics and social institutions and organisations that lead to the appearance
of timeless permanence in binary gender representation;
(4) the construction of subjective gender identities.
By way of illustration: the construction of social insurance and social welfare
The way in which in the Netherlands – as in most Western countries – a division has been
created between social insurance and social welfare can serve as an example of how these
four factors operate in law.6
On the symbolic level in this construction a clear ranking has been made between a ‘hard’
sector (social insurance, which grants independent individual rights to benefits) and a ‘soft’
sector (social welfare, which uses means testing and which stipulates interdependence
between people).
In constructing the differences between these two parts of the social security system
two pairs of concepts are systematically opposed to each other. Social welfare is typified
by concepts such as family cohesion, solidarity, distributive justice, and immediate need
while at the other end, social insurance is characterised by concepts such as individual
autonomy, performance-based rights (e.g. work related rights, rights based on contributions
to social insurance funds), equivalent justice and the use of ‘objective’ criteria. While the
one deals with a real person in her/his concrete circumstances, the other postulates an
abstract subject of the law (citizen). In these two groups of concepts, care (social welfare)
and rights (social insurance) are symbolically opposed to each other, as two mutually
exclusive systems of concepts. This symbolic order closely connects to what in our culture
is associated with femininity and masculinity.
In the construction of this twofold system normative concepts also play an important role.
An example is the concept of an ‘insurable social risk’. This concept is defined in such
a way that it covers those risks which are linked to those ways of earning an income
5 Scott 1989, pp. 94-95.
6 See Holtmaat 1992, Holtmaat 1994 and Holtmaat 1997.
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traditionally primarily performed by men (full-time salaried work) and excludes those risks
which, given the traditional relationships between the sexes, particularly affect women
(such as loss of income from income-sharing within a marriage). The loss of support and
care in the private sphere is not covered under social insurance schemes in the same way
as the loss of paid labour. Widowers do not get compensation for work ‘in the home’ when
their (house)wives die. However, housewives get a pension when the breadwinner dies.7
In the third place, an important role in this construction is played by a rigid idea of what
are considered to be private life and private responsibilities, and what is held to be the
public domain. Again this division reflects traditional gender relations in which women’s
lives are seen as private and men’s lives as public.
Finally, especially in welfare law and policy, a construction of subjective gender identities
takes place in the form of the ‘welfare mother’ or the ‘welfare woman’.8 The position
of this particular category of welfare beneficiary has been the object of a political and social
struggle extending over decades. In this struggle the question is whether such women –
who often are head of a single parent household – can be required to perform paid labour
or whether they should be compelled to require maintenance from their ex-partner or ex-
husband. The unequal relationship between the sexes is reflected in the construction of
the ‘welfare woman’. Welfare law does not contain an equivalent term ‘welfare man’. On
the contrary, social insurance language only knows neutral (in the male form) concepts
such as ‘the unemployed’, ‘invalids’ or ‘claimants’.
The role of gender in the construction of power differences between the sexes
In the second place the analytical concept of gender can be used to expose the ideological
power of gender.9 This means that this concept is used to analyse the power processes
that maintain the unequal relationships between the sexes.
“Ideology might then be defined as the process of naturalisation within social consciousness,
whereby certain immutable (often biological) facts are idealised in a system of ideas, beliefs, and
practices, which are in turn taken for granted as ‘natural’ and necessary to the proper functioning
of society. Whilst other facts and human possibilities are either ignored or implicitly rejected as
‘unnatural’ in this process, the production of ideology necessarily involves some form of selective
interpretation”10
The ideological power of gender means that ideas and unspecified or unspoken ‘self-evident
facts’ in relation to the differences between the sexes are presented as compelling, necessary
7 This was the situation in the Netherlands until recently.
8 Smart 1992, p. 37 gives the example of the category of the ‘bad mother’ in UK criminal law.
9 Smart 1989
10 Fegan 1996, pp. 180-181, emphasis in original.
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and unchangeable ‘truths’. In that process the biological and the social categories of men
and women are presented as one and the same thing and ‘real’ or ‘essential’ differences
between men and women are presented as ‘natural’. Should a biological difference be found,
this often serves to legitimate social and economic difference (in power). Women give
birth to children, therefore it is only ‘natural’ that they depend on a male breadwinner.
In law this ideological power of gender can play a role in three different ways: in legal
norms, in legal principles and in the (ideological) format of law.11 The latter means the
way in which rights are constructed and have been given a place in a wider legal frame-
work.
By way of illustration: the power of gender in matrimonial property law
Matrimonial property law contains a number of legal norms in which (traditional) gender
relations are reflected.12 For example, until recently there was the norm that there can
be only ‘one captain on the (matrimonial) ship’. On this ground the law stipulated that
the person who had contributed a certain good or asset to the community (mostly the man)
had the power to dispose over it This reflected the idea that the man is the head of the
household, although this provision was abolished a long time ago.
In the same field of law there still is – at the level of legal principles – an important place
for the principle of protection of a party who is deemed to be weak and needs to be
supported by the law. This principle is used to construct the duties of the breadwinner
with respect to the ‘non-earning’ partner (mostly the woman). Being a women is associated
with weakness, being a man with being the patron. Already, the use of the term ‘non-
earning’ is revealing because with that term the value of the input of this person in the
field of care and education is reduced to zero.
Finally, gender relations also play an evident role at the level of the legal format of
matrimonial property rights. Matrimonial property law is part of (civil) family law, not
social or public law. As such, it is subject to the general principles that govern this area
of law as far as the allocation of rights and duties is concerned.
13.2 Structural gender discrimination
Chapter 2 explained that within the Women’s Convention the aim of combating the
dominant gender ideology exists alongside the aims of eliminating (direct and indirect)
discrimination against women and improving the position of women. Although – also
11 Holtmaat 2001 and the literature that is discussed at this article.
12 This example is described more fully in Holtmaat and De Hond 2001
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according to the Groenman Commission and the CEDAW Committee – there is an important
connection between the three sub-aims of the Convention, the obligations under Article
5a CEDAW differ from the other obligations under this Convention. These differences are
briefly described here, especially in as far as the first and the third sub-aims are con-
cerned.13
The difference with the concept of sex discrimination
The concept of structural gender discrimination refers to those forms of discrimination
that are a consequence of the fact that the structure or organisation of society is based on
gender stereotypes which serve to sustain the existing unequal power relations between
the sexes. Stereotyped, often traditional and implicit ideas, symbols and structures, lead
to the subordination and exclusion of women and of femininity. This concept exists
alongside the legal concept of sex discrimination that refers directly to differential treatment
on the basis of the biological male and female sex. Structural gender discrimination
describes a situation in which women or the female perspective are systematically dis-
advantaged or excluded, but where such disadvantage or exclusion is not covered by legal
definitions of direct and indirect sex discrimination.14
The differences between sex discrimination and structural gender discrimination can be
summarised in three points.
Firstly, in sex discrimination legislation biological sex differences play a central role.
No differences in treatment are allowed on the basis of the mere fact that somebody is
male or female. Gender discrimination is primarily about the social, cultural and institutional
construction of being a male or a female subject.
Secondly, in the case of sex discrimination an assessment needs to be made as to
whether there indeed was a difference in treatment between an individual man and a
woman. Sex discrimination law offers individuals a legal remedy, provided they bring cases
to court. Combating sex discrimination through this route requires a high degree of acuity
and courage on the part of individual women. In contrast, in the case of structural gender
discrimination, responsibility lies with government to tackle the underlying structural causes
of discrimination.
Thirdly, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex has a tendency to culminate
in assimilation to the dominant male standard or norm. Combating structural gender
discrimination entails a fundamental re-appraisal of such norms. When combating gender
stereotypes that are at the basis of law and public policy the issue is not to create a situation
of sameness or identity between the two positions, but of creating space for perspectives
13 The second objective: to improve the position of women, poses special obligations in the sense that ap-
propriate measures (among other temporary special measures on the ground of Article 4(1) should be taken)
to achieve this.
14 Holtmaat 1996, p. 12 and Holtmaat 2000, p. 261. Feminist legal theory has highlighted the danger that sex
discrimination law in itself reproduces gender ideology. See Chapter 4.
Part III 91
and positions other than the dominant (male) position. Instead of focusing on equality or
sameness the accent lies on diversity.
The difference with the concept of indirect discrimination
Indirect sex discrimination occurs when an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice
would put persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of the
other sex.15 Legal doctrine on indirect discrimination demands that the person who com-
plains that they have suffered a detriment must prove the disparate impact (for example,
by means of statistical proof). Indirect discrimination can be objectively justifiable if it
can be established that the aim of the provision, criterion or practice is legitimate and
important and that the means (the neutral rule) is appropriate and necessary to reach that
aim.
Many forms of indirect discrimination are based on stereotyped assumptions about the
separate roles of men and women. One example is the different (and poorer) treatment
of part-time workers with regard to working conditions and payment on the basis of the
assumption that such workers do this work ‘on the side’ (that is, besides being a housewife)
and that they do not really ‘need’ the job.
The concept of structural gender discrimination is broader than the concept of indirect
discrimination in the sense that, under the former concept, it allows assumptions and
constructions to be tackled that do not fit into the narrow legal definition of the latter.
Structural gender discrimination is about the effect of existing structures and systems on
stereotyped role models and role expectations for both men and women, irrespective of
which of the two sexes mainly suffers from such stereotypes.
15 See the definition in Article 2(2) of Directive 2002/73/EG. The literature on this topic is abundant. See
e..g. Loenen 1999 and Voogsgeerd 2000.

14
PUBLIC POLICY AND RESEARCH IN THE FIELD OF GENDER
STEREOTYPED IMAGES
14.1 Dutch policy in the field of gender stereotyped images
For almost thirty years combating gender-stereotyped images has been an important part
of the emancipation policy of the Dutch government. Objectives that have played an
important role over the years in this context are “removing role limitations of men and
women”, “the promotion of a (positive) value for characteristics traditionally are attached
to femaleness”1 and “the promotion of structural change as a result of which sex difference
is no longer a pillar for the structuring of society.”2 The objective of “het doorbreken
van beeldvorming in termen van mannelijkheid en vrouwelijkheid” has become increasingly
important over the years.3 It is particularly difficult to translate this phrase. Beelvorming
(literally: ‘the construction of an image’) carries the meaning of ‘the social and cultural
construction of images and perceptions’. In this book I have chosen to translate the whole
phrase as ‘combating stereotyped images of masculinity and femininity’ or, more concisely:
‘to combat gender stereotyped images’.
As a consequence of this policy, in the early-1990s a dedicated working party – the
Projectgoep Beeldvorming – was established, consisting of civil servants from a number
of Ministries. It submitted a final report in 1996.4 When the group was first established
the following definition of the term ‘beeldvorming’ was given:
“The explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious making of a subordinating difference between
men and women, by means of attributing different qualities to them, to their behaviour, to their
ideas, feelings, values and expectations.”5
1 TK 1976-1977, 14 496 nr. 2, p. 10.
2 Min. SZW 1984, p. 13.
3 Min. SZW 1984, p. 13 and Min. SZW 1992 (a), p. 30.
4 Projectgroep Beeldvorming 1996.
5 Mission statement of the Projectgroep Beeldvorming, included in Min. SZW 1992 (a), p. 145.
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In its final report the group indicated that government has two separate responsibilities
in this field. First, it should engage with and counter negative and dominant gender
stereotypes in society. And secondly, government should ensure that it no longer employs
gender stereotypes in its own policy.
“Important elements of policy-making – the definition of the problem at hand, the (quantitative)
data that are used and the choice of central concepts – contribute to the reproduction of unequal
social relations between men and women (…).”6
According to this working group, this means that government should eliminate “the
reproduction of these differences in symbols, language and norms, in institutions and
structures, and in concrete acts.”7
In 2000 the objective of ‘combating gender stereotyped images’ was replaced by “the
necessity to modernise the ‘social contract’ between men and women.”8
“With this approach the government refers to the explicit and implicit arrangements that exist in
society about the different rights and duties of male and female citizens. This ‘contract’ also includes
how rules and institutions support the rights and duties of men and women. The current ‘social
contract’ is based upon a division of roles of men and women that has now undergone important
change.”9
The obligation under Article 5a CEDAW to eliminate structural gender discrimination can
be seen as part of this policy framework.10 As part of this policy, three studies have been
conducted into the nature of gender stereotypes and the role that they play in the process
of policy-making, under the guidance of the working party. The studies have yielded a
rich source of material that can be used in developing a research method to reveal structural
gender discrimination. This is a good reason to review them briefly below.
14.2 Scientific research into gender stereotyped images
From individual gender-identity towards gender as a mechanism for constructing social
relations
In the first study, Mossink and Nederland make a distinction between explicit and indirect
gender stereotyped images.
6 Projectgroep Beeldvorming 1996, p. 11.
7 Projectgroep Beeldvorming 1996, p. 12.
8 Min. SZW 2000 (b), p. 35 e.v.
9 Min. SZW 2000 (b), p. 35.
10 TK 1997-1998, 25 893, nr 2, p. 8
Part III 95
“The ‘imagination / construction’ of femininity and masculinity happens, in the first place, when
explicit statements are made about the position of men and women. From this ideas can be distilled
about characteristics and patterns of conduct that are attributed to women and men. In the second
place, it is necessary to reveal the indirect gender stereotyped images, the invisible area of the self-
evident ideas about men and women in policy-documents.”11
In this report, the emphasis still lies on the symbolic representation of masculinity and
femininity or male and female behaviour. However, according to Schaapman, who carried
out the second research project, gender-stereotyped images play a role at (at least) three
levels: the symbolic-cultural level, the structural level and the individual level.12
Schaapman devotes a good deal of attention to the assumptions about a male and a
female way of life that are ‘baked’ into the structure and content of legislation.13 The
scope for government intervention at the individual and symbolic levels is limited. For
Schaapman this is an additional reason to concentrate on the level of social structures and
institutions. These structures and institutions (legislation included) are themselves gender
biased. In other words: government itself is part of the problem.14
Gender stereotyped images and the difference in power between men and women
According to Schaapman the consequence is that eradicating negative gender stereotypes
of women is not simply a matter of education or a change in mentality, but entails a change
in power.15 Schaapman is quite critical of Dutch emancipation policy which, she argues,
merely addresses the equal social position of men and women rather than uncovering and
combating (structural) and institutionalised gender differences:
“Regardless of the theoretical starting-points of this policy, emancipation policy time and again
is being transformed into a strategy for fitting women into an existing order, in which the position
of men is the norm for the equality that is striven for. The policy is not aimed at changing this
order nor at men.”16
Interpreting equality as ‘identical to men’ leaves no scope for realising the policy aim of
‘increasing diversity’.17
Schaapman draws the conclusion that in order to combat gender-stereotyped images it is
necessary to use a concept of power which researchers can use to reveal how images and
meanings are (re)produced. This concept of power needs to be filled out with the concept
11 Mossink & Nederland, 1993, pp. 3-4. In this quote it is clear that these researchers emphasise the first aspect
of the definition of gender derived from Joan W. Scott.
12 Schaapman 1995, p. 22 and 24.
13 Schaapman 1995, p. 58.
14 Schaapman 1995, p. 59.
15 Schaapman 1995, p. 3 and 9.
16 Schaapman 1995, p. 14.
17 Schaapman 1995, p. 11 and 15.
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of gender in order to make it possible to explore the processes of construction of gender-
related images and meanings.18 According to Schaapman, eliminating negative stereotyped
images should not be a separate aim of emancipation policy, but rather constitutes a
problem-oriented approach which needs to pervade all policy fields.19
Research into the construction of masculinity as ‘normality’
The researchers Brouns and Scholten argue that – as far as combating discrimination against
women is concerned – a choice always needs to be made between a policy that ignores
the specific position of women (that is, is neutral) and a policy that takes this position
as a starting point (that is, is specific).20 The first approach runs the risk of assimilation
to the male norm, the second that the categories ‘female’ and ‘femininity’ simply end up
by being reproduced. These researchers, therefore, wish to shift the focus to the construction
of males and masculinity.21
This study again devotes a great deal of attention to the structural aspects of gender-specific
beeldvorming. The authors argue that for a long period, Dutch society has been built on
the classic ‘sex-contract’ in which a separation between private and public is coupled to
a division of labour between the sexes. It is precisely this sex-contract that has been placed
under pressure because of changes in personal and social relations between the sexes.
However, law and public policy are still based on outdated presuppositions. This leads
to tensions and frictions. The aim of their research is to develop a model that can be used
to reveal these presuppositions.22
14.3 Gender Impact Assessments
The development of GIA
Over this same period a research model for a so-called Emancipatie-effectrapportage
(Gender Impact Assessment, or GIA) was developed in the Netherlands. Again, this work
was closely connected to the insights into the phenomenon of gender gained from women’s
studies.23
18 Schaapman 1995, p. 16.
19 Schaapman 1995, p. 24. With this she describes what later on has been called ‘gender mainstreaming’.
20 Brouns & Scholten 1997, p. 4. This dilemma parallels the (endless) debate in feminist legal studies as to
whether women should have equal rights or special rights. See e. g. Williams 1982, Wolgast 1980 and Scott
1988.
21 Brouns & Scholten 1997, p. 5.
22 This model is discussed in Chapter 15.
23 Verloo & Roggeband 1994, p. 6. Examples of the application of this instrument has been described in
Plantenga 2000, Verloo & Roggeband 1996 and Ruberay & Fagan 2000. A description of the Dutch GIA-
instrument can be found in Verloo & Roggeband 1996.
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According to Verloo and Roggeband, who laid the theoretical foundation for the GIA
instrument, three levels need to be distinguished at which the construction of gender takes
place: structures, processes and (normative) criteria. The most important structures are the
organisation of paid labour and of intimate life. As far as processes are concerned, they
distinguish between the operation of power relations in the division of resources and the
functioning of rules and regulations. The criteria that they deem important are equality
and autonomy. In all this, attention needs to be paid to how gender rules are effective.
With this they mean the following:
“At the individual level gender rules can be found in ideas and attitudes of human beings and in
their behaviour. At the structural level gender rules can be found in formal regulations and in
presuppositions that lie at the basis of organisations.”24
Based on this, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment has published a manual
explaining the aim and structure of the GIA. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science
has also published its own GIA instrument.25 In both models the accent lies on estimating
the effects of policy and (proposed) law on the concrete social and economic position of
women.
The GIA of changes in matrimonial property law
The Clara Wichmann Institute developed a somewhat different GIA approach in the context
of research into (proposed) changes to Dutch matrimonial property law.26 In this, a dis-
tinction is drawn between three different frameworks for reviewing the legislation: standards
set by law, standards set in (existing) government emancipation policy, and theoretical
(analytical) standards. The first two frameworks led to a series of questions with regard
to the lawfulness or desirability of the proposed changes in Dutch matrimonial property
law from the perspective of national and international legal norms, as well as from ‘eman-
cipation aims’ expressed in policy documents. As far as the legal norms are concerned
the CEDAW Convention played an important role. For the theoretical (analytical) framework
a connection was made with the work of Joan W. Scott (discussed in Chapter 13). This
led to scrutiny of the content of central concepts and presuppositions in the existing and
proposed law.27
24 Verloo & Roggeband 1994, p. 14.
25 Min. SZW 2001(a) and Min. OC&W 1995. The GIA model of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employ-
ment is currently under reconstruction.
26 Clara Wichmann Instituut 2001 and Holtmaat & De Hondt 2001..
27 See also Chapter 13, where I used examples from this study.
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METHODOLOGICAL DIRECTIONS AND STARTING-POINTS FOR
THE STUDY OF STRUCTURAL GENDER DISCRIMINATION
15.1 Introduction
It is impossible to design one general ‘checklist’ that can be used in all cases to establish
whether damaging or negative gender stereotypes lie at the basis of a particular policy
or area of law. The reason is that structural gender discrimination is about the hidden
power-effects of gender, and because the context in which gender relations are being
constructed has a strong influence on the outcome.1 The studies discussed in the two
previous Chapters allow a number of methodological directions and starting-points to be
distilled. These will be presented here in a summary form,2 beginning at a general and
abstract level and concluding with some more concrete points.
At the end of this Chapter I discuss the ways in which this approach differs from the GIA
approach, and how it fits into the (adopted) policy on gender mainstreaming.
15.2 Gender operates at different levels
Within women’s studies, the construction of gender and gender relations takes place at
three different levels: individual consciousness, the symbolic order and the structure and
organisation of society.3
Although research into the existence of structural gender discrimination primarily
focuses on the latter level, it should not be forgotten that the first two levels are also of
great importance. Civil servants and legislators are human beings who work with a certain
language (symbolic representation) and who hold personal views and attitudes about
relations between the sexes. Policy makers and legislators select, organise, and interpret
those parts of the reality to which future policies or legislation are aimed. From this mental
framework (framing) they denominate the problem to which the policy or law should be
1 Mossink & Nederland 1993, p. 5.
2 This means that I cannot enter into the nuances and refinements that the researchers made.
3 Sevenhuysen 1998, pp. 79-82.
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directed (naming). In this process of naming and framing the civil servant or the legislator
creates a certain image of the problem at hand and connects this to possible solutions.4
In this process certain mental frameworks often (unconsciously) play an important role.
Gender is part of such mental frameworks.
15.3 The level of the analysis
While public policy making and law constantly respond to changes in society (and therefore
have to be dynamic), they also exhibit rigidities: “While definitions of problems, aims
of programmes and measures change, the norms that underlie public policy hardly change.”5
The dogged persistence of existing mental frameworks that are coloured by gender become
explicable when the presuppositions that underlie policy- and/or law-making are divided
into presuppositions of a first and a second order.
The first order is about the concrete context in which a civil servant or legislator has to
act (discussed below at the end of this Chapter). The second order is about the social
structure in which policy and law is constructed and the contribution that policy or law
makes to the functioning of this structure.6 Civil servants are inclined to define problems
from their own perspective. This is a matter of the power of definition: “(…) the more
powerful we are, the less able we are to see how our own perspective and the current
structure of our world coincide.”7
This means that research into how gender stereotypes become operative in policy and law
should mainly be directed at this second level.
“In each step of the process of policy-making (the definition of the problem, the formulation of
aims, the selection of means and the implementation) presuppositions at the second order level
are at stake and this (…) is the most intractable element steering the process of policy-making.”8
It is precisely at this second level that processes such as the power of law, the effect of
a system of classifications, and the presentation of men and women as fixed (biological)
categories play a role. Anyone who wants to uncover structural gender discrimination needs
to be very aware of these processes – which are briefly explained below.
4 Brouns & Scholten 1997, p. 76.
5 Brouns & Scholten 1997, p. 79.
6 Brouns & Scholten 1997, p. 76-77 and 80.
7 Shaw 2001.
8 Brouns & Scholten 1997, p. 80.
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15.4 The power of law
When defining problems the legal framework in which one wants to or needs to find a
solution structures the field in advance.9 In recent decades, for example, problems between
parents (or ex-partners) with regard to the upbringing and caring of their children have
been located within the framework of the principle of formal legal equality and the right
to family life. This meant that the solution to these problems had to meet certain criteria,
and other approaches ceased to be conceivable or possible. For women this has meant that
the provision of daily care for children is no longer the basis for the attribution of custody
rights or the right to see a child regularly, but that fathers’ claims – based on the principle
of the formal (equal) right to have a family life with their children – is now decisive.10
Men who did not, and do not, participate in caring tasks have made use of this ‘rule’ to
claim legal custody.
In other words, law ‘translates’ social problems in such a way that they can be defined
and solved within the framework of the existing legal system. For instance, the right to
equal treatment, as laid down in EC Directives and the Dutch Equal Treatment Act, requires
a comparison to be made between men and women.
“This process forces you into stereotyping and generalizing. So, in our case, Angelika Helmig and
her associates were forced to present their problem (…), namely the fact that part-timers did not
get overtime supplements, as a problem of sex discrimination, which, in turn, forced them to
categorise part-time work as women’s work.”11
As a consequence, the existing
“(…) social reality (the statistical ‘fact’ that more women then men engage in part-time work) is
transferred into a sexualised or gendered category.”12
This mechanism seems to a be to high decree responsible for the fact that the enforcement
of the right to equal treatment has re-established rather than eradicated gender stereotypes.13
9 Smart 1989 and Smart 1992.
10 See e.g. Loenen 1997, Smart 1992, Moller Okin 1989 and Fineman 1995.
11 Holtmaat 1999, p. 429.
12 Holtmaat 1999, p. 429.
13 See Van den Brink 2000 (discussed in Chapter 4 of this book.) However, these cases can reveal a lot about
gender stereotypes that are active in society. Why should a female postwoman be allowed to wear skirts
and a male postman be prohibited to wear shorts? Why should a woman in a fitness centre be allowed to
wear a sleeveless top and a man be obliged to wear a T-shirt? See the judgements of the Dutch Equal
Treatment Commission, numbers 1999-56 and 2002-130.
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In legal theory this power of definition14 is known as the self-referential or autopoietic
operation of law.15 Researchers engaged in tracking down the extent to which structural
gender discrimination occurs in law need to be alert to this mechanism.
15.5 The apparent neutrality of law and policy
One of the ways in which law wields power is by presenting the norms and constructions
that are deemed to be valid in the legal framework as general or neutral. This generality
or neutrality of law as well as policy conceals the fact that in reality they mostly reflect
dominant values and norms. This means that gender relations can also be hidden under
this flag.16
According to Brouns and Scholten, who have conducted a study about the construction
of masculinity in policy making, this is accomplished in two ways. First, masculinity can
function as generality, that is to say that the policy is presented as general, while in fact
it deals about men. And secondly, masculinity can function as normality. That is to say,
the reality of men implicitly serves as the starting-point for the policy, as a result of which
women and femininity, but also other or alternative meanings of masculinity (such as
homosexuality), appear to be deviant or a problem.17
A third way of concealing masculinity as the dominant norm is by not mentioning or
regulating certain issues or problems at all. According to Hilary Charlesworth, the silences
in law should be revealed. “All systems of knowledge depend on deeming certain issues
as irrelevant or of little significance.”18
Law has an almost impenetrable appearance of gender-neutrality, certainly since most
vestiges of open and/or direct discrimination have now been removed from it. However,
this does not mean that the struggle against sex discrimination can be called off. Or, as
Nicola Lacey puts it: feminist approaches to law reject
“(…) the idea of law as an autonomous structure generating claims to truth which are insulated
from political critique. Feminism (...) will always be concerned to undermine, to expose as false,
law’s pretended autonomy, objectivity and neutrality.”19
14 E.g. Van Maarseveen 1990, Pessers 1991 and Smart 1992.
15 Teubner 1984.
16 Fegan 1996, p. 186 and Holtmaat 2001. See also Lünneman, Loenen and Veldman 1999, in which a number
of examples are presented of what they call the ‘invisible standard of the law’.
17 Brouns and Scholten 1997, p. 67. They point at the study by Mossink and Nederland, who came to the
conclusion that women and girls are explicitly mentioned in policy documents (as a category that suffers
from arrears) and boys and men are not. Thereby implicitly the male norm is seen as the standard.
18 Charlesworth 1999, p. 381.
19 Lacey 1998, p. 186.
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Therefore, one of the central aims of (Western) feminist legal studies in recent decades
has been to decode or deconstruct this appearance of neutrality, and reveal the strong
ideologically biased connotation of law. Although this has been carried out very successfully
in particular sub-fields, it nevertheless seems that the idea of the neutrality of law has
remained largely unassailed.20 This could go some way to explain the persistence of many
forms of institutional or systematic gender discrimination.21 Those engaged in revealing
and combating this therefore always need to ask whether neutral really is neutral and
whether ‘general’ does not, in fact, mean ‘men’.
15.6 The development of a matrix of standards
In order to facilitate the task of uncovering implicit norms with respect to maleness or
masculinity in general policy, Brouns and Scholten have developed a ‘matrix of standards’
(raster van ijkpunten).22 This is to say, a listing of ‘suspect’ characterisations or ex-
pressions that traditionally refer to masculinity or femininity. There is an indication that
such is the case when a set of two mutual exclusive or hierarchically placed terms or
concepts is being used. The researchers cite a set of five indications of masculinity: ‘public
activity’, ‘crossing borders’, ‘breadwinning’, ‘powerful body’, and ‘emotional control’.
Conversely, there are a set of ‘female’ notions: ‘private sphere and inactivity’, ‘social
cohesion, social responsibility and care’, ‘dependence and thankfulness’, ‘the vulnerable
body that needs attention and care’ and ‘emotions’.23
The researchers assume that the characteristics of masculinity lie at the basis of policy-
making as a self-evident, but implicit ‘normativity’. In order to test this they have developed
a so-called N-test, against which policy documents can be screened. In this test N stands
for normativity in terms of masculinity.24 “The N-test tries to reveal the way in which
the dominant contents of the concept of masculinity are operative within policy.”25
Every policy area or field of law has central concepts that are constitutive for that area
or field. The content of these should be clarified with the help of the matrix of standards.
The standards mentioned here are indications for the researcher that there may be structural
gender discrimination in a particular field. Whether this is indeed the case also depends
on whether the use of these concepts and structures fixes and reaffirms traditional stereo-
typed roles of men and women and hence has an exclusionary and disadvantaging effect
on women.
20 Fegan mentions the belief in legal neutrality and objectivity as the core of the ideology of law, whereby
law can in turn function as a “significant reinforcer of ideologies”. Fegan 196, p. 186.
21 Holtmaat 2001.
22 Brouns & Scholten 1997, p. 6.
23 Brouns & Scholten 1997, pp 65-66.
24 Brouns & Scholten 1997, p. 71
25 Brouns & Scholten 1997, p. 73.
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15.7 Law and policy as a system of classifications
Every policy and every law classifies, assigning rights and obligations to certain groups
of citizens and excluding others from these. For the construction of these categories and
classifications – certainly since direct discrimination against women is legally prohibited
in most countries – sex neutral terms are used, such as ‘employee’, ‘unemployed people’,
‘citizens’, ‘immigrants’ or ‘parents’. Research needs to address how these classifications
came about and in what manner those terms that are used to draw boundaries between
those people with and those without rights are defined.26 One example is the concept
of an employee, which in Dutch social law was long held to mean a full-time working
breadwinner.27
Any researcher engaged in the search for instances of structural gender discrimination
constantly needs to ask her self the question as to whether seemingly neutral and general
categories, such as ‘the’ citizen, or ‘the’ beneficiary of social security, do indeed refer
to both sexes in the same manner, or whether such categories de facto refer to only one
sex or to a gender-stereotyped division of roles between the sexes. The adjectives necessary
to describe a given situation in more detail can be quite revealing in this context. A strong
example is the expression ‘working mother’, which expresses the idea that mothers are
not working when they are in the home! There is no comparable expression ‘working
fathers’.
15.8 The dynamics of gender
In the description of the meaning of the concept of gender, as developed in women’s
studies, it is stressed that those attributes or characteristics seen as ‘typically male’ or
‘typically female’ differ according to time and place. That is to say, gender is not about
a collection of fixed images of masculinity and femininity, but about a process in which
‘difference’ between men and women is repeatedly constructed and legitimised.28
As far as law is concerned, one can sometimes read the statement that law is male. That
is, it is constructed by biological males and serves only their interests. The body of law
is said to embody mainly masculine values.29 This approach runs the risk of once again
fixing gendered categories. According to Carol Smart, we should rather argue that law
26 Mossink & Nederland 1993, p. 5. Verloo & Roggeband 1994 and 1996 mention rules (that is to say:
interpretations, definitions and norms) as one of the two important structures that are responsible for the
reproduction of differences in power between men and women.
27 Holtmaat 1989.
28 Mossink & Nederland 1993, p. 7.
29 E.g. MacKinnon 1991.
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(and policy) is gendered. The advantage of this approach is that the content and working
of law no longer has to be described using the categories male and female, but that we
“(...) can begin to see the way in which law insists on a specific version of gender differentiation,
without having to posit our own form of differentiation as some kind of starting or finishing
point.”30 This means that “(...) we can begin to analyse law as a process of producing gender
identities rather than simply as the application of law to previously gendered subjects.”
Gender is active, not passive; every person and every human structure or construct con-
tributes to it. In the words of Silvia Gherardi: “we are ‘doing’ gender”.31
The fact that gender is not a static category has two consequences for the development
of a research method for revealing structural gender discrimination in law and policy. In
the first place it means that the researcher cannot start from the perspective that men and
women are two separate categories, for which certain equal or different rules could or
should apply.32 And secondly, attention needs to be paid to the question as to whether
men and women are presented as two unambiguous and separate categories in policy or
in law, or whether there is room for ‘fusion’ and diversity.33 Where the first is the case
this could be an indication that certain stereotyped gender relations lie at the basis of this
policy or law.34
15.9 The context in which policy or law is being developed
An assessment of the way gender operates and of the existence of structural gender dis-
crimination cannot be undertaken without addressing the concrete context in which policy-
makers or the legislator has to act. (This is the first order level of the research, mentioned
above.) This means that the researcher needs to be acquainted with the basic structure of
the particular policy field or field of legislation and the way this field interacts with the
wider society and politics. This presupposes a good knowledge of the historically-deter-
mined features of this field and the forces that play (or have played) a role in it.
For example, in assessing public policy on childcare or parental leave in the Netherlands,
and the way in which these social arrangements are structured, it is crucial to have a good
insight into the relationships of power between government and the social partners, the
role of advisory committees in policy-making, and the structures of existing systems of
social services into which these specific arrangements must fit. Again, as in law, there
30 Smart 1992, p. 34.
31 Gherardi 1994.
32 Charlesworth 1999, pp 383 and 384.
33 That is to say: does one speak of ‘men” and “women” or is it acknowledged that actual men and women
can be in a great variety of positions. See Mossink & Nederland 1993, p. 5.
34 Mossink & Nederland 1993, p. 7.
106 Chapter 15 – Methodological directions and starting-points
are powerful pressures towards conformity to a pre-given set of norms and standards: once
childcare is viewed as a policy area that belongs to the domain of the Ministry of Health
(as is the case in the Netherlands) it is extremely difficult to make norms that primarily
‘belong’ to the domain of the Ministry of Social Affairs or the Ministry of Education apply
in the field of childcare. If a Minister of Justice wants to change the divorce laws he or
she – besides political differences of opinion – has to take into account the opinions of
the judges, advocates, and notaries, and the existence of pressure groups of divorced fathers,
the organisation of welfare mothers, and so on.
In all this one should constantly be aware of the fact that policy and law always come
about on the basis of compromise, in which a concession for one side is counterbalanced
by a victory for the other.
15.10 The context of unequal power relations between the sexes
The GIA approach recommended by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
expressly states that researchers who conduct such an assessment must acknowledge the
structural difference in power between men and women that still exists in our society. These
unequal power relations lie at the basis of the inequality that manifests itself in various
areas of society.
In the same way, research into the existence of structural gender discrimination needs to
address the social inequality of the sexes. This inequality is reflected in the construction
of gender, in the sense that the concepts of masculinity and femininity are not equivalent
but almost always express a difference in valuation, in which the male part of the pair
of concepts is valued higher or better than the female part. For good reasons, the wording
of Article 5a CEDAW acknowledges that gender stereotypes often express an unequal
estimation of attitudes, expressions and so on of one of the sexes.
15.11 Why a specific research model to reveal structural gender discrimination?
The question that still remains to be answered is why a specific research model is needed
for the implementation of Article 5a CEDAW. Why is the existing GIA approach not suffi-
cient, or possibly useable with some small modifications?
There are several reasons why a specific method is needed. In the first place, a GIA aims
at an ex ante estimation of the effects of a certain policy or law. Research into gender
stereotypes that are constitutive for laws and public policy also needs to consider laws
and policies that are already operative, and in some cases over a long period.
Secondly, in a GIA the concrete position of women is the key issue. The notion of
‘position’ implies a set of social and economic standards. In order to assess whether an
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improvement or worsening of this position will occur a so-called ‘zero measurement’ must
be undertaken. That is, an assessment of the current position and the effects that can be
expected from the proposed measure or rule. Such an estimation is not really possible in
the context of Article 5a CEDAW as the policy or law that is the object of research is already
in use. To this it should be added that the GIA model takes sex differences as a starting
point and not the multi-layered concept of gender: that is, it counts how many men and
women will either gain or be disadvantaged by the proposed rule or measure.
And thirdly, the GIA approach, in terms of Schaapman’s first- and second-order analysis,
is mainly directed at the first level: the concrete circumstances under which gender is
reproduced. In contrast, as well as considering the first level the research model needed
to implement Article 5a CEDAW needs to be directed explicitly at a second-order analysis
– the level at which structural gender discrimination occurs.
One final reason why the existing GIA model cannot be used in this case is that research
conducted in the framework of implementing the obligations under the Women’s Conven-
tion must always address all three sub-objectives of the Convention. Although the third
objective is central in this research, this means that it also needs to be ascertained that
the policy or law in question does not otherwise infringe the norms of the Convention.
Part of the inquiry should, therefore, be whether a particular policy or law entails direct
or indirect discrimination against women and whether it is really aimed at the second
objective: improving the position of women. In this regard the Convention’s Articles and
the General Recommendations of the CEDAW Committee provide concrete directions for
each field as to what needs to be done to combat discrimination against women. Within
the framework of the Dutch GIA model the test of whether the proposed policy or law is
in conformity with national and international non-discrimination standards is only a minor
aspect of the research.35
15.12 The function of this research method in the execution of a policy of gender
mainstreaming
Like the GIA model, the research method presented in this study can serve as an instrument
in the execution of a policy of gender mainstreaming. Since the mid-1990s, the national
and international policy-making arena has seen a shift in policy in the field of sex equality.
Until that time the main policy was to combat discrimination and promote sex equality
by means of so-called specific instruments. Since then it has been recognised that the
problem of sex discrimination needs to be tackled in a much broader way. Policy makers
35 In the GIA model this aspect is dealt with in the question as to whether the policy is in conformity with
the criterion of equality between the sexes. In 2004 a new model of the GIA will be published in which
more attention is given to legal standards.
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now, therefore, speak of a double-track approach, in which gender mainstreaming constitutes
the new, second track.
The Dutch government defines gender mainstreaming as taking relevant differences between
men and women into account, in order to reach a qualitative better policy. The government
expects not only better quality but also more efficiency.36 In 2001 it announced in Par-
liament that gender mainstreaming is now officially part of government’s policy.
Within the European Union gender mainstreaming became part of the EU’s policy following
the adoption of Article 2(3) of the Treaty of Amsterdam. According to the European
Commission, gender mainstreaming
“involves not restricting efforts to promote equality to the implementation of specific measures
to help women, but mobilising all generally policies and measures specifically for the purpose
of achieving equality by actively and openly taking into account at the planning stage their possible
effects on the respective situations of men and women (gender perspective)”.37 (Emphasis in
original).
Pollack and Hafner-Burton term gender mainstreaming an “extraordinarily demanding
concept which requires the adoption of a gender perspective by all the central actors in
the policy process (…)”.38 No wonder that the results have been described by commenta-
tors as weak or very meagre.39
In comments and critiques on the model of gender mainstreaming that have appeared in
recent years, it is recognised that gender mainstreaming can develop in two different ways.
“The first of these approaches, which Jahan labels ‘integrationist’, essentially introduces a gender
perspective into existing policy processes, but does not challenge existing policy paradigms. By
contrast, a second and more radical approach, which Jahan calls ‘agenda setting’, involves a
fundamental rethinking, not simply of the means or procedures of policymaking, but of the ends
or goals of policy from a gender perspective. In this approach, ‘Women not only become part of
the mainstream, they also reorient the nature of the mainstream’ (Jahan 1995: 13).”40
The first approach is the dominant one, according to Pollack and Hafner-Burton, who
researched the effects of European Union policy on gender mainstreaming.
“As appealing as the latter approach may seem, we would agree with Rees (1998) that the European
Union has generally adopted an integrationist approach to gender mainstreaming, integrating women
36 Min. SZW 2001 (b), appendix, p. 11
37 Commission of the European Communities 1996, p. 2
38 Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 5.
39 See Shaw 2001, Beveridge, Nott & Stephe 2000, Verloo 2000 and Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000.
40 Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 34.
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and gender issues into specific policies rather than rethinking the fundamental aims of the European
Union from a gender perspective.”41
Mindful of the general objective and purpose of the CEDAW Convention and the specific
meaning that – according to this research – must be attached to Article 5a CEDAW, there
is an undeniably close link between CEDAW and the second approach of gender mainstream-
ing mentioned in the quotation above. The research method presented here aims at providing
a suitable instrument for pursuing this approach. It should be kept in mind that this instru-
ment is not developed for use by public officials in their daily practice of policymaking,
but as a tool that researchers and legal scholars can use in undertaking in-depth studies
into the existence of gender stereotypes in law and public policy.
In turn, the results of such studies can be used by public officials or the legislator to design
different policy and law.42
41 Pollack & Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 26.
42 Holtmaat 1989.

16
A RESEARCH MODEL TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF
STRUCTURAL GENDER DISCRIMINATION
16.1 Introduction
In the introduction to the previous Chapter, it was noted that it is impossible to design
a general checklist that could be used in all fields to ascertain the existence of negative
gender stereotypes that cause structural gender discrimination. Researchers need to develop
their own specific approach, taking into account the methodological directions and starting-
points discussed in Chapter 15.
As a consequence, the model presented in this final Chapter should not be understood
as a ready-made research model. Rather, it is intended simply as a guideline for research,
on the basis of which the specific research questions that need to be posed in a certain
part of the law or field of policymaking can be adduced.
To make the model less abstract, I illustrate it with series of questions that could be posed
when screening Dutch policy and legislation with regard to the ‘inburgering’ (which can
be translated into: becoming acquainted with the Dutch society) of asylum seekers and
immigrants. Inburgering became obligatory in 1998 when the Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers
(WIN) was adopted.1 It means (among other things) that asylum seekers and immigrants
can be obliged to learn the Dutch language and follow courses in which they become
acquainted with the norms and values that are prevalent in current Dutch society. Know-
ledge of this is deemed to be necessary with a view to social integration and participation
in the labour market. Failure to pass the inburgering-exam is sanctioned by administrative
fines. The Act has been formulated in strictly sex neutral terms: that is, nowhere is there
an explicit difference in rights and duties between men and women.2
1 Act of 9 April 1998, Official Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 1998, 261: Law on the Integration of
Newcomers. E-Quality, an expert centre for gender and diversity, has published a fact sheet on the position
of women in the process of inburgering. See E-Quality 2003.
2 I constructed the following quistionnaire after a quick scan of this Act. Since I am not a specialist in this
field of law, it is quite feasible that experts would have posed different questions or given different examples.
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16.2 The central question and the design of the research
On the basis of the outcome of the research into the meaning of Article 5a CEDAW the
central question of the research project has been phrased as follows:
In how far and in what way does the legal obligation to inburgering of newcomers,
as laid down in the Law on the Inburgerging of Newcomers (WIN), suffer from systemic
discrimination or structural gender discrimination?
The researcher should give their own clear definition of systemic discrimination or structural
gender discrimination. Chapter 13 of this book provides materials to do this. This definition
needs to be designed in such a way that it includes yardsticks or standards with which
the central question can be answered at the end of the research.
Sources that should be used in this research about the WIN are:
· The written documents about the WIN Bill, including earlier proposals and the Advice
of the Council of State.
· Invited and uninvited advice of organisations in and outside government submitted
before and during the procedure of adoption of the WIN.
· The report of the written and oral debates about the WIN in both Chambers of Par-
liament.
· Commentaries on the Bill from the political and legal side (in journals, newspapers,
legal journals or at conferences) from some years before the design of the Bill until
passing the Act in Parliament.
· Comments on the actual functioning of the WIN since adoption, official evaluations
of the WIN in practice and possibly proposals to make amendments or changes in the
Act.
· Possibly written and oral interviews with civil servants and politicians who were deeply
involved in the process of writing the Bill and the adaptations or amendments necessary
as a result of the debates in Parliament between the Cabinet and MPs.
· Possibly written and oral interviews with civil servants at local level who are respons-
ible for implementing the WIN.
· Sociological, cultural-anthropological and economic studies of the position of women
and men in immigrant communities in the Netherlands.
The research should be divided into a first order analysis, that concentrates on the concrete
context in which the drafters (executors) of the WIN had (have) to act, and a second order
analysis that concentrates on the assumptions that played a role during the process of law
making.
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16.3 The first order analysis
· What has been formulated as the central aim of the WIN? What problems did the
government want to solve with this law? Which interests were to be served? (For
example, raising labour market participation, or decreasing social tensions in neighbor-
hoods.)
· To which policy field does the WIN belong? (Which Department or Ministry is primarily
responsible for the design of the Bill and for implementing and enforcing the Act?)
What other Ministries were and are involved in the process of legislation?
· Who are the main advisors of the Ministries that were involved in the process of
designing the WIN? (Advisory boards, lobby groups?)
· What is the social and political context in which the WIN was designed and adopted?
Which actors have brought forward views about the analysis of the problem that needed
to be solved, about solutions to these problems, et cetera? How and where are these
standpoints expressed? In what way can these opinions be traced in the Bill or the
debates that took place in Parliament?
· Has any attention been given to the actual differences in the position of (subgroups
of) male and female newcomers in the definition of the problem, the formulation of
aims and the choice of means? If so, which words are used to describe these differ-
ences? Does the accent lie on (assumed) social, economic or cultural differences
between men and women?
· Which empirical materials or data are used to make these statements about (assumed)
differences? Is the data reliable, complete and recent?
· Which consequences in terms of different rights and duties for men and women are
attached to these assumed differences?
· Has any attention been given in the definition of the problem, the formulation of aims
and the choice of means to the possible different consequences of the legal obligation
to inburgering in the WIN, in terms of a change in power relations between men and
women? If this is the case: what arguments are brought forward to state that these
effects will occur? In other words: has a Gender Impact Assessment been done before
it was decided to present this Bill? If so, what were the outcomes of this GIA? Did
these influence the structure or content of the WIN?
16.4 The second order analysis
· Which of the problems known from literature about the position of men and women
within the population of immigrants and asylum seekers were, and were not, discussed
in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill and during the process of adopting the
WIN in Parliament?
· If attention is being given to the different positions of men and women, are these two
categories presented as static (fixed) categories or as changeable categories? Is there
sensitivity for differences within the categories of males and females?
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· When the duty to inburgering is presented as a general or neutral duty, can this never-
theless be qualified as containing a male standard when applying the matrix of standards
or the N-test?
· In how far and in what way do characteristics of masculinity appear to be ‘normal’
(or standard) and does femininity thereby implicitly appear as ‘deviant’ or as the
problem?
· Which categories does the WIN use or create with regard to:
- Designation of the persons who, on the basis of this law, are obliged to participate
in the process of inburgering? (The personal scope of the law.) (The WIN appears
to make a distinction between people who have been in the Netherlands for a
number of years and those who are now entering it, and between persons who are
and who are not eligible under the social security system.)
- Exceptions to the norm (persons or groups excluded from the WIN or for whom
different regulations are made.) (Does this law apply only to certain categories of
aliens or for everyone who is new in the Country?)
- Designation of the areas in which the WIN is applicable (the material scope of the
law). (It is possible that the duty to participate in inburgeringsprograms only applies
in the field of paid labour or political participation.)
· To what extent are these categories implicitly or explicitly based on the assumed equal
or different needs of men and women in certain circumstances?
· In which legal framework has the duty to inburgering been constructed? Is it an
administrative law, a civil law or a criminal law?
· Which are the central legal principles that underlie this framework? (For example, in
employment law the principle of the correction of unequal power relationships between
employers and employees is important for the construction and interpretation of concrete
norms.) To what extent do these principles (or the way in which they are phased) refer
to gender? Did they have an influence on content or structure of this particular law?
· Which are the constitutive (central) concepts in the WIN? (For example, citizenship,
language ability, knowledge of the Dutch history and culture.)
· What do these concepts say about:
- The material scope of the law (for example, only ‘workers’ are covered and are
eligible for language courses free of charge).
- The content of the rights and duties on the ground of the WIN.
· Which sanctions can be imposed on grounds of the WIN? Can these sanctions have
different consequences for men and women?
· Which organs or organisations are involved in the enforcement of the WIN? What
standards of conduct are dominant in these organizations? (For example, some welfare
agencies are known to accept that mothers with young children do not apply for paid
work.)
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16.5 Evaluation / Conclusions
This study should be concluded with an evaluation of the materials that have been con-
sidered, together with a clear answer to the central question posed. This evaluation should
also be seen against the background of the general aim of the Women’s Convention. This
means that separate attention should be paid to the three sub-aims of the Convention.
This test should contain at least the following questions:
· Is it established that the WIN directly or indirectly reflects or consolidates traditional
and stereotyped views about ‘proper’ roles of men and women or about masculinity
and femininity and thereby hampers individual freedom of choice as to how to be a
man or a woman? Does this act to sustain the dominant gender ideology? In other
words: is there a breach of Articles 2f and 5a of the Convention?
· Does the WIN directly or indirectly hamper the realisation of women’s human rights
or the right to equal treatment in the sense of the Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention?
Which of the Convention’s Articles are specifically at stake? (For example, the right
to a free choice of spouse.) Does this amount to direct or indirect discrimination (as
defined, for example, in EC sex equality law or in other legal systems)?
· Does the WIN directly or indirectly hamper the realisation of the second aim of the
Convention: to improve the position of women? (See Articles 3, 4 and 24 of the
Convention and General Recommendation 25.)
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1INTRODUCTION
1.1 Brief background
The UN-Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) was concluded on 18 December 1979, and it was signed by the Netherlands at
the Second World Conference on Women in Copenhagen in 1980. There was a considerable
period between the signing and the final ratification in August 1991, by which the Nether-
lands became an actual party to the Convention. The draft Ratification Bill was submitted
in April 1985; it was accepted by the house of Representative of Parliament in July 1990,
and by the Senate in July 1991. The primary reason for the long delay was the difficult
realisation progress of the General Equal Treatment Act (Algemene Wet Gelijke Behande-
ling, AWGB). The parliamentary debate on the draft Ratification Bill opted for a gradual
process in the realisation of the obligations under the Convention, rather then for a deadline.
The focus was on a dynamic interpretation, “because”, as the government said, “interpreta-
tions of the content of the obligations under the Convention could change wit time and
would then demand a contemporary implementation.”
A Human Rights Convention requires periodic reports be made to the relevant Convention
committee. In the case of the Women’s Convention, it is the Committee on the Elimination
of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). It emerged during the parlia-
mentary discussion on the Convention in 1990 that the House of Representatives did nit
simply want to take note of the reports to CEDAW but also wanted to remain involved in
the implementation of the Convention itself. In Article 3 of the 1991 Ratification Act,1
an amendment by members of the House of Representatives Kalsbeek-Jasperse, Groenman
and Wiesglas laid down that a report on the implementation of the Convention should be
submitted to the General Assembly every four years. The House asked for a national report
of this kind with a view to influencing the Country Reports of the Netherlands to the
CEDAW Committee. The explanation of the amendment stated that the national report
1 Kingdom Act of 3 July 1991 for the Ratification of the CEDAW Convention (New York, 18 December
1979), Official Bulletin of Acts, Orders and Decrees 1991, 355.
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“should give a true summary of the state of affairs regarding the equal treatment of women
in all conceivable areas.”
As the further parliamentary discussion shows, the national report was to have a mainly
legal character, directed to the issue of equal treatment. This distinguishes this report from
the CEDAW report, which is aimed more at the international community. The Country Report
to the CEDAW Committee has to give an insight into all measures taken in respect of all
the obligations under the Convention, as well as the progress achieved. The First Nether-
lands Report to the UN-Committee for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination
Against Women2 was published in November 1992; the second report is to be sent to
the Committee in the course of 1997 and will then be published.
(…)
1.2 Remit
The Report Committee’s remit was to write a report “outlining the present state of affairs
regarding the implementation of the Convention in the Netherlands”. It was also requested
to take responsibility for he official report to Parliament and a report on the views of non-
governmental organisations. The legal study of the meaning of the Convention for the Dutch
legal system was completed in August 1996.6 A specific study about the significance of
the Convention in the field of healthcare appeared in June 1996.7 (…)
1.3 The Report Committee’s interpretation of its remit
The Women’s Convention does not provide a blueprint of an ideal ‘emancipated’ society,
but it lays down a large number of measures for eliminating all forms of discrimination
against women. The Convention and the associated international development of ideas
are to form a guideline for national emancipation policy, and at the same time they can
serve as a source of inspiration. However, this demands a clear and coherent view on the
significance of the Convention. If this is lacking, then so is the framework to check that
the Dutch government is complying with its obligations under the Convention. As the
Committee was entering unknown territory with this first national report, it was able to
take the opportunity of linking the legal discussion on the meaning of various Convention
obligations to the general discussion on the consequences of various forms of Dutch policy
to women, including emancipation policy. (…)
2 Ministerie SZW 1992.
6 Hes & Van Vleuten 1996.
7 Holtust et al. 1996.
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The Report Committee saw it as its task to continue building on the report The Women’s
Convention in the Dutch Legal System.9 The introduction to that explanatory report states
that one round is not sufficient to provide a coherent vision of the Convention’s significance
for the Dutch legal system owing to the large number of views and disciplines involved.
Because more then eleven years have passed between the adoption of the Convention (in
1979) and its ratification by the Netherlands, the Report Committee has taken the view
that there is now a major need for an authoritative contemporary view of the Convention.
This is all the more important because the report The Women’s Convention in the Dutch
Legal System has provided evidence of major legal developments at the international level.
During the ratification process, too little account could be taken of this.
The Report Committee has interpreted its task to be twofold. On the one hand, it has
clarified the main thrusts of the Convention, and on the other hand it has provided illustra-
tions from a number of policy areas where legislation or policy is still not (or not yet)
in line with the Convention’s obligations. Where further study or policy is desirable, this
is indicated in the conclusions and recommendations. While the decision was made from
the start (…) to illustrate the significance of the Convention, the Committee has used a
relatively large amount of time and energy in bringing unity into the variety of legal points
of view. This legal framework can be taken as a given in future reports, so that they can
deal in more detail with actual compliance to the Convention in practice. (…)
1.4 Method and experiences
(…)
1.5 The structure of the report
Chapter 2 discusses the meaning of the Convention according to the most recent under-
standings. It deals with its objectives and scope, the obligations it imposes on State parties
and the operation of the Convention in the Dutch legal system. The possibilities for
inspection and compliance and the need for dissemination of the text of the Convention
and information on it are also dealt with. This Chapter explains the Convention’s main
aim in three sub-aims that, taken together, should result in the elimination of all forms
of discrimination against women. Chapter 3 and 4 discuss the Convention’s consequences
for the policy that must be applied to achieve its central aim. Chapter 3 discusses the
general part of such an emancipation policy on the basis of the three sub-aims. The Chapter
also deals with the organisation of that policy as a precondition for its effectiveness.
Chapter 4 considers the policy that should be applied in various policy areas. By agreement
9 Hes & Van Vleuten 1996.
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with the Co-ordinating Minister, the Report Committee restricted itself to a number of
relevant areas. In this Chapter the Committee has been able to draw on materials sent by
the Non Governmental Organisations. The Report concludes in Chapter 5 with general
conclusions and a series of recommendations.
2THE MEANING OF THE WOMEN’S CONVENTION
In this Chapter, the Report Committee intends to provide insight into the aims and scope
of the Convention (Section 2.1). After this, the obligations resting on the government will
be clarified (Section 2.2) as will the way in which the Convention affects the legal system
in the Netherlands, including monitoring compliance with the Convention (Section 2.3).
Because the statements about these topics in government documents and parliamentary
discussions concerning the Bill for the Ratification of the Convention have been largely
superseded by insights from recent studies and by the General Recommendations of the
CEDAW Committee, a fairly extensive treatment is appropriate here.1 In the present Chapter,
the Report Committee will present clear standpoints in these areas in the hope that this
report will, in part, provide guidance for a continuing judicial and political discussion about
the content of the Women’s Convention.2
2.1 Aim and scope of the Convention
2.1.1 Background
The documents relating to the Act for the Ratification of the Convention do not go into
much detail concerning the aim and scope of the Convention. For example, the fact that
the Convention relates only to discrimination against women was hardly discussed. In the
Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill for the Ratification, the government states that
eliminating discrimination on the basis of sex was “not yet feasible” within the United
Nations.
This interpretation is contrary to the Convention’s genesis, which is dominated by the
view that the aim of this Convention is to put an end to the inferior position of women.
1 General Recommendations of the CEDAW Committee are authoritative interpretations of the Convention,
which are discussed in this report in relation to the Convention provisions.
2 In this chapter the Report Committee has relied primarily on scientific analyses, such as the reports of Hes
& Van Vleuten 1996, Holtrust et al. 1996, Heringa, Hes & Lijnzaad 1994, Emancipatieraad 1996 and Cook
1994.
138 Chapter 2 – The meaning of the Women’s Convention
The prohibition of discrimination in Article 1 of the Convention should therefore be
regarded instead as a more detailed definition than the general prohibitions of discrimination
on the basis of sex that are found in other international Human Rights Conventions.3
The government regarded full equality before the law and anti-discrimination legislation
as important objectives of the Convention. Ratification of the Convention has taken a long
time because the Dutch legislators struggled with the implications of the anti-discrimination
provisions in international law, especially the EC Equal Treatment Directives and Article
26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
In the mid-1980s, when the rulings of national and international courts showed that
the Netherlands was in default regarding equal and independent social security rights of
women, there were even calls to withdraw ratification of the ICCPR.
The ratification of the Convention was long deemed dependent on the adoption of a
general Equal Treatment Act (ETA). However, preparations for this Act proceeded slowly
due to the extensive discussion of the conflict between the principle of non-discrimination
and the right to freedom of religion and education. (Note RH: this was due to the fact that
the ETA also covered discrimination the ground of sexual orientation; however schools
wanted to keep the right not to hire homosexuals.) Although implementing a policy of
equality before the law was mandatory, this was more difficult than was assumed. As far
back as the 1980s, the Netherlands ran up against the international, constitutional and socio-
economic context of inequality. The implications of the principle of non-discrimination
went much further than had initially been anticipated.
During the discussion in Parliament of the Bill for the Ratification of the Convention,
the government emphasised that the Convention concerns not only the legislative branch
of government, but also the executive and administrative branches.4 The Report Committee
endorses this interpretation. The actions the government subsequently took in this regard
were limited. Instead of detailing the obligations arising under the Convention, the govern-
ment referred to its existing emancipation policy. The government measured its actions
according to its own intentions and previously-chosen objectives, not according to the
general object and purpose of the Convention or the specific significance of its individual
provisions.
The object and purpose of the Convention was explicitly used as a basic principle in
the Act for the Ratification of the Convention on only a single point: the exclusion of
women from military conscription. Because the general aim of the Convention is to improve
the position of women, the government considered it superfluous to enter a reservation
on this point.
3 Such as the bans on discrimination in Art. 14 ECHR and Art. 26 ICCPR. A description of the discussion
about limiting this ban to cover only discrimination against women can be found in Rehof 1993, pp. 42-49.
4 The entire set of administrative instruments can be used to implement Article 5, according to the Memorie
van Antwoord aan de Eerste Kamer (Explanatory Memorandum to the First Chamber of Parliament). EK,
1990-1991, 18 950 (R1281), no. 72a p. 4.
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2.1.2 The aim of the Convention
The general aim of the Convention is to eliminate all forms of discrimination against
women. This is a mandate to act. Moreover, the Convention does not provide a blueprint
for the ideal, emancipated society, but instead prescribes an extensive programme of
requirements.
As its point of departure, the Preamble presupposes a situation where there is widespread
discrimination against women, which is related in part to the traditional roles of men and
women in society and the family. The Preamble assumes that discrimination against women
is an infringement of the principles of equal treatment and human dignity, and is an obstacle
to improving the welfare of society and the family.
Unlike the prevailing international law that bans discrimination on the grounds of sex,
the Convention acknowledges the structurally subordinate position of women compared
to men, and deliberately gives protection only to women.5
To get a better idea of the substance of the obligations that the Convention entails,
it is desirable to split its general aim into three sub-aims. These sub-aims can be derived
from Articles 2, 3 and 5. They are
1. Achieving full equality before the law and in public administration.
2. Improving the position of women.
3. Combating the dominant gender ideology.
The three sub-aims are to be understood as follows:
Re 1 Equality before the law and in public administration
The Convention prescribes that State parties should eliminate discrimination against women
in all its forms (Article 2 a): their constitutions and other legislation must ensure that
women will not be treated differently from men in a negative sense, either directly or
indirectly. Direct discrimination is defined as making a distinction with direct reference
to an individual’s sex or to characteristics that are inextricably linked to an individual’s
sex.
The legal doctrine on discrimination generally endorses the fact that no exceptions
to the prohibition on direct distinction on the basis of a person’s sex are allowed, except
for the cases explicitly specified in the law or in the Convention. This system can be traced
back to the EC Directives and the provisions in the Dutch ETA. In these cases, no objective
grounds for an exception can be put forward other than those already specified in the law.
If the text of a Convention does not explicitly refer to certain allowable exceptions, any
appeal for an exception must be assessed very strictly. Some forms of discrimination
5 In the relevant literature this is sometimes defined as an asymmetrical implementation of the judicial principle
of equality; the principle is not applied in a strictly formal sense to all cases, but only offers protection
to those groups/individuals who have a structurally disadvantaged position. In this context see especially
Loenen 1992, and Loenen 1994. See also: Van Maarseveen, Pessers, Gunning (ed.) 1987.
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according to sex are expressly excluded from the Convention’s general prohibition on direct
discrimination. For example, the Convention requires measures to be taken in the area
of prenatal and postnatal care. After all, due to their biological characteristics, special
measures for women may be required in order to achieve equality.
An exception of a completely different order concerns taking positive action or pursuing
a policy of preferential treatment for women (Article 4 (1) CEDAW). To the extent that
rights are exclusively assigned to women in legislation or regulations on these grounds,
they are permitted under certain conditions. (See re 2).6
Because the Convention aims to improve the position of women, it cannot readily be
assumed that it is permissible to achieve equality before the law by lowering general (or
male) standards to the disadvantageous position of women (levelling down).
Due to existing social differences between men and women, a sex-neutral legal rule
may have a disproportionately adverse effect on women. This is defined as indirect dis-
crimination, unless objective grounds can be provided to justify it. Objective grounds can
exist only if (1) the aim of the relevant regulation is not in itself discriminatory and the
interests served by the arrangement are sufficiently important and (2) the means chosen
are appropriate and necessary for the purpose of actually achieving the aim. It is undisputed
that the prohibition of discrimination in the Convention also concerns indirect discrimina-
tion.
The government’s obligation to implement equal treatment is not limited to legislative
activities alone. This sub-aim also includes the elimination of direct and indirect discrimina-
tion arising due to actions by the government or government decisions focusing on an
individual case.
Re 2 Improving the position of women
The Convention prescribes that the government is responsible for actually realising the
social, civil, economic, cultural and political human rights of women (Article 3).7
The Convention’s non-discrimination principle is more than a guarantee that women
will be treated equally in legislation, public administration and legal procedures (the
classical component of the principle of equality). It also signifies that the government will
do everything possible to put an end to discrimination in society and to the de facto
inequalities between men and women (the social component of the principle of equality).8
6 Positive action can take the form of a statutory regulation and that of policy measures. As such, it is important
in connection with the first two sub-aims of the Convention.
7 As used in this report, the term government also includes local governments. See Section 2.2.5.
8 These two components can be found in many human rights. For example, the right to education implies
that the government guarantees that there will not be any unjustified interference with education, but also -
and especially – that everyone can actually take part in education. See Coomans 1992. Vlemminx 1996
makes a three part distinction: freedom, protection in horizontal relationships and positive measures. In
the relevant literature, the principle of non-discrimination is frequently split up into striving for formal equality
and striving for substantive equality, where the delineation between the two concepts is drawn differently.
The Report Committee therefore did not want to use these concepts in its discussion of the aims of the
Convention.
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This means that in a number of policy areas, which are defined in the Convention in great
detail, the government must actively promote a situation in which women can exercise
these rights in freedom. This policy to improve the position of women can be given shape
in two ways.
Firstly, the government must ban all forms of discrimination in society and ensure
compliance with this prohibition (Article 2 b and c). In the Netherlands, this has been done,
for example, by incorporating anti-discrimination provisions in criminal law, in legislation
in the area of equal treatment in employment and by means of the ETA. In this way, the
government has imposed the norm of equal treatment and non-discrimination on society
in a binding fashion; as a result, the Convention has also made itself felt in relations
between citizens.
Secondly, the government must encourage necessary and desirable developments.9
Among other things, this means developing emancipation policies, establishing and main-
taining a support structure and a ‘national machinery’ (see Section 3.3.3.3), and using the
instrument of Gender Impact Assessments (see Chapter 3).
If this sub-aim results in measures that exclusively place women in a favourable (or
more favourable) position, such as an affirmative action policy for women in government
posts, the reasons for the measures must be explained in detail.10 Article 4 of the Conven-
tion provides guidelines for taking affirmative treatment or positive action measures. Such
measures must always be temporary and have the aim of advancing the actual equality
of women. General Recommendation 4 of the CEDAW Committee mentions affirmative
treatment, positive action and quota systems.
The Convention does not limit affirmative treatment to aims that mirror the presence
of males and females in the relevant group. Nor does it exclude regulations where only
women are selected. The Convention therefore permits more than is customary in the
Netherlands.11
Re 3 Combating the dominant gender ideology
The current gender ideology distinguishes between men and women by attributing different
values and qualities to their behaviour, ideas, feelings, value judgements and expecta-
9 This often is called ‘emancipation policy’. This term can also refer to all three sub-aims of the Convention
at the same time. When we use the word emancipation policy in this report we refer to this latter meaning.
10 The Report Committee wishes to emphasise that it is incorrect to label all measures under the second sub-aim
as positive action for women. See Loenen 1993.
11 Policy in which quotas or target figures are limited to a reflection of the male/female ratio in the professional
group is therefore on the cautious side. A regulation such as that on the level of the Kalanke Judgement
(ECJ 17 October 1995, No. C450/93) is admissible from the viewpoint of the Convention. See also Section
2.2.4. (Not of the translator: See for a recent interpretation of Article 4(1) CEDAW General Recommendation
25 of January 2004.
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tions.12 This ideology must be exposed, and the exclusion mechanisms to which it gives
rise must be combated effectively.13
This third sub-aim can be derived from the Preamble and from Articles 5a and 10c.
Article 5b also draws attention to the social function of motherhood and the joint respons-
ibility of men and women in bringing up their children.
This obligation is new. Never before in a legal document that focuses on combating
discrimination against women has there been so much emphasis on the need to change
existing ideas and ideologies, where women are assigned an unequal, subordinate or ‘other’
role in human life in all its facets (in both the public and private sphere). In this way, the
Convention recognises that the unequal position of women is a stubborn phenomenon and
that it can only be improved if essential changes take place at the level of gender ideology.
Established or dominant ideas about the role of women, and about what is (or should
be) typically male and typically female, permeate the entirety of people’s social, economic,
cultural, political and personal lives. These ideas define not only the identity of individuals,
but also shape virtually all society’s structures and institutions.14 The gender-based
structuring of human life is sometimes described with the terms structural discrimination,
institutional discrimination or systematic discrimination
One example is the organisation of paid labour. This is organised not only in accordance
with a gender-defined gap between paid and unpaid labour, but the way in which paid
labour is structured is also based largely on the needs and possibilities of the traditional
male role of the full time breadwinner without any care tasks. The structure and length
of the workday, the normal working hours per day and per week (where part-time work
is viewed as an aberration), the locations where work can take place, the rights and obliga-
tions of the employers and employees, all these aspects appear to have a sex-specific
character. Paid work is still an area that is totally separate from the care needs of society.
In the report Ongezien onderscheid naar sekse (Invisible sex discrimination), the task
of the government in this area is described as follows. “For the government this means
that it must attempt to break out of the reproduction of these differences in symbols,
languages and norms, in institutions and structures, and in behaviours.” In the Explanatory
12 Rapport Interdepartementale Projectgroep Beeldvorming (Report of the Interdepartmental Project Group
on Gender Image Formation) 1996, p. 5. The Project Group uses the term ‘traditional gender ideology’;
the Report Committee prefers the concept of ‘dominant gender ideology’.
13 The concept of sex is frequently replaced by the concept of gender in women’s studies and emancipation
policy documents. The concept of gender refers not only to biological differences, but also to the social
and culturally construed differences between men and women. According to Sevenhuijsen, gender is a ‘layered
concept’, i.e. it has a powerful effect on multiple levels. It operates on the symbolic level, the level of the
collective and individual identities and at the level of social structures. See Sevenhuijsen 1996, p. 64 and
p.103.
14 This is acknowledged in various documents by the Dutch government. The Report Committee refers here
only to the establishment of the Project Group on Gender Image Formation in 1993 and its report published
in 1996 (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 1996). In the Beleidsbrief Emancipatiebeleid 1997
(Policy Paper on Emancipation, published in 1996), the government emphasised the importance of this topic
(p. 19). TK 1996-1997, 25 006, no. 1.
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Memorandum to the recently approved Equal Treatment (Working Hours) Act, the Dutch
government itself indicates that new terminology is appropriate: employees with varying
working hours have replaced the distinction between full time and part-time workers. The
full time worker must no longer be used as the point of reference.15
The relationship between Articles 2, 3 and 5
The relevant literature regularly discusses the programmatic structure of the Convention.
The Report Committee believes that the programme of the Convention is comprised of
the further development and realisation of the sub-aims discussed above.
Aside from their individual significance, Articles 2, 3 and 5 will have an optimal effect
due especially to their mutual relationship. After all, achieving complete equality before
the law and implementing a policy to improve the position of women cannot contribute
effectively to eliminating all forms of discrimination against women if ideologies about
masculinity and femininity that oppress and exclude women are not subjected to discussion.
If this sub-aim is neglected, the exclusion mechanisms affecting women will continue to
exist.
On the other hand, few results can be expected from the attention focused on gender
stereotypes or image if this is not supported by concrete measures. Such measures may
include implementing strict rules for the male/female ratio in advisory bodies, or providing
financial support for women’s health care with the aim of integrating insights from this
endeavour into regular care.
The significance of Article 5
By discussing the three sub-aims separately, the Report Committee wants to emphasise
that Article 5 of the Convention, in addition to Articles 2 and 3, has independent signi-
ficance.16
According to Article 5, the government cannot stop after completing the first two sub-
aims. A fundamental change of society is essential, i.e. a change in ideas, values and
structures based on the female perspective. Article 5 can be read as an exhortation to
determine the exact content and scope of concepts and assumptions that are used in law
and policy. If this does not happen, the implementation of full equality before the law and
a policy to improve the position of women could sometimes have contrary effects. The
concepts and assumptions that are currently being used are often coloured by gender
stereotypical relationships and expectations. If these concepts and assumptions are included
15 TK, 1995-1996, 24 498, no. 3 p. 2. For that matter, this was not lived up to in the regulation for overtime
work supplements. According to the law, part-time workers do not have to be paid an overtime supplement
if they work less than 40 hours. For a more extensive discussion on this issue, see Holtmaat 1996.
16 The Convention begins with the obligation to provide equality before the law as an established fundamental
rights principle. After this, the obligation to implement an active policy to improve the position of women
is elaborated. It is only then that combating the dominant gender ideology is discussed. The Report Committee
believes that no order or priorities were established in this process.
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unchanged in new legislation or new policy, this will lead to unwitting and unintentional
reproduction of gender differences.17
The same danger threatens when policy directed at improving the position of women
is not carefully and deliberately included in general policy (‘mainstreaming’).
The implementation of full equality before the law or of measures to improve the
position of women must not lead to a disregard of biological differences or to women only
being given the opportunity to reach the same position as men. This negates the experiences
and needs of women who cannot be fitted into the male model of life that has been
dominant until now. Article 5 offers an outstanding opportunity to place pluriformity or
diversity at the core of the policy to improve the position of women.18
The Article does not provide standards which men and women must satisfy – with
the exception of breaking through the traditional role division. As a result, it creates the
possibility that dominant male norms are not assumed to be self-evident. In a number of
areas, this can mean that it is not equal rights or equal opportunities that must have priority,
but that different (or other) rights must be developed or different opportunities must be
offered.
2.1.3 The scope of the Convention
Article 1 defines discrimination as making a distinction as a result of which women’s
human rights or their rights in any other area are impaired or nullified. Seen in this way,
the Convention has a very broad scope. This implies that discrimination against women
is regarded as a ‘total phenomenon’ which occurs as a complex and structural problem
in all aspects of human existence. The Convention intervenes in not only the relationships
between government and citizens (the vertical relationships), but also the relationships
between citizens themselves (the horizontal relationships).
The literature on women’s emancipation19 and on the CEDAW Convention20 argues
that the Convention also covers the private lives of individuals.21 The Report Committee
agrees. It follows from this that the government’s interpretation at the time the Bill for
the Ratification of the Convention was debated in the First Chamber of Parliament, i.e.
that the Convention does not concern the private sphere, was incorrect.22
17 See Holtmaat 1988.
18 See Lijnzaad 1994. Since 1985, pluriformity has been the aim of the emancipation policy of the national
government. See also the Beleidsbrief Emancipatiebeleid 1997.
19 See notes 6 and 7 in Chapter 1, and the literature references in these books. (I.e.: Hes & Van Vleuten 1996
and Holtrust et al. 1996.)
20 In General Recommendation 19, violence against women within the family is cited as one of the most
treacherous forms of violence against women. General Recommendation 21 states explicitly that family
life is covered by the Convention; statutory rights, responsibilities and actual relationships in family life
must be safeguarded against discrimination against women in the broad sense of the Convention.
21 In the following, the terms private sphere and private life are used interchangeably.
22 EK, 1990-1991, 18950 (R 1281), no. 72a p. 9.
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There is a great deal of confusion about the concept of the private sphere or the private
lives of individuals, and about the question of the extent to which the government is allowed
to, or should, intervene on the grounds of Convention obligations and fundamental rights.
The distinction between a public and a private sphere can be applied in two different
ways.23
Firstly, the distinction can be used to denote the difference and the boundary between
the state sphere and civil society. This distinction concerns the difference between govern-
mental actors and nongovernmental actors. Secondly, the distinction can be used to denote
the difference and the boundary between the market and the family. The market is defined
as public productive life, or the world of paid labour and commerce. The family stands
for the private affective lives of individuals, the home environment or the personal
sphere.24
By applying the principle of non-discrimination not only to the government itself, but
also to horizontal relationships,25 the Convention undoubtedly aims at non-governmental
actors as well. Without question, various articles in the Convention and several General
Recommendations of the CEDAW Committee concern the relationships and responsibilities
within the family.
The discussion on this topic concerns the extent to which the government, while
implementing the Convention, can intervene in the ‘private affective lives’ of its subjects.
In other words, can the Dutch government carry out these Convention norms without
coming into conflict with the constitutional protection of private life?
The Dutch government has an increasing influence on the private lives of its citizens
by means of all kinds of legislation and facilities. Parental visiting rights, the regulation
of working hours in employment legislation, the Social Assistance Act and compulsory
education are a few examples of how the government can deeply affect the family lives
of individuals.26
The boundaries that limit where the government can and cannot interfere have been
frequently drawn in the past on ideological grounds. This often amounted to the interests
of men in particular being spared in the patriarchal society.
In recent decades, the women’s movement has brought these boundaries up for dis-
cussion. For example, by discussing violence and rape in the family and the consequences
of the economic independence of women and children, relationships within the family have
become a public matter. The growth of childcare, the increasing political interest in unpaid
23 See Van den Brink & Loenen 1996, p. 25.
24 Van den Brink & Loenen 1996 (p. 25) derived this distinction in turn from the American feminist legal
scholar Francis Olson (Olson 1993).
25 For an example, see Article 2: States parties ... agree ...(e) to take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women by any person, organisation or enterprise; …
26 Bussemaker 1995.
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care tasks and the current legal discourse on this topic show that major shifts have occurred
in the thinking about the boundaries between the public and private spheres.27
The way in which these boundaries were, and are, established, has to do (among other
things) with the degree with which a specific problem can be seen as a ‘natural’ factor.
As a result, it would appear that the government could not have any influence on such
problems. The biological gender as a determinant of human behaviour is one of the ‘natural’
factors that should lie outside the sphere of influence of the government. According to
this point of view, the government should not attempt to influence how male and female
individuals behave.28
It is especially important in relation to the third sub-aim that the government acknow-
ledge that there are no ‘natural’ factors in this regard, and that the boundaries between
what is (or what should be) private or public are socially and culturally determined. By
means of the norms in Article 5, the Convention places a weighty mandate on the govern-
ment to continuously bring these boundaries up for discussion.
The Convention refers to various policy areas that can influence the way in which
people relate, or come to relate, to each other in their personal relationships (see Section
4.5). The interest that migrant women and girls have in equal opportunities in education,
for instance by maintaining compulsory education, can serve as an example of such a policy
area. Although compulsory education erodes paternal power and the parental freedom –
based on religious or cultural grounds – to prevent girls from participating in education,
few people in the Netherlands would consider this measure as an unjustified violation of
the private sphere.29
The boundaries of government interference in private life are established in the classical
civil rights.30 These civil rights have their origin in protection against the power of the
government to prevent misuse of power and excessive influence on the choices and lifestyles
of individuals. The social civil rights have added an extra dimension to the protective and
restrained role of the government, i.e. that of supporting the individual during his or her
own development.
27 The Emancipation Council has recently focused a great deal of attention on this topic. The Council intends
to publish a report on this topic in the spring of 1997. See the theme issue of the periodical Nemesis, 1996
no. 3 concerning the legal discourse in family law on unpaid care tasks.
28 Van den Brink & Loenen 1996 (pp. 27 and 28) cite the example of parental leave: the government should
not exert any influence on whether or not men actually take this leave, or whether or not parents maintain
the stereotypical role division. However, by choosing a specific form of parental leave (i.e. a short-term
and unpaid leave), the government does indeed influence the way in which roles in the so-called private
sphere are divided between men and women. For that matter, the government as an employer has chosen
long-term paid (or partially paid) parental leave.
29 See Mulder 1995, p. 68: “Cultural customs, norms and values and institutions that are diametrically opposed
to the principle of equal treatment of these women, or which obstruct their free development, must therefore
be categorically rejected.”
30 The private lives of citizens are protected by, among other things, Articles 10-13 of the Dutch Constitution
and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
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Because the classical and social civil rights are becoming increasingly interwoven, the
contrast between the public sphere and the private sphere has become much less well-
defined.31 However, this does not mean that the civil right of ‘protection of private life’,
with its classical meaning of protection against government interference, is no longer
assigned any significance.32
Implementing a policy to improve the position of women and carrying out anti-discrim-
ination legislation – also if this establishes norms that intervene in the private lives of
people – does not in itself have to come into conflict with this constitutional protection.
It is only when the government exceeds certain boundaries as part of its monitoring
activities that there can be a conflict.
Another boundary to government interference in private life has to do with the funda-
mental discussion about the desirability or undesirability of the continually more far-
reaching legal discourse on human social interaction. This discussion is also taking place
in the women’s movement. There appears to be a consensus that the shift of the boundary
between public and private life must not go so far that public norms and public expectations
determine the entire personal lives of individuals. The norms that apply to social trans-
actions cannot be made equivalent to norms that apply to the most personal relations
between people.33
An example of a situation in which this friction is felt quite sharply is the obligation
to seek paid employment which has been imposed by social assistance legislation on single
parents with young children.
2.1.4 The Convention and the changing society
The Convention requires governments to implement equality before the law, to work on
improving the position of women and to break through the culture that is based on tradi-
tional role patterns and prejudices. The central point is to create the freedom to make one’s
own choices, to strive for a society with behaviour alternatives for women and men.
The State parties obligate themselves to contribute continuously to this dynamic process
of change. The Convention may be gradually implemented on a part-by-part basis. After
all, with the passing of time, new analyses and measures are continuously necessary.
The change process is even more dynamic because individuals and groups in society
are structuring their lives in different ways. They do this at differing rates and following
different paths. Generation differences, ethnic differences, differences in social environment,
education and access to the labour market all affect the starting positions and possibilities
31 Cook 1994 gives the example of a positive government obligation to protect family life: a divorce must
be attainable with government-financed legal assistance in the case of an alcoholic spouse (European Court
of Human Rights: Airey versus Ireland, decision based on Article 8 ECHR).
32 Rights such as the inviolability of the home and the protection of the confidentiality of the mail have not
lost any of their value.
33 Van Asperen 1991.
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for change. A dynamic situation is also created by changes in technological and economic
conditions.
There must be good channels between society and government to ensure that the
position, needs and viewpoints of all women are taken into account in policy. Moreover,
research and international exchange remain important instruments to understand the change
process, which has a world-wide dimension, and to conceive of adequate government
interventions.
The complexity of the context in which the Convention will be implemented is not,
however, a licence for a type of implementation that would be limited to creating minimal
conditions and a minimal rate of change. But it does require permanent attention to the
process of change in society.
An example of the above is the increasing attention that has been paid in recent years
by the women’s movement and the government to the development of a policy for increas-
ing behaviour alternatives for men. This includes the implementation of parental leave
and other career interruptions, and the right to part-time work. Based on a dynamic inter-
pretation of the Convention, such a shift of attention could lead to new types of implementa-
tion measures. A pre-condition for carrying out such a policy that also focuses on men
is – in the light of the Convention – that an improvement in the position of women is also
intended.
The so-called 1990 Measure is an example of a differentiated policy concerning the
position of women, which takes account of the possibilities of the various generations.
The same applies to the intended elimination of breadwinner’s provisions in tax legis-
lation.34
This type of measure theoretically reduces the financial support for the traditional, care-
giving role of the woman and, in the light of the Convention, is therefore acceptable only
if it does not result in a worsening of the position of women. This is only the case when
the measure links up with the changes in behaviour of men and women and with concrete
changes in society that have already taken place.
In the example of the 1990 Measure, this means that there must be actual equal oppor-
tunities on the labour market. In the other example, this means that the care needs of society
must be adequately provided for without this continuing to lead to the economic dependence
of the caregiver on a partner.35
In recent decades, age criteria in legislation and policy have been increasingly applied
in the Netherlands. A study of the relevant literature shows that there is a relationship
between age as a structuring principle and the position of women in society. The use of
34 The discussion took place as a result of the Member’s Bill of De Korte and Van Rey (Members of Parlia-
ment), TK 1992-1993, 23 231. (Note RH: The 1990-measure entails a gradual abolishment of breadwinner
provisions in social security for generations of people who are born after 1990.)
35 The Women’s Alliance, other women’s organisations and the Emancipation Council are therefore critical
of these types of measures.
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age criteria can have various effects on men and women, so that the use of these criteria
can result in indirect discrimination against women.36
In the anthology Zwarte, migranten- en vluchtelingenvrouwen en het VN-Vrouwenverdrag
(Black, migrant and refugee women and the UN Women’s Convention), the emancipation
of women from non-dominant population groups is placed in the collective framework
of the Race Convention and the Women’s Convention. Human dignity is the basic principle
of both Conventions. A consequence of this notion of human dignity is the fundamental
right to the formation of one’s own identity. The identity formation of every individual
begins with one’s own cultural heritage and takes place in relation to the entire society
within which one moves.37
The cultural background of individuals will partly determine the way in which they
use the new freedoms in the changing society. The cultural background of black, migrant
and refugee women is much less known and is much less understood than that of the
traditionally existing communities in a country. The creation of a multicultural society,
as a significant aspect of the context of Convention implementation, means that the im-
migrant cultural communities – in addition to the native ones – will be acknowledged and
taken seriously.38
2.2 Obligations for the government
During the ratification procedure, the government suggested that State parties must eliminate
discrimination with all means available to them.39 However, no concept of the means
to be used can be derived from the explanation in the Bill for the Ratification of the
Convention. The government describes applicable legislation, bills, policy and planned
policy based on the Convention Articles. Sometimes a situation of inequality is ascertained
without any policy plans concerning the matter being suggested, such as the lesser oppor-
tunities for women to obtain bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial credit.40
2.2.1 All appropriate measures
The way in which the aims of the Convention should be achieved has been worked out
in a series of Convention articles that concern one or several related policy areas such as
labour, healthcare and education. Every article states that all appropriate measures must
be taken in the relevant area. Some of the articles then list concrete measures, which have
36 See Emancipatieraad 1995.
37 Mulder 1997.
38 The government acknowledges the great importance of the fact that we live in a pluriform and multicultural
society. See the Beleidsbrief Emancipatiebeleid 1997.
39 TK 1984-1985, 18950, Memorie van Toelichting p.3.
40 TK 1984-1985, 18950 Memorie van Toelichting p. 26, elaborated in: TK 1995-1996, 24 406 no.2, Section
3 under b. Recently, policy has been made on this point. See Ministry of Economic Affairs 1996.
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been worked out in a series of General Recommendations of the CEDAW Committee. The
Convention does not provide an exhaustive account of measures.
From the repeated phrase, “all appropriate measures must be taken”, it follows that
first an optimal effort is demanded, and second that there must be measures which result
in the intended effect.
A broad range of means can be used for this purpose; these include economic instru-
ments such as subsidies and tariffs, the instrument of legislation and regulation (including
enforcement) and the instrument of information transfer, which includes all activities
focusing on communication.
This means that they must be used in any case as soon as it is plausible that they are
essential for an optimal result.
The suggestions from the CEDAW Committee are very important for answering the
question: which measures can be considered to be appropriate? The Committee’s ideas
are clearly visible in the discussion from the first (or initial) Dutch Country Report on
the Convention. At that time, the CEDAW Committee proposed in its Concluding Comments
that the Dutch government should aim for more result-oriented measures concerning the
employment of women. Such measures included positive action, equal pay and childcare.
The Netherlands was then supposed to report the results of such measures to the Commit-
tee.41 The Report, Het Vrouwenverdrag in de Nederlandse rechtsorde (The Women’s
Convention in the Dutch legal system) ascertained, based on the discussion concerning
the first Country Report on the Netherlands, that the appropriate measures had to be based
on a solid analysis of the position of women and that data about the effectiveness of the
measures taken must be made available.
Regarding general government policy, the effect of this policy on the position of women
must be acknowledged. In General Recommendation 6, the CEDAW Committee proposed
establishing and strengthening a ‘national machinery’, institutions and procedures to provide
advice about the expected effects. With the term national machinery, the Committee means
infrastructural facilities within the governmental apparatus for the development of policy
to improve the position of women. To benefit such an effective, advisory ‘national machin-
ery’
· there must be intensive monitoring of the position of women,
· all causes of discrimination must be ascertained and
· all institutions must be supported when developing strategies and measures to eliminate
discrimination.
The concept of ‘appropriate’ therefore implies a permanent investment in very specific
pre-policy research, evaluations and advisory services (Gender Impact Assessments) and
monitoring and evaluating the results of measures. Target figures are one outstanding means
to operate in a result-oriented fashion. Another important means is an open link and mutual
41 See Appendix to TK 1993-1994, 18950 (R 1281), no. 14.
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interaction between the women’s movement and the government with the aim of promoting
the necessary policy input and innovation.
The influence of the women’s movement can increase the effectiveness of the policy
and therefore must be part of the preparations to determine all appropriate measures; this
was a conclusion in the first Dutch Country Report to the CEDAW Committee.
2.2.2 Effort and result
The aim to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women entails an obligation to
take concrete action. This means much more than an obligation to exert effort. The Conven-
tion focuses on bringing about concrete results, i.e. actually improving the position of
women.
During the parliamentary discussion of the Bill for the Ratification of the Convention,
there was an incorrect impression that the realisation of the Convention, both as a whole
and regarding the individual obligations, would largely be left to the policy freedom of
the State parties.42 This idea urgently requires correction on both the government side
and the parliamentary side. The Convention comprises a larger number of more concrete
obligations than had been assumed during the parliamentary discussion of the Bill for the
Ratification of the Convention.
The interpretation of individual articles and parts of articles must be in agreement with
what is called the ‘object and purpose’ of the Convention.
It is striking that no distinction is made between civil/political rights and social, cultural
and economic rights; in the Convention these rights flow into each other and supplement
each other. This is related to the fact that the rights are described from the position of
women for whom this distinction is much less relevant.43 For the interpretation, one can
refer to the Convention text itself, which first formulates the Convention obligations in
general terms (Articles 1 through 5) and then in thematic terms and for individual policy
areas.
In the relevant legal literature, specific obligations have meanwhile taken concrete form,
and the CEDAW Committee has also more precisely defined several Convention obligations
in its General Recommendations.44 The Convention offers limited policy freedom, which
varies from provision to provision and which depends on the tangibility of the provision
in question. The more precise and concrete the formulation, the less policy freedom the
government has during implementation, and the greater the judicial enforceability.
42 This misconception arose from the idea that the Convention would contain only instruction norms that would
serve as a guideline for government policy, where the government would be given maximum policy freedom.
43 There is a reference to a general ’Bill of Rights’ of women that is contrary to the classical categories of
human rights into two separate categories of rights. The enforceability is therefore unrelated to the category
to which the relevant right belongs.
44 Refer to the literature cited in note 2 from this chapter. In addition, two working documents in the report
from Hes & Van Vleuten 1996 are important: Ascher-Vonk 1994 and Betten & Westerveld 1994.
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For example, the provisions on participation (Article 7) and parts of the provisions
on education (Article 10) and employment (Article 11) are formulated in such a concrete
fashion that they do not allow any space to the government. At the same time, this means
that these provisions are judicially enforceable.
2.2.3 Gradual implementation
The State parties are under the duty to achieve demonstrable progress when implementing
the Convention; the CEDAW Convention requires a periodic report about whether or not
there has been progress. The evaluation is relative; more policy and different policy is
expected from a developed country than a developing country. As far as the Convention
is concerned, the developed countries must apply mutual ‘standards of comparison’. In
other words, the position of women in the Netherlands should be compared with other
developed countries such as the Scandinavian countries, England, Germany and France,
but not with South American or Asian countries.45
Because the legislator was aware of the dynamic character of the developments that
the Convention aims for, no final deadline for approval was named. On the other hand,
the time that a State party is allowed to meet its Convention obligations in good faith can
not be arbitrarily extended by appealing to this dynamic character. The principle of ‘good
faith interpretation’ is opposed to such arbitrary extensions. The possibility of implementa-
tion must be evaluated for each Convention provision and with an eye to the mutual
coherence of the Convention obligations. Of course, some difference in insight is possible,
but in general the Convention contains clear political tasks that must be commenced with
appropriate care and appropriate speed.
In any case, it is essential that implementation is begun. The government should have
taken the initial steps on the way to implementing the various Convention obligations.
Moreover, the minimum norm, which is at the heart of the individual provisions, must
be assured from the beginning. Both of these requirements can be tested in court, and the
State of the Netherlands can be held accountable in an international forum, such as the
Human Rights Committee of the United Nations or the CEDAW Committee.
In concrete terms this means that the obligation to include bans on discrimination in
legislation must be followed in any case. Legislative activities that intend to eliminate direct
or indirect discrimination in legislation cannot be delayed. Such activities include the
completion of the legislative operation Anders geregeld (‘Different regulations’; i.e different
for men and women) and the modification of legislation with an indirect discriminatory
character.
In addition, an immediate beginning must be made with the implementation of those
parts of the Convention that are formulated in such a clear and precise fashion that no
one can doubt their meaning. Such measures include establishing a network of childcare
45 In this regard, the Convention links up with the practice of the European Social Charter. See Hes & Van
Vleuten 1996, p. 191.
Appendix 153
facilities (Article 12c) and creating an adequate ‘national machinery’ (General Recommenda-
tion 6).
Following the accession to the Convention, an appeal to scarce means to delay or avoid
the realisation of specific obligations will no longer be possible. A State party can be held
responsible for the measures that it should have taken in view of its economic position.
It is clear that measures which in practice mean a worsening of the position of women
are in conflict with the Convention.46
The degree of equality allowed by the Convention is essentially tested on a substantive
basis. A great deal depends on the nature of the wording of the provision and on the
framework within which the provision is implemented. This means that the courts will
be able to test the policy or the lack of policy under specific conditions. In any case, the
term within which gradual realisation is possible must be reasonable. When making a
judgement, it is plausible that the courts will take into consideration the fact that the
Netherlands has spent more than 10 years in the ratification procedure.47
2.2.4 The relationship with EU law; the example of positive action and affirmative
action
The Women’s Convention contains a flexibly formulated possibility to institute affirmative
action (Article 4). Although the Convention does not generally obligate State parties to
institute affirmative action, under certain conditions this measure is part of the package
of ‘all appropriate measures’ that may be essential in a specific policy area or specific
sector. At the same time it is important to not allow the more flexible possibilities of the
Women’s Convention, and also the current painstaking Dutch policy, to be excessively
limited by a formal legal approach to equality. The current debate in the European Union
about a possible amendment to the second EC Directive concerning the equal treatment
of men and women – resulting from the decision of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities in the case Kalanke-Bremen – shows that this danger is not imaginary.48
The Dutch government, represented by Minister Melkert of the Ministry of Social Affairs
and Employment, stated that it attaches great value to the enforcement, or the possibility
of enforcement, of Dutch policy. A Cabinet Memorandum on this matter was approved
by the Second Chamber of Parliament.49 The Report Committee supports the position
of the Dutch Government in the European discussion, although we believe it could be some-
46 See Coomans 1992, pp. 42-43 and “Limburg Principles”, UN Doc. E/CN 4/1987/17 published in Human
Rights Quarterly 9 (1987).
47 A role has been played in this long approval process by the fact that the Parliament wanted to realise as
many Convention obligations as possible before actually approving the Convention. Member of Parliament
Kalsbeek in Handelingen II, 26 June 1990, TK, p. 4620. Goedkeuringswet: TK 1986-1987, 18 9050 (R
1281).
48 Court of Justice of the European Communities, 17 October 1995: Kalanke-Bremen, C-450/93.
49 Letter dated 21 December 1995 from the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment and others to the Chair
of the Second Chamber of Parliament, TK 1995-1996, 24564, no. 1.
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what more assertive.50 In this context, the Committee quotes with permission from the
written contribution of the Equal Treatment Commission to its inquiry about the imple-
mentation of the Convention:
“The developments in the area of equal treatment appear at the Community level to have stagnated
somewhat. A recent study has shown that actual enforcement of equal treatment norms in the
Member States has resulted in many problems. The Netherlands could, partly in view of the
obligations resulting from the Women’s Convention, also make efforts at this level to bring about
change. This obligation to take action can also be satisfied by providing a Dutch contribution to
the development of case law by the European Court of Justice concerning cases pending before
the Court; strikingly little use has been made of this possibility to intervene. (Note RH: by way
of sending an opinion on behalf of the government.) By making such a contribution, the Netherlands
could participate in an interpretation of Community law that is in accordance with the CEDAW
Convention by involving the Convention in the interpretation.”
The Report Committee concurs with the above recommendation. An active approach within
the EC is compatible with the obligation from the Women’s Convention to achieve optimal
regulations for equal treatment and to take all appropriate measures that can lead to the
elimination of discrimination, including horizontal discrimination.51
2.2.5 Which level of government is responsible?
It has emerged from the literature on international law that the government as a whole,
with all its institutions and agencies, is responsible and can be held responsible. The
national government can give shape to its concern for the implementation of the Convention
in many ways, such as by having concrete aspects of Convention obligations be imple-
mented by local governments or government agencies.
This does not take away from the fact that the national government is primarily respons-
ible, and remains primarily responsible, because it acts on behalf of the Netherlands as
one of the State parties to the Convention. In this way the national government must
monitor progress under all conditions, maintain an infrastructure for appropriate implementa-
tion, must administer and coordinate, and must report to the CEDAW Committee
During the discussion of the Bill for the Ratification of the Convention, the government
was of the opinion that it was scarcely responsible for the emancipation content of the
policy of local governments. It rejected a proposal from D66 (the Liberal Democratic party)
50 See the Verslag van de Sociale Raad, 2 December 1996, enclosed with the letter dated 13 December 1996
sent to the Chair of the Second Chamber of Parliament. TK 1996-1997, 21501-18, no. 60, Section 4: Richtlijn
Kalanke (equal treatment of men and women concerning access to the labour market).
51 From this perspective the Report Committee urged that the coordinating Minister for Emancipation Policy
ensure that the Netherlands in March/April 1997 provide an oral contribution to the hearing of the Court
of Justice of the European Communities of the Marschall case, in which, as a sequel to the Kalanke case,
a preliminary decision with respect to the application of affirmative treatment of women must be made.
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to negotiate with local governments about its obligations under the Convention. The Report
Committee believes the government was too restrained on this point.
2.3 Effect in the legal system
After the ratification procedure in the 1980s and the Act for Ratification of the Convention
came into force in 1991, there has been a significant shift in ideas among international
law experts and in the practice of law about the way in which the Convention or individual
Convention provisions affect the Dutch legal system. In the Explanatory Memorandum
to the Bill for Ratification of the Convention, the government still held the opinion that
there could scarcely be any direct effect in view of the fact that the Convention requires
a gradual realisation of its aims. At the present time, fewer restrictions are assigned to
the possibility to have direct effect.52 A significant consensus has been attained in recent
decades on the issue of the extent to which the Convention aims to affect horizontal
relations.
2.3.1 Direct effect
Will it be possible in the future, or near future, to have the courts compel the Dutch
government to provide sufficient childcare on the basis of the Convention?53
Such a question reaches deeply into the issue of the direct effect of the Convention.
Whether or not there is a direct effect is in the end entirely up to the judgement of the
courts. The courts tend to apply fundamental Convention norms directly or to not enforce
Dutch legislation if there is a conflict with Convention rights – especially if more time
has passed since the signing or the date the document went into force.54 An analysis of
the relevant jurisprudence shows that Dutch courts have developed various routes along
which they can assign a broad application to Articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitu-
tion.55 The courts derive their instructions from the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
of the Netherlands and from interpretations developed by international courts or supervisory
bodies (like the CEDAW Committee). The courts also use insights that have been developed
52 See the comments on the individual Convention articles in Heringa, Hes & Lijnzaad 1994.
53 Dierx 1996.
54 Compare the developments concerning Article 26 of the ICCPR, which initially also did not have a direct
effect, but which gradually acquired this due to court judgements.
55 See Heringa 1990.
Article 93 of the Constitution: Provisions of conventions or treaties and of decrees of international law
organisations, the substance of which is obligatory to all parties, have a binding force as soon as they are
officially announced.
Article 94 of the Constitution: Statutory provisions that are valid in the Kingdom of the Netherlands are
not enforceable if this enforcement is not compatible with all binding provisions of conventions and decrees
of international law organisations.
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in the literature on international law concerning various types of norms in international
Human Rights Conventions and their implications for national legal systems.
The instructions from the Supreme Court are very generally formulated and in them-
selves do not prevent assigning a direct effect of the Women’s Convention or individual
articles from the Convention. The court review can vary from a marginal review, where
a large degree of policy freedom for the government implementing the Convention is
accepted, to a very strict review, where virtually no deviation from the Convention’s norms
is allowed.
Because it is generally accepted that the Women’s Convention comprises obligations
to attain results, a strict court review appears obvious, also in areas where policy freedom
concerning the choice of means to implement the Convention is assumed.
According to the degree the government is in default concerning the implementation
of Convention provisions, or the longer it remains in default, it can be held increasingly
responsible by the courts for this default. In the meantime, experts in international law
have made an estimate for various Convention provisions of the probability that these
provisions can or will be directly applied if they are invoked during judicial procedures.56
According to expectations, in the near future more and more case law will be elicited
on the basis of which the magnitude of the government’s responsibilities can be mapped
out more clearly.
2.3.2 Horizontal effect
The possibility of there being a direct effect of specific Convention provisions is usually
emphasised when the vertical relation between government and citizens is addressed. This
is significantly more difficult concerning the horizontal relations between citizens them-
selves. With respect to norms, after all, the majority of Convention provisions are directed
at the government.
However, Article 2 of the Convention stipulates that the duty rests on the government
to actively ensure that the principle of non-discrimination is followed, also in the mutual
relations between citizens. As a result, the national government is required, where possible,
to assign a horizontal effect to the Convention. To the extent the principle of non-discrim-
ination is directly threatened, a direct effect must be derived from the norms of the Conven-
tion, also between citizens themselves (see Section 2.1.3 on the scope of the Convention).
56 See the comments on the individual articles of the Convention in Heringa, Hes & Lijnzaad 1994.
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2.3.3 The influence of the Convention norms on Dutch law
The Convention norms may also affect national law directly or indirectly.57 This can
happen because the courts, when supplementing concepts in Dutch law, take account of
the Convention norms and ‘read them in’, as it were, into national law. A faithful Conven-
tion implementation requires this openness from the Dutch legal system for the interpreta-
tion of its own law in accordance with the Convention. It is especially the so-called open
concepts in law, such as reasonableness and fairness, or good employment practice, that
can serve as a vehicle with which the Convention is brought into force in legal practice.
For example, the norm derived from Article 11, which states that women have the right
to special protection against hazardous work during pregnancy (Article 11, 2, d), could
stipulate that an employer who neglects to take adequate measures in this regard does not
satisfy the norm of ‘good employment practice’ from the Civil Code.
A concrete example of the effect of applying the instrument of interpretation in
conformance with the Convention is the Dekker-VJV judgement of the European Court
of Justice. In this judgement it became clear that Dutch law with respect to tort is sub-
stantively determined by the ban on discrimination from the second EC Directive on the
equal treatment of men and women.58
This form of ‘interpretation in accordance with the Convention’ can play a role in both
vertical and horizontal relations. If this mechanism is to maintain its optimal effect, then
the courts must be well informed about the norms established by the Convention. This
requires that the courts be adequately informed about such aspects as the content of the
new General Recommendations of the CEDAW Committee.
2.3.4 Enforcement and compliance
Various instruments are important for enforcing the Convention: reviews of legislation
and policy, progress reports, court reviews and information provision.
Reviews of legislation and policy
The Convention is directed initially at the State parties. This means that enforcement is
primarily in the hands of the government itself, which can continuously include a review
of legislation and policy as it is formed to assure that it is in accordance with the Conven-
tion. The legal literature is clear on this point; the principle of equality, which is worked
out by the Convention with respect to discrimination against women, weighs so heavily
that every deviation from this principle in legislation or regulations (proposed or in force)
57 In the relevant literature it is assumed that the same can happen with respect to international law. This
mechanism (the inclusion of provisions in another treaty or convention) plays a role, for example, with
respect to Article 26 of the ICCPR; this general, non-discrimination provision can acquire more substance
afterwards due to the much more detailed provisions in the Women’s Convention.
58 HvJ van de EG, Dekker-VJV Centrum, 8 Nov. 1990, RN 1991, no. 132 and HR Dekker-VJV Centrum,
24 June 1988, NJ 1988, 1002, as well as HR 13 Sept. 1991, RvdW 1991, 193.
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must be explained in the explanatory memorandum attached to such legislation or regula-
tions.59 The explanation and/or justification of a distinction that is made to the disad-
vantage of groups or individuals who are systematically being discriminated against, and
partly as a result are even more vulnerable, must meet more rigorous demands than the
explanation and/or justification of a distinction that is to the disadvantage of dominant
groups (Caucasians, men, heterosexuals).60 The courts are authorised to review legislation
and regulations on this point. By not providing an explanation, or by providing an in-
adequate explanation, the legislator runs a certain risk:
“If an inadequate explanation of unequal treatment cannot be found in the judicial history and
is not put forward in the court procedure, and if the court, moreover, rules that such an
explanation ‘cannot be indicated’ (see HR 30-9-1992, AB 1993, 2), then the court can decide
to not enforce the relevant provision (...).”61
This also applies to deviations from the Convention. Therefore the Explanatory Memo-
randum for every Bill for which this is relevant must contain a section that explains why
the proposed legislation is in agreement with the principle of legal certainty, the principle
of equality and other constitutional or civil rights.62 This obligation to provide an explana-
tion could be included in Chapter 4 of the Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving (a handbook
for government officials about how to draft legislation). Regarding the Women’s Conven-
tion, there could be a reference to the checklist that is included in the conclusion of the
Report The Women’s Convention in the Dutch Legal System.63 For that matter, if govern-
ment legislative officials are expected to conduct this review, it is important that familiarity
with the content and scope of the Convention is promoted within the national government.
During the review, which according to the Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving must
be conducted beforehand concerning the question of whether or not government regulations
are desirable (and if so, how desirable), the necessity or desiribility of making a Gender
Impact Assessment (in advance) can be brought up for discussion in several places in the
Explanatory Memorandum to a Bill.
Finally, during the development of monitoring as a policy instrument, it is important
that the obligations from the Convention are emphatically converted into points of reference
and elements of the framework for legal review.64
59 See Waaldijk 1994, p. 157 and p. 345. See also Hes & Van Vleuten 1996, p. 116.
60 Waaldijk 1994, p. 347.
61 Waaldijk 1994, p. 355.
62 Waaldijk 1994, p. 382.
63 Hes & Van Vleuten, pp. 238-239. It is also important to explicitly name the Women’s Convention as part
of the explanation of Aanwijzing 18.
64 See Beleidsbrief Emancipatiebeleid 1997, Section 1.3.
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Progress reports
At the international level, compliance with the Women’s Convention is promoted by the
obligation to submit a Country Report every four years to the supervisory committee of
the CEDAW (= CEDAW Committee). This obligation is included in Article 18 of the Conven-
tion. The report to the CEDAW Committee must indicate which legislative, judicial, ad-
ministrative or other measures have been taken to implement the Convention and what
progress has been made with respect to the previous Report. The Netherlands produced
its first (initial) Country Report in 1992.
From the Concluding Comments on the Country Reports, it appears that the CEDAW
Committee expects a concrete summary of legislation and policy with the accompanying
information (in figures) concerning progress and effects. The Committee requests countries,
if there is inadequate insight provided in one or more areas, to provide more information
in a subsequent Report.
In the Netherlands, as proposed by the Second Chamber of Parliament, the obligation
has been included in the Act for the Ratification of the Convention to report to the Parlia-
ment one year before every Country Report is sent to the CEDAW Committee. The Second
Chamber of Parliament wished to remain involved with the implementation of the Conven-
tion and wanted to have the possibility to exert influence on the reporting to the CEDAW
Committee (see Chapter 1).
Court reviews
During the enforcement of the Women’s Convention, national courts play an important
role. The Convention prescribes that the principle of equal treatment and protection against
discrimination should be achieved in part through the authorised national courts. Moreover,
the national courts can review legislation and policy, and norms from the Convention can
be gradually included in the practice of law.
In the relevant literature, there are strong arguments for an individual right of complaint,
as this exists with many United Nations Conventions. For example, violations of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can be brought by individual citizens
before the Human Rights Committee.
A similar right of complaint to a United Nations Committee with respect to the
Women’s Convention can strengthen international monitoring of compliance with the
Convention and contribute to the continuing interpretation of the Convention provisions.
Decisions resulting from such a complaint procedure can then be applied directly by the
national courts. Individuals, groups and organisations must be able to file complaints about
violations of the Convention. The complaint procedure must concern all provisions of the
Convention.
In the Spring of 1996, a separate working group developed a draft version for an
Optional Protocol concerning a right of complaint during the annual meeting of the Com-
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mission on the Status of Women of the United Nations. The Netherlands was in favour
of such an Optional Protocol.65
Information provision
The implementation of the Convention will stand or fall based on knowledge of the
Convention obligations. Proper familiarity with the Convention among legislators, policy
makers, practising lawyers and the general public is also a vital part of the enforcement
process.
In General Recommendation 10, the CEDAW Committee, as part of the 10 year anniver-
sary of the Convention, requests that familiarity with the Convention be increased by
holding conferences, seminars, publicity campaigns and distributing relevant documents
in the national language of the State parties. NGOs must be encouraged to distribute informa-
tion about the Convention and its implementation.
Until now the Netherlands has not taken any steps to increase the familiarity of the
general public with the Convention.
65 According to the report of the Dutch delegation to the 40th session of the Commission on the Status of
Women from 11 to 21 March 1996, there is, in principle, broad support for a complaint procedure that
comprises all provisions of the Convention. Problems can be expected with respect to the review procedure
proposed by the CEDAW Committee, which would also be included in the Optional Protocol. (Translator’s
note: the Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the UN
on 15 October 1999. The Netherlands have acceded to it on 22 May 2002.)
LITERATURE REFERENCES TO THE REPORT
THE WOMEN’S CONVENTION IN THE NETHERLANDS IN 1997
Asperen, Van 1991
T. van Asperen, Bedreigd burgerschap, Dr. J.M. den Uyl-lecture, Amsterdam: 20 December
1991. (Unpublished.)
Asscher-Vonk 1994
I. Asscher-Vonk, De betekenis van het Vrouwenverdrag voor het nationale arbeidsrecht, (Working
paper A in the framework of the report by J.C. Hes & C.E. Van Vleuten 1996. Unpublished.)
The Hague: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 1994.
Betten & Westerveld 1994
L. Betten & M. Westerveld, De betekenis van het Vrouwenverdrag voor het nationale sociale
zekerheidsstelsel. (Working paper B in the framework of the report by J.C. Hes & C.E. Van
Vleuten 1996. Unpublished.) The Hague: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 1994.
Brink, Van den & Loenen 1996
M. van den Brink & T. Loenen, ‘Publiek/privé revisited. Internationaal recht en vrouwen’, in:
Nemesis Essays. Vrouwenrechten, mensenrechten, March 1996, p. 23-40.
Bussemaker 1995
J. Bussemaker, ‘Individualisering als paradox’, in: Nemesis Essays. Publiek geheim, January
1995, p. 31-44.
Cook 1994
Rebecca J. Cook, ‘International human rights law. The way forward’, in: Rebecca J. Cook (ed.),
Human rights of women. National and international perspectives, Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press 1994, p. 3-36.
Coomans 1992
A.P.M. Coomans, De internationale bescherming van het recht op onderwijs, Leiden: Stichting
NJCM-Boekerij 1992.
Dierx 1996
J. Dierx, ‘Marktgedrag in de kinderopvang’, Nemesis 1996, p. 133-135.
Emancipatieraad 1995
Emancipatieraad (Emancipation Council), Advies oudere vrouwen. Sekse telt, The Hague 1995.
Emancipatieraad 1996
Emancipatieraad (Emancipation Council), Zwarte, migranten- en vluchtelingenvrouwen en het
VN-Verdrag, The Hague/Amsterdam: Emancipation Council and the Clara Wichmann Institute
1996.
162 Literature references to the report
Heringa 1990
A.W. Heringa, ‘Van de Europese Conventie tot de Nederlandse constitutie voor de Rechten van
de Mens’, in: A.W. Heringa et al, 40 jaar EVRM. Opstellen over de ontwikkeling van het EVRM
in Straatsburg en in Nederland 1950-1990, Leiden: Stichting NJCM-Boekerij 1990, p. 339-356.
Hes & Van Vleuten 1996
J.C. Hes & C.E. Van Vleuten, Het Vrouwenverdrag in de Nederlandse rechtsorde, The Hague:
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 1996.
Holtmaat 1988
R. Holtmaat, ‘Naar een ander recht’, Nemesis 1988, p. 3-13.
Holtmaat 1996
Rikki Holtmaat, ‘Deeltijdwerk, gelijkheid en gender. Een beschouwing naar aanleiding van de
zaak Helmig inzake overwerktoeslagen voor deeltijdwerkers, Nemesis 1996, p. 4-17.
Holtrust et al 1996
N. Holtrust, A.C. Hendriks & D.M.J. Bauduin (eds.), De betekenis van artikel 12 Vrouwenverdrag
voor Nederland. Gezondheid als recht, The Hague: Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
1996.
Interdepartementale Projectgroep Beeldvorming 1996
Rapport Interdepartementale projectgroep beeldvorming (Report of the Interdepartmental Project
Group on Gender Image Formation), Taal en beeldvorming over vrouwen en mannen, The Hague:
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science & Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (DCE)
1996.
Keuzenkamp & Teunissen 1990
S. Keuzenkamp & A. Teunissen, Emancipatie ten halve geregeld, The Hague: Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment 1990.
Loenen 1992
T. Loenen, Verschil in Gelijkheid. De conceptualisering van het juridisch gelijkheidsbeginsel
met betrekking tot vrouwen en mannen in Nederland en de Verenigde Staten (Diss. Leiden),
Zwolle: Tjeenk-Willink 1992.
Loenen 1993
T. Loenen, Voorkeursbehandeling of gewoon sociaal beleid?, NJB 1993, p. 403-407
Loenen 1994
T. Loenen, ‘Het discriminatiebegrip’, in: A.W. Heringa, J. Hes & E. Lijnzaad (eds.), Het
Vrouwenverdrag. Een beeld van een verdrag, Antwerpen/Apeldoorn: Maklu, p. 1-14.
Lijnzaad 1994
E. Lijnzaad, ‘Over rollenpatronen en de rol van het Verdrag’, in: A.W. Heringa, J. Hes & E.
Lijnzaad (eds.), Het Vrouwenverdrag. Een beeld van een verdrag, Antwerpen/Apeldoorn: Maklu,
p. 43-57.
Maarseveen, van, Pessers & Gunning 1987
H. Van Maarseveen, D. Pessers & M.J. Gunning (eds.), Internationaal recht en vrouwen (Deel
1 Commentaren), Zwolle: Tjeenk-Willink 1987.
Ministerie EZ 1996 (Ministry of Economic Affairs)
Ministerie van Economische Zaken, De economische kracht van vrouwen. Emancipatienota van
het ministerie van Economische Zaken 1995-1998, The Hague 1996.
Literature references to the report 163
Ministerie SZW 1992
Ministerie van SZW, Eerste Nederlandse rapportage aan het VN-Comité voor de uitbanning
van discriminatie van vrouwen, The Hague November 1992. (The first report of the Netherlands
to the UN Committee for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women).
Mulder 1995
L. Mulder, ‘Migrantenrechten en mensenrechten. Het maagdenvlies het ziekenfonds uit?’, in:
Nemesis Essays, januari 1995, p. 61-80.
Mulder 1997
L. Mulder, ‘Recht voor één is geen recht voor allen. Emancipatierechten voor zwarte, migranten-
en vluchtelingenvrouwen’, Nemesis 1997, p. 4-13.
Olson 1993
Francis Olson, ‘International Law. Feminist critiques of the public/private distinction’, in: D.G.
Dallmeyer (ed.), Reconceiving reality. Women and international law, Washington: American
Society of International Law 1993.
Rehof 1993
Lars Adam Rehof, Guide to the Traveax préparatoires of the United nations Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Dordrecht/Boston/London:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993.
Sevenhuijsen 1996
Selma Sevenhuijsen, Oordelen met zorg, Meppel: Boom 1996.
Vlemminx 1996
Vlemminx, ‘Het juridisch tekort van de sociale grondrechten in de Grondwet’, NJB 1996, p.
1201-1205.
Waaldijk 1994
K. Waaldijk, Motiveringsplichten van de wetgever (diss.), Lelystad: Vermande 1994.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Rikki Holtmaat is a freelance researcher and consultant in the field of equal treatment
and non-discrimination law. She is also a (part time) professor in European Non-Discrimina-
tion Law at the University of Leiden, the Netherlands. Over the past years she has intensive-
ly studied the CEDAW Convention. In 1997 she was a member of the independent Committee
of experts that wrote the first National Report (Groenman Committee). Between 1999 and
2001 she was involved in the writing of a shadow report about the situation of women
in the Netherlands, which she presented to the CEDAW Committee in New York on behalf
of 23 Dutch women’s NGOs.
In 2000 she contributed materials about sexual harassment to the fourth in-depth study
on the impact of the Convention on Dutch law and policy in the field of violence against
women. In 2001 she acted as an expert for OSCE, in the process of implementation of the
Women’s Convention in several Eastern European and Central Asian countries. In 2001-
2002 she edited a book, published by E-Quality, on the meaning of the Women’s Conven-
tion in the context of a multicultural society. Together with the universities of Maastricht
and Utrecht she organised an expert conference in 2002 on Article 4(1) CEDAW about
positive action or affirmative action. The CEDAW-Committee used the outcomes of this
expert meeting to draft General Recommendation number 25, which was adopted in January
2004.
Further details about the activities and a list of publications of dr. Rikki Holtmaat can be
found at: www.rikkiholtmaat.nl

